University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Faculty Publications

Law School

Fall 2000

Products Liability: User Misconduct Defenses
David G. Owen
University of South Carolina - Columbia, dowen@law.sc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
David G. Owen, Products Liability: User Misconduct Defenses, 52 S.C.L.Rev. 1 (2000).

This Article is brought to you by the Law School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
USER MISCONDUCT DEFENSES
DAVID G. OwEN*
TRADITIONAL USER MISCONDUCT DEFENSES: AN OVERVIEW .......

3

A. Common Law .........................................
B. Reform Legislation .....................................

3
5

II. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ................................

9

I.

A. In General ...........................................

9

B. Warnings Cases ......................................

15

C. Children ............................................
D. Employees ...........................................
E. ContributoryNegligence as a Defense to Strict Liability
in Tort Claims ........................................
F. ContributoryNegligence as the Sole Proximate Cause
of an Accident ........................................

15
16
17
21

III. ASSUMPTION OF RISK .....................................
A. In General ..........................................
B. Knowledge andAppreciation ............................
C. Voluntary Encounter ..................................
D. Assumption ofRisk as a Defense to Strict Liability
in Tort Claims ........................................
E. Reform .............................................
F. Express Assumption ofRisk .............................
G. Fireman'srule .......................................

23

IV. MISUSE ................................................
A. In General ..........................................
B. Development of the DoctrineandAvailability
as a Bar to Various Liability Claims ......................
C. Misuse as a "Defense" andBurden ofPleadingand
Proof...............................................
D. The ForeseeabilityLimitation ...........................
E. Failureto Follow Warnings andInstructions ...............
F. ComparativeFault ....................................

45
45

23
26
31
36
39
42
44

47
49
51
55
57

0 2000 David G. Owen
* Carolina Distinguished Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. Another version
of this Article will appear as a chapter in 2 DAVID G. OWEN, M. STUART MADDEN & MARY J.
DAVIS, MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY (forthcoming 2000). Thanks to James
Callahan, Forrest Norvell, Stephanie Borsanyi, James Bums, Nikki Lee, and Mike Dimbauer for
research, editorial, and technical assistance. Thinking that Pat Hubbard's intimate, personal
familiarity with the subject of this Article, human fraility, might compromise his objectivity, I did
not seek his counsel.

2

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52: 1

V. DEFENSES TO WARRANTY CLAIMS ........................... 59

A. In General .................................... 59
B.

ContributoryNegligence andAssumption of Risk ...........

60

C.
D.
E.
F.

Misuse ..............................................
U.C.C.Article 2 ......................................
Express Warranty .....................................
ComparativeFault ....................................

62
63
67
68

VI. DEFENSES TO MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS .................... 71

A. In General .......................................... 71
B. JustifiabilityofReliance ................................ 73
C. Contributoryand ComparativeNegligence,
Assumption ofRisk, andMisuse .......................... 77
VII. CONCLUSION ............................................ 80

When a person is injured while using a product, the accident may be
attributable to some defect in the product. But even if a product is defective in
some respect, most product accidents are caused more by the consumer's risky
behavior in using the product than by the product's defective condition. In the
estimation of a former chairman of the Consumer Product Safety Commission,
"over 2/3 of all injuries related to consumer products have nothing to do with
the design or the performance ofthe product. They relate to the misuse or abuse
of the product."' If a product accident is caused in whole or in part by a user's
behavior that was by some measure improper, or that was informed and
voluntary, the manufacturer or other seller of a defective (or misrepresented)
product may avoid responsibility for some or all of the resulting damages. An
improper or deliberately risky use of a product which results in injury to the
rise to one or more of the traditional conduct (or
user often gives
"misconduct") 2 defenses,3 the subject of this Article.4
This Article examines the nature and effect of the traditional defenses
arising out of the plaintiff's misconduct, largely separate from the doctrine of
comparative fault which is treated in detail elsewhere.' First considered are the
traditional user misconduct defenses-contributory negligence, assumption of

1. Mary Fisk, An Interview with John Byington, 14 TRIAL, Feb. 1978, at 25, 25.
2. User conduct defenses normally involve "misconduct" in the sense of the user's failure
to conform to some standard of proper behavior. Although the conventional definitions of
product misuse and assumption of risk do not require a formal showing that the conduct was

"improper," the type of behavior that qualifies for both defenses ordinarily may be fairly
characterized as "misconduct." Accordingly, the terms "user conduct" and "user misconduct"
are interchanged throughout this Article.
3. See generally David G. Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiff's
Conduct, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 267 (1968); Dix W. Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use,
ContributoryNegligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93 (1972).
4. A user's conduct which results in injury to a third party may raise an issue of

superseding causation, a topic which is outside the scope of this Article.
5. The doctrine of comparative fault, an approach to plaintiff misconduct which cuts a
broad swathe across the law of torts and products liability, is examined fully elsewhere. See
generally 2 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY ch. 15
(forthcoming 2000)

[hereinafter 2

MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY]; VICTOR E.

(3d ed. 1994);
DEERE, COMPARATiVE FAuLT §§ 14:42-:48 (3d ed. 1996).
SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE §§ 11-1 to -8

HENRY WOODS & BETH
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risk, and product misuse. After an overview of these defenses in Part I,
contributory negligence is fully examined in Part II, assumption of risk in Part
III, and product misuse in Part IV. Misconduct defenses applicable to warranty
claims are considered in Part V, and those applicable to misrepresentation
claims are treated in Part VI. Because user misconduct in some form figures
prominently in a large proportion of products liability cases, this Article
concludes that a thorough understanding of the user misconduct defenses is
essential to lawyers litigating such cases.
I. TRADITIONAL USER MISCONDUCT DEFENSES: AN OVERVIEW
A. Common Law
The classic misconduct defenses to products liability negligence claims
have always been contributory negligence6 and assumption of risk.7 With the
advent of the modem doctrine of strict products liability in tort during the
1960s and 1970s,8 most jurisdictions added the new defense9 of product
"misuse."' While contributory negligence has remained the basic defense to
products liability claims grounded in negligence, mostjurisdictions in the latter
part of the twentieth century renamed the doctrine "comparative negligence,"
or "comparative fault," and changed its effect from barring a plaintiff's claim
altogether to reducing the plaintiff's damages proportionate to his or her fault.
In addition to defining the role of contributory negligence in mostjurisdictions,
comparative fault principles now to a large extent control the effect of
assumption of risk in many jurisdictions, and product misuse in a few
jurisdictions, as discussed below. Nevertheless, the traditional user misconduct
defenses still apply to products liability claims in the handful of states that
continue to reject the doctrine of comparative fault." Moreover, much of the
traditional doctrine surrounding contributory negligence, assumption of risk,
and product misuse has survived the conversion to comparative fault even

6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See 1 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5.1 (3d
ed. 2000) [hereinafter 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY].
9. In many jurisdictions, product misuse is technically not a "defense" in the sense of an
affirmative defense, but its absence is instead considered part of a plaintiff's prima facie case.
In such jurisdictions, the role of misuse in products liability law may be viewed more in the
nature of a limitation on defectiveness than a true defense. From whatever perspective, when a
user 'misuses" a defective product, his or her misconduct may operate as a bar to liability
similar to the operation of the traditional defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of
risk. For that reason, together with the fact that a number of state reform acts treat product
misuse as an affirmative defense, this Article covers the doctrine of misuse with other
misconduct "defenses."
10. See infra Part IV.
11. As of 2000, the comparative fault doctrine is still rejected in Maryland, the District
of Columbia, Virginia, North Carolina, and Alabama. In early 2000, a Maryland Senate
committee voted 7-2 to kill a bill that would have replaced that state's contributory negligence
doctrine with a comparative fault rule. See Maryland Legislators Vote to Keep Contributory
Negligence, LiAB. & INS. WK., March 6, 2000, at 5.
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though the conventional defenses now often operate to reduce, rather than to
bar altogether, a plaintiff s damages recovery."
Although courts in comparative fault jurisdictions generally apply
damages-apportioning principles to a plaintiff's contributory negligence, both
contributory negligence and assumption of risk remain as totalbars to recovery
in mostjurisdictions if the plaintiff's fault equals or, in some states, exceeds the
fault of the defendant' 3 In addition, while some courts after the adoption of
comparative fault abolished assumption of risk as a separate doctrine, or
merged it into the comparative fault scheme, other courts refuse to apply
comparative fault principles to assumption of risk or do so only to a limited
extent. Further, in the many jurisdictions that consider the absence of misuse
to be an element of the prima facie case of strict liability in tort,' a finding of
misuse should be entirely unaffected by the doctrine of comparative fault.
Similarly, with claims for breach of warranty 6 and misrepresentation, 7 the
respective issues ofjustifiable reliance, proximate cause, and scope of warranty
implicated by a user's conduct are part of a plaintiff s case in chief which, if not
established, will destroy such claims before they ever arise. In short, the
traditional plaintiffmisconduct defenses often still operate in their conventional
form as a total bar to liability.
When a plaintiff acts carelessly or adventurously in a manner that causes
or contributes to a product accident, the conduct may give rise to two or all
three traditional misconduct defenses.' So, if a plaintiff proceeds to ignite a

12. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Barbo Mach. Co., 957 P.2d 147 (Or. 1998) (holding that
plaintiff, found 50.5 % at fault, entitled to instruction that his failure to discover or guard against
existence of defect could not be considered comparative fault for strict products liability claim);
accord Busch v. Busch Const., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 394 (Minn. 1977) ("[A] consumer's
negligent failure to inspect a product or to guard against defects is not a defense and thus may
not be compared with a distributor's strict liability.").
As with contributory negligence, see infra Part II, some courts have ruled that a plaintiff's
fault may be the sole proximate cause of an accident even in a comparative fault jurisdiction. See
Kroon v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 628 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1980) (2-1 decision) (applying Florida
law and finding that plaintiff's misconduct may serve as sole proximate cause even in
comparative fault regime, where pilot attempted to take off without removing gust lock pin from
steering control column); States v. R.D. Werner Co., 799 P.2d 427, 430 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that unlike comparative negligence, which diminishes recovery, unforeseeable misuse
of ladder from which plaintiff fell goes to causation and completely bars recovery, regardless
of defective condition); Bowling v. Heil Co., 511 N.E.2d 373, 377 (Ohio 1987) (noting that
unreasonable assumption of risk remains absolute defense to actions based on strict liability in
tort); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 423 (rex. 1984) (noting that assumption
of risk remains total bar to liability notwithstanding adoption of comparative fault), rev don
other grounds, Smithson v. Cesigna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. 1984).
13. See, e.g., King v. Kayak Mfg. Corp., 387 S.E.2d 511 (W. Va. 1989) (holding that
assumption of risk remains total bar if plaintiff's fault equals or exceeds fault of other parties).
See generally 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supranote 5, ch. 15.
14. In Ohio, for example, assumption of risk has been merged into the comparative fault
scheme for negligence claims but remains as a total bar for claims brought in strict liability in
tort. See Bowling, 511 N.E.2d at 377; Onderko v. Richmond Mfg. Co., 511 N.E.2d 388, 392
(Ohio 1987).
15. See infra Part IV.C.
16. See infra Part V.
17. See infra Part VI.
18. See, e.g., Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348, 357 (Md. 1985) ("A
plaintiff in a products liability case may plead alternative causes of action, and if the plaintiff
alleges negligence in addition to strict liability, a defendant may be entitled to instructions on
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and misuse.").
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pilot light, knowing of a leaking gas valve; 9 attempts to mount atire, expressly
contrary to a warning, on a wheel rim of a different size;2' falls as a stunt 323
feet onto a cushion rated for 200 feet;21 or locks herself into a car's trunk,
which has no internal release device, in an attempt to commit suicide,' a
defendant may assert and sometimes successfully defend the case on the basis
of some combination of contributory (or comparative) negligence, assumption
of risk, and misuse. Thus, subject to applicable principles of comparative fault,
a practitioner representing a defendant seller in a case involving plaintiff
misconduct should almost always consider the possible availability of two or
all three traditional misconduct defenses.'
The three plaintiff misconduct defenses are fundamental mechanisms by
which the law defines the boundaries of liability by allowing manufacturers to
avoid responsibility for certain types of product accidents. Accordingly, trial
courts have an important obligation to admit appropriate evidence, permit
appropriate argument, and submit appropriate instructions to the jury on any
misconduct defenses that fairly may be raised in a particular case.?
B. Reform Legislation
Many states have enacted products liability "reform" statutes that
specifically address the definition, scope, and effect of various defenses based
on a plaintiff' s conduct. Such statutes variously reduce damages or bar recovery
if a product accident is caused by a plaintiff's unreasonable behavior or
contributory fault, assumption of risk, misuse of the product, or sometimes
specifically designated types ofplaintiffmisbehavior.' Moreover, comparative
fault statutes in many states address plaintiff misconduct in general terms, and
some such statutes include provisions on the role of a plaintiffs conduct in
products liability claims, particularly when the misconduct involves product
misuse.'
19. Freislinger v. Emro Propane Co., 99 F.3d 1412 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying Illinois law
and discussing contributory/comparative negligence and assumption of risk).
20. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Hall, 681 So. 2d 126 (Ala. 1996) (discussing
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and misuse).
21. Bakunas v.Life Pack, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 89 (E.D. La. 1982), f'd, 701 F.2d 946 (5th
Cir. 1983) (applying assumption of risk and misuse).
22. Daniell v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F. Supp. 728, 730-31 (D.N.M. 1984) (examining
misuse, and possibly assumption of risk and comparative fault).
23. This assumes that the complaint includes claims in both negligence and strict liability
because, as discussed below, misuse is more typically viewed as a strict liability defense and
ordinary contributory negligence is not a defense at all to strict liability in tort.
24. In Freislinger,99 F.3d 1412, the trial court failed to allow the jury to consider certain
allegations of contributory negligence asserted by defendants:
In spite of the fact that district courts have substantial discretion in
determining whether the evidence at trial warrants submitting theories to
the jury, we are disturbed by the court's placing such tight shackles on the
jury's ability to consider specific allegations of contributory negligence.
Id. at 1418. The court remanded the case for a new trial "because of the court's decision to
exclude certain theories of contributory negligence that were supported by the evidence." Id.
25. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 5.40.060 (West 1995) (permitting drug or
alcohol intoxication to be a complete defense in some cases).
26. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109(a)(iv) (Michie 1999) (defining "fault" to
include "acts or omissions, determined to be a proximate cause of death or injury to person or
property, that are in any measure negligent, or that subject an actor to strict tort or strict
products liability, and includes breach of warranty, assumption of risk and misuse or alteration
of a product . . ."). See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, §§ 11-1 to -8 (discussing strict
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For example, one statutory provision in Connecticut specifies that
contributory negligence shall merely diminish damages rather than bar
liability;27 another specifies that neither contributory nor comparative
negligence shall bar liability in strict products liability in tort claims but
recognizes the separate defenses of "misuse of the product" and "knowingly
using the Product in a defective condition."2 Statutes in Arizona29 and North
Carolina3 provide a defense for the use of products contrary to their "express
and adequate instructions or warnings... if the user knew or with the exercise
of reasonable and diligent care should have known of such instructions or
warnings."3 Kentucky enacted a contributory negligence defense to products
liability actions in 197832 but superseded it with a comparative fault act in
1988.?3 A number of products liability reform statutes provide that a plaintiffs
damages shall be reduced,34 or that recovery shall be barred altogether," if a
liability and comparative fault); WOODS & DEERE, supra note 5, §§ 14:25-:48 (discussing
defenses to strict liability in tort).
27. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(b) (West 1991 & Supp. 2000).
28. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-5721 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000).
29. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683(3) (West 1992). The Arizona statute provides
that a products liability defendant shall not be liable if the defendant proves:
The proximate cause of the incident giving rise to the action was a use or
consumption of the product which was for a purpose, in a manner or in an activity
other than that which was reasonably foreseeable or was contrary to any express and
adequate instructions or warnings appearing on or attached to the product or on its
original container or wrapping, if the injured person knew or with the exercise of
reasonable and diligent care should have known of such instructions or warnings.
Id.
30. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4(1) (1999).
31. Id.
32. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.320 (Michie 1992). See generally Reda Pump Co.
v. Finck, 713 S.W.2d 818 (Ky. 1986) (holding statute constitutional), superseded by statute as
stated in, Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Rice, 775 S.W.2d 924, 930 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).
33. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182 (Michie 1992); see also Caterpillar, Inc. v.
Brock, 915 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Ky. 1996).
34. One source lists Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New York, North Dakota, Utah, and Washington as being strict
liability states which provide statutorily that assumption of risk merely reduces a plaintiff's
recovery rather than serving as a total bar. WOODS & DEERE, supra NOTE 5, § 6:11, at 146-47.
Examples of such legislation include the following:
Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 6-1305(2)(a) (Michie 1998) states:
When the product seller proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the claimant knew about the product's defective condition, and voluntarily
used the product or voluntarily assumed the risk of harm from the product,
the claimant's damages shall be subject to reduction to the extent that the
claimant did not act as an ordinary reasonably prudent person under the
circumstances.
Missouri: Mo. STAT. ANN. § 537.765(3)(3) (West 2000) provides damages subject to reduction
according to pure comparative fault if plaintiff used the product "with knowledge of a danger
involved in such use with reasonable appreciation of the consequences and the voluntary and
unreasonable exposure to said danger."
Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5)(a) & (6) (1999) provide that comparative fault
applies if "[t]he user or consumer of the product discovered the defect or the defect was open
and obvious and the user or consumer unreasonably made use of the product and was injured by
it."
35. States that have enacted such legislation include:
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-5721 (West 1991) retains assumption of risk and
misuse defenses for products liability claims based on strict liability in tort.
Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-6-3 (Michie 1998) makes a defense available if the user or
consumer "(1) knew of the defect; (2) was aware of the danger in the product; and (3)
nevertheless proceeded to make use of the product and was injured."
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36
plaintiffvoluntarily--sometimes voluntarily andunreasonably
-encounters

a known (or obvious)" product danger. Products liability statutes in several
states reduce damages s or bar liability39 when a plaintiff s use of a product is

Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2947(3) (West 2000) states:
A manufacturer or seller is not liable in a product liability action if
the purchaser or user of the product was aware that use of the product
created an unreasonable risk of personal injury and voluntarily exposed
himself or herself to that risk and the risk that he or she exposed himself
or herself to was the proximate cause of the injury. This subsection does
not relieve a manufacturer or seller from a duty to use reasonable care in
a product's production.
Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(d) (Supp. 1999) states:
In any action alleging that a product is defective pursuant to paragraph
(a) of this section, the manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if the
claimant (i) had knowledge of a condition of the product that was
inconsistent with his safety; (ii) appreciated the danger in the condition;
and (iii) deliberately and voluntarily chose to expose himself to the danger
in such a manner to register assent on the continuance of the dangerous
condition.
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4(2) (1999) provides that no manufacturer or seller
is liable if the "user knew of or discovered a defect or dangerous condition of the product that
was inconsistent with the safe use of the product, and then unreasonably and voluntarily exposed
himself or herself to the danger, and was injured by or caused injury with that product."
South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976) states "[i]f the user or
consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds
unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery."
36. At least Missouri, North Carolina, and South Carolina define the assumption of risk
defense in terms of encounters with dangers which are known or voluntary and unreasonable.
See Mo. STAT. ANN. § 537.765.3(3) (West 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4(2) (1999); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-73-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
37. Mississippi and Montana both allow a defense in cases of encounters with obvious, as
well as known, risks. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5)(a) (West 2000) (allowing defense
if "[t]he user or consumer discovered the defect or the defect was open and obvious and the user
or consumer unreasonably made use of the product and was injured by it"). Compare Miss.
CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(d) (Supp. 1999) (assumed risks) with Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(e)
(Supp. 1999) (danger is "known or is open and obvious").
38. At least Idaho and Missouri have enacted such legislation. See IDAHO CODE
§ 6-1305(3) (Michie 1998) (providing that misuse reduces the claimant's damages according to
comparative responsibility and defining "misuse" as "when the product user does not act in a
manner that would be expected of an ordinary reasonably prudent person who is likely to use
the product in the same or similar circumstances"); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 537.765.3 (West 2000)
(providing that, for purposes of apportionment, a plaintiff's "fault" includes product use that is
(1) not reasonably anticipated or (2) not intended by the manufacturer).
39. At least the following states have such provisions:
Arizona: ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-683(3) (West 1992) states:
The proximate cause ofthe incident giving rise to the action was a use
or consumption of the product which was for a purpose, in a manner or in
an activity other than that which was reasonably foreseeable or was
contrary to any express and adequate instructions or warnings appearing on
or attached to the product or on its original container or wrapping, if the
injured person knew or with the exercise of reasonable and diligent care
should have known of such instructions or warnings.
Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-6-4 (Michie 1998) states:
It is a defense to an action under this article (or IC 33-1-1.5 before its
repeal) that a cause of the physical harm is a misuse of the product by the
claimant or any other person not reasonably expected by the seller at the
time the seller sold or otherwise conveyed the product to another party.
Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2947(2) (West 2000) provides no liability for harm
caused by misuse unless the misuse is "reasonably foreseeable" which is a legal issue for the
court.
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-108 (Michie 2000) provides no liability for dangers
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abnormal
unforeseeable, generally referred to in the statutes as product
,,misuse. , , or
'
Finally, most of the reform legislation mentioned above specifically
addresses products liability litigation. Some state statutes abolish the defense
of assumption of risk as a general proposition, not restricted to the products
liability context, 4' and most states have enacted legislation which broadly
applies comparative faultprinciples to the doctrines of contributory negligence,
assumption of risk, and often product misuse." Although only a couple of
states43 have adopted the Uniform Comparative Fault Act," the Act broadly
addresses the effect of plaintiff misconduct in claims brought in negligence,
warranty, and strict liability in tort. For purposes of apportionment, the Act
provides that "fault" includes unreasonable assumption of risk and "misuse of
a product for which the defendant would otherwise be liable," in addition to
more conventional contributory negligence.4" The Act's misuse provision
means that a claimant's damages should be reduced if they result in part from
the claimant's foreseeable misuse, but not for the claimant's unforeseeable
misuse which remains as a total bar.46

resulting from "unforeseeable alteration, change, improper maintenance or abnormal use."
40. The Montana statute defines the conduct in terms of unreasonable misuse. MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5)(b) (1999).
41. At least Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Oregon have abolished the defense of
assumption of risk legislatively. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West 1991 & Supp.
1999) (abolishing defense in negligence actions only, but retaining defense in strict products
liability in tort actions: § 52-5720; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231 § 85 (West 2000) ("The
defense of assumption of risk is hereby abolished in all actions hereunder."); OR. REV.STAT.
§ 18.475(2) (1988) ("The doctrine of implied assumption of risk is abolished.").
42. The statutory provisions vary widely. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.900 (Michie
1998) (defining "fault" to include "misuse of aproduct for which the defendant otherwise would
be liable"); ARK.CODE ANN. § 16-64-122(c) (Michie 1987) ("The word 'fault' as used in this
section includes any act, omission, conduct, risk assumed, breach of warranty, or breach of any
legal duty which is a proximate cause of any damages sustained by any party."); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 668.1 (West 1998) (stating that "fault" means "one or more acts or omissions that are
in any measure negligent or reckless toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that
subject a person to strict tort liability" and that fault "also includes breach of warranty,
unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an enforceable express consent, misuse of a
product for which the defendant otherwise would be liable, and unreasonable failure to avoid an
injury or to mitigate damages"); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109(a)(iv) (Michie 1999) ("'Fault'
includes acts or omissions, determined to be a proximate cause of death or injury to person or
property, that are in any measure negligent, or that subject an actor to strict tort or strict
products liability, and includes breach of warranty, assumption of risk and misuse or alteration
of a product.").
43. These states are Iowa and Washington.
44. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 123 (1996). On the Act generally, see
John W. Wade, A Uniform ComparativeFaultAct-What Should It Provide?, 10 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 220 (1977). Dean Wade was chairman of the NCCUSL committee responsible for
drafting the Act.
45. UNiF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 123 (1996).
46. Id. cmt. b.
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II. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

A.

In General

Contributory negligence is the classic common-law defense47 to products
liability negligence claims." Although most courts considerably restrict the
availability of this defense in strict liability in tort claims, as discussed below,
they widely apply ordinary contributory negligence principles to products
liability claims brought in negligence.49 Thus, in the products liability context
as in others, contributory negligence is defined as conduct of a plaintiff which
falls below the standard of reasonable behavior required for a person's own
protection which proximately contributes, together with a defendant's
negligence or other breach of duty, to the person's harm. 0
Contributory negligence operates in much the same manner in products
liability cases as in other types of negligence cases. So, if comparative fault
principles do not dictate to the contrary, a finding that a plaintiff was
contributorily negligent bars the plaintiff altogether from recovering damages
from a negligent defendant."1 Thus, a plaintiff found to have been contributorily
negligent in an encounter with a dangerously defective product may not recover
from the manufacturer or other seller for negligently making or supplying the
product in such a condition. 2 However, if the defendant's misconduct is not
merely negligent but rises to the level of reckless, willful, or wanton
misbehavior, a plaintiffs recovery will not be barred by contributory
negligence, although it will be barred by contributory recklessness.53
Contributory negligence operates as a total bar to liability not only in those
few jurisdictions that have not adopted comparative fault, 4 but also in certain

47. While contributory negligence is a common law doctrine, comparative fault legislation
and products liability reform legislation in many states govern the effect of various forms of user
misconduct. See supra Part II.
48. See generally Noel, supra note 3, at 105-19 (discussing effect of contributory
negligence as a defense in strict product liability); Epstein, supra note 3, at 270-73 (discussing
traditional notion of contributory negligence and its continuing role).
49. See, e.g., Reed v. Carlyle & Martin, Inc., 202 S.E.2d 874 (Va. 1974); see also Duke
v. Am. Olean Tile Co., 400 N.W.2d 677 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (holding, in slip-and-fall action
against manufacturer of quarry tile used for flooring in fast food restaurant, that jury could find
that plaintiff was walking unreasonably fast).
50. See W. PAGE KEETON ETAL., PROSSER& KEETON ON THE LAW OFTORTS § 65, at 451
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS].

51. Id. at 461 ("[I]n the absence of modifying legislation or judicial action, contributory
negligence of the plaintiff is a complete bar to his action for any common law negligence of the
defendant." (footnotes omitted)); see also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 102, at 670 (4th ed. 1971) ("There is no doubt that where the plaintiff's action is
founded on negligence, his contributory negligence will bar his recovery to the same extent as
in any other negligence case.").
52. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Am. Safety Util. Corp., 488 S.E.2d 240, 244 (N.C. 1997)
("[Contributory negligence in the context of a products liability action operates as a bar to
recovery in the same manner as in an ordinary negligence action.").
53. See, e.g., Koske v. Townsend Eng'g Co., 526 N.E.2d 985 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)
(stating that a claimant's recklessness will bar recovery even against a reckless manufacturer),
adopted in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 551 N.E.2d 437 (Ind. 1990); see
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 482 (1965); David G. Owen, The Highly Blameworthy
Manufacturer: Implicationson Rules ofLiability andDefense in ProductsLiability Actions, 10
IND. L. REv. 769, 787-88 (1977).
54. These jurisdictions include Alabama, the District of Columbia, Maryland, North
Carolina, and Virginia. SCHWARTz, supra note 5, §1-5 (e)(3).
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cases in most other jurisdictions as well. Except for5 the thirteen states that
presently have a system of pure comparative fault, most states apply the
principles of comparative fault only when a plaintiff's fault was less than (or
equal to) the fault of the defendant or defendants. In jurisdictions following
such a modified ("50%") approach to comparative negligence, if a plaintiff's
fault was greater than (or equal to) that of the defendant(s), the contributory
negligence doctrine applies in its conventional form by barring recovery
altogether.5 6 Thus, the doctrine of contributory negligence remains an important
doctrine in modem products liability litigation.
The complex interrelationships between the human brain, the human body,
and the myriad different products encountered daily at home and at work result
in a vast universe of ways in which user carelessness may result in injury.
Consumers may be contributorily negligent in using products for an
unreasonably dangerous purpose, such as using a lawnmower to cut a hedge,
but the usual form of contributory negligence involves using a product in an
unreasonably dangerous manner, as in driving an automobile at excessive
speed57 or in an intoxicated condition;5" reaching into a trash compactor
knowing that its door cables are broken;59 failing to release one's hold of a
piece of meat when pushing it into the revolving blade of a meat slicing
machine;' standing on a slippery substance dangerously close to the exposed
moving parts of a machine;6 operating a spray-painting machine without using
to label instructions,
an available mask;62 failing to wear rubber gloves, contrary
and splattering a caustic substance on one's hand;63 failing properly to engage5
a car's transmission in the "park" position;' improperly using a condom;
walking too fast on a slippery floor;' or carelessly lighting a cigarette with a

55. The present list of such states includes Alaska, California, Colorado (pure approach
applicable to products liability actions only under COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-406 (2000)),
Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan (partially amended to a modified 50% approach in 1996
under MICH. COMP. LAwSANN. § 600.2959 (West2000)), Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico,
New York, Rhode Island, and Washington (except cases involving drug or alcohol influence
under WASH. REv. CODEANN. § 5.40.060 (West 1995)). See SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, § 2-1(a);
WOODS & DEERE, supra note 5, § 4:2. A few other states in which the courts adopted pure
comparative fault subsequently switched over legislatively to a 50% system. See SCHWARTZ,
supranote 5, § 2-1(b)(3).
56. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 50, § 67, at 473.
57. Hoelter v. Mohawk Serv., Inc., 365 A.2d 1064 (Conn. 1976).
58. Hill v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 98-1433, 1998 WL 911699 (4th Cir. Dec. 31, 1998)
(applying North Carolina law).
59. Sears v. Waste Processing Equip., Inc., 695 So. 2d 51 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997).
60. Koske v. Townsend Eng'g Co., 526 N.E.2d 985 (Ind.Ct. App. 1988), adopted inpart
and vacated in part on other grounds, 551 N.E.2d 437 (Ind. 1990).
61. Reed v. Carlyle & Martin, Inc., 202 S.E.2d 874 (Va. 1974).
62. Parris v. M.A. Bruder & Sons, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
63. Lee v. Crest Chem. Co., 583 F. Supp. 131 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (granting defendant's
motion for summary judgment pursuant to statutory provision barring recovery for use of
product contrary to instructions).
64. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d 584, 594 (Tex. 1999) ("Regardless of any
danger of a mis-shift, a driver has a duty to take reasonable precautions to secure his vehicle
before getting out of it."); Ray v. Ford Motor Co., 514 S.E.2d 227 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); cf.
Ford Motor Co. v. Bartholomew, 297 S.E.2d 675 (Va. 1982) (upholding jury's finding of no
contributory negligence where gear shift lever, not fully engaged in park, slipped into reverse
with motor running).
65. J.P.M. v. Schmid Lab., Inc., 428 A.2d 515 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
66. Duke v. Am. Olean Tile Co., 400 N.W.2d 677 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (regarding slipand-fall action against manufacturer of quarry tile used for flooring in fast food restaurant).
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disposable lighter near one's "big hair" bouffant hairdo held in place with
excessive hair spray, the fumes of which ignite.67
As is true with negligence claims in general, the issues of contributory
negligence are peculiarly grounded in community norms of properly safe
behavior in particular circumstances, so that the issue of whether a plaintiff's
behavior should be classified as unreasonable is inherently a question of fact
especially suited to resolution by a jury. 8 Yet if a plaintiff's behavior is so
evidently reasonable or unreasonable that no reasonable jury could find to the
contrary, a court may rule on contributory negligence as a matter of law.69
Whereas negligence is defined as the failure to exercise due care toward
others, contributory negligence is the failure to exercise due care toward
oneself. In most respects, however, contributory negligence is the mirror image
of negligence. While theorists may debate whether people properly may be said
to have a "duty" to act with reasonable care to protect themselves, 0 the courts
are in quite general agreement that the classic elements ofnegligence--duty,72

67. McClure v. Wilkinson Sword Consumer Prod., Inc., (Ill. Cir. Ct.), 23 Prod. Safety
& Liab. Rep. (BNA) 394 (Apr. 14, 1995).
68. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Am. Safety Util. Corp., 488 S.E.2d 240, 244 (N.C. 1997)
("Issues of contributory negligence, like those of ordinary negligence, are ordinarily questions
for the jury and are rarely appropriate for summary judgment.").
69. Id. ("Only where the evidence establishes the plaintiff's own negligence so clearly that
no other reasonable conclusion may be reached is summary judgment to be granted."). See, e.g.,
Hill v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 98-1433, 1998 WL 911699 (4th Cir. Dec. 31, 1998) (applying
North Carolina law and affirming summary judgment for defendant); Sears v. Waste Processing
Equip., Inc., 695 So. 2d 51 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (affirming summary judgment in defendant's
favor).
70. Dean Prosser and other scholars have questioned whether the doctrine of contributory
negligence fairly may be said to embrace the notion of a duty. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON ON
TORTS, supra note 50, § 65, at 453 ("Negligence requires a duty, an obligation of conduct to
another person. Contributory negligence involves no duty, unless we are to be so ingenious as
to say that the plaintiff is under an obligation to protect the defendant against liability for the
consequences of the plaintiff's own negligence." (footnotes omitted)). Yet, Immanuel Kant
believed that the supreme principle of morality (the categorical imperative) included a respect
for oneself: "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another,
always as an end and never as a means only." IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 47 (Lewis W. Beck trans., 1959) (1785). However, Kant believed
that one's duty to oneself transcended the law: "My duty toward myself cannot be treated
juridically; the law touches only our relations with other men; I have no legal obligations
towards myself.. . ." Immanuel Kant, Duties to Oneself, in LECTURES ON ETHICS 117 (L.
Infield trans., 1978) (1930), quoted in J.M. Finnis, Legal Enforcement of "Dutiesto Oneself":
Kant v. New-Kantians, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 433,433 (1987). See generallyKenneth W. Simons,
ContributoryNegligence: ConceptualandNormative Issues, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF TORTLAW 461, 469 (David G.Owen ed., 1995) (observing that under current legal doctrine,
"the formal criteria defining plaintiff's negligence and defendant's negligence are essentially the
same").
71. See 1MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 8, § 2.1.
72. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 720, 728-29 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying
Hawaii law and asserting notion of duty).
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breach,73 cause in fact,74 proximate cause, 75 and damage 76-- comprise the
defense of contributory negligence as well.
A plaintiff will be contributorily negligent if he or she "'fails to exercise
such care as an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under the
or simply "fails to use reasonable
circumstances in order to avoid injury
care with regard to [a] product."7 Contributory negligence in the products
liability setting has been particularized to include the use of a product contrary
to adequate warnings and instructions, the unreasonable use of a product
known to be defective, or the use of a product in an unreasonable manner.79 In
short, persons have a duty to exercise reasonable care in using products to
avoid injuries to themselves.

supra note 50, § 65, at 453-54 (footnotes omitted)

73. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS,
provides:
The plaintiff is required to conform to the same
objective standard of

conduct, that of the reasonable person of ordinary prudence under like
circumstances. The unreasonableness of the risks which he incurs is judged
by the same process of weighing the importance of the interest he is
seeking to advance, and the burden of taking precautions, against the
probability and probable gravity of the anticipated harm to himself.
74. "The ordinary negligence principles of cause in fact apply with equal force to
contributory negligence." Id. at 456. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 465(2)
(1965).
75. For example the court in Jenkins, 785 F.2d at 729 stated:
Proximate cause is lacking because the alleged [contributory]
negligence... has no connection with the actual injury. The acts asserted,
however much they may have increased the risk of injury [from another
source], had absolutely no relation to the risk that actually matured ....
The duty breached by the alleged [contributory] negligence did not
encompass the hazard that actually came about, and any such negligence
is therefore irrelevant to the issue of proximate cause.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 468 (1965).
76. On actual damages, see 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTs LIABILITY, supra note 5,
ch. 17.
77. Nicholson v. Am. Safety Util. Corp., 488 S.E.2d 240, 244 (N.C. 1997) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Newton v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 467 S.E.2d 58, 65 (N.C.
1996)). See also Egelhoff v. Holt, 875 S.W.2d 543, 547-48 (Mo. 1994) (en banc) (quoting
comparative fault statute, Mo. STAT. ANN. § 537.765.3(5) (West 2000), which defines "fault"
in part as a "failure to undertake the precautions a reasonably careful user of the product would
take").
78. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Hall, 681 So. 2d 126, 129 (Ala. 1996); see also
Williams v. Delta Int'l Mach. Corp., 619 So. 2d 1330, 1332 (Ala. 1993) (clarifying case law
regarding failure to exercise reasonable care in using the product).
79. Section 99 B-4 of the North Carolina Code describes the form of conduct that may
establish contributory negligence in the products liability context:
No manufacturer or seller shall be held liable in any product liability action if:
(1) The use of the product giving rise to the product liability action
was contrary to any express and adequate instructions or warnings
delivered with, appearing on, or attached to the product or on its original
container or wrapping, if the user knew or with the exercise of reasonable
and diligent care should have known of such instructions or warnings; or
(2) The user knew of or discovered a defect or dangerous condition
of the product that was inconsistent with the safe use of the product, and
then unreasonably and voluntarily exposed himselfor herself to the danger,
and was injured by or caused injury with that product; or
(3) The claimant failed to exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances in the use of the product, and such failure was a proximate
cause of the occurrence that caused injury or damage complained of.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4 (1999); see also Nicholson v. Am. Safety Util. Corp., 488 S.E.2d
240, 243 (N.C. 1997) (discussing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4 (1989)).
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Although courts rarely examine the notion of contributory negligence
explicitly in terms of the Hand formula, by which B < P x L implies an actor's
negligence, this classic "calculus of risk" approach to ascertaining negligence
applies as well to contributory negligence. 0 Thus, the reasonableness of a
plaintiff's exposure of himself to a product hazard is to be ascertained by
weighing the burden of avoiding the dangerous conduct on the one hand,
against the likelihood and severity of a foreseeably harmful result on the other.
If the burden of avoiding a risk is large, as in shutting down a machine that
takes hours to restart, 81or very great, such as the possible loss of employment
if a worker refuses to engage in a dangerous task as directed by a superior, then
an exposure to the risk for such reasons is more likely to be reasonable under
the circumstances.8 2
On the other hand, a user's act is more likely to be contributorily negligent
if a significant risk may be avoided by a relatively small degree of effort or
if a substantial
attention. Contributory negligence may be found, for example,
risk of harm may be avoided by simply putting on gloves 3 or a face mask, 4 to
avoid bums or lung damage; by driving at an appropriate speed for the
condition of a tire, to avoid a high speed crash;" by securely shifting the
out of a car parked on an
transmission into the "park" position before getting
incline, to avoid being squashed by the car;86 by using a condom in an
8 7 or by moving
appropriate manner, to avoid pregnancy and the birth of twins;
8
cautiously over a slippery floor, to avoid injury from a fall. In sum, the same
cost-benefit principles of balance that define negligence define contributory
negligence as well.
Other principles governing the negligence standard of care also apply to
determinations of contributory negligence. One such principle is the doctrine
of negligence per se for violation of a statute. 9 So, an intoxicated driver may
be barred from maintaining a negligence claim against an automotive
and contributed to the
manufacturer if the intoxication violated a DUI statute
injury." Another principle is the rescue doctrine, 9' relieving a rescuer of the
normal responsibilities of acting according to a standard of reasonable

80. For an explanation of the basic Hand formula, see 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS
§ 2:5; see also supra note 73.
81. As, for example, the printing press which took three hours to restart after shutting
down in Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 1976).
82. See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 148 (N.J. 1979),
supersededby statute on othergrounds,Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239,
1252 (N.J. 1990).
83. Lee v. Crest Chem. Co., 583 F. Supp. 131 (M.D.N.C. 1984).
84. Parris v. M.A. Bruder & Sons, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
85. Noel, supra note 3, at 111 (mentioning "high-speed driving on a tire not actually
known to be defective" as an example of conduct which should bar recovery).
86. E.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d 584, 594 (rex. 1999) ("Regardless
of any danger of a mis-shift, a driver has a duty to take reasonable precautions to secure his
vehicle before getting out of it."); Ray v. Ford Motor Co., 514 S.E.2d 227 (Ga. Ct. App.
1999).
87. J.P.M. v. Schmid Lab., Inc., 428 A.2d 515 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
88. Reed v. Carlyle & Martin, Inc., 202 S.E.2d 874 (Va. 1974); Duke v. Am. Olean Tile
Co., 400 N.W.2d 677 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
89. See Klinke v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 581 N.W.2d 272, 276 (Mich. 1998) (dictum).
See generally PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS supranote 50, § 36.
90. See Hill v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 98-1433, 1998 WL 911699 (4th Cir. Dec. 31,
1998).
91. See generally PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 50, § 44, at 307-09.
LIABILITY, supra note 8,
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prudence.92 Other- negligence law principles applicable to contributory
negligence include the objective nature of,93 and role of customary behavior in
relation to,94 the standard of responsibility.
Reedy. Carlyle& Martin,Inc.' 5 involved negligence claims by a farm hand
against the manufacturer, dealer, and repairer of a piece of farm equipment, an
ensilage wagon.96 At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was standing upon
and removing a five foot deep load of ensilage from the wagon.97 A pair of
revolving beaters, comprised of metal rods with spikes, at the front of the
wagon deposited the ensilage onto a conveyor belt which then discharged the
substance.9" A co-worker was throwing the ensilage with a pitchfork from the
rear of the wagon, but the plaintiff, standing on top of the load, decided thatthe
quickest and easiest way to get the ensilage out of the wagon was to throw it
with his pitchfork into the beaters atthe front of the wagon. 9 After unloading
the ensilage in this manner for some time, the plaintiff found himself standing
on a bank of ensilage, which contained "a good bit of sap" and was "right
slippery," sloping downward toward the beaters.l"° The bank collapsed, and the
plaintiff slid into the beaters.' 0 '
The trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on
the basis of the plaintiff's contributory negligence, and the Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed. The court applied to the contributory negligence context two
of the classic principles of negligence doctrine: the objective nature of the
negligence standard of care,'0 and the effect of proof of compliance with
customary behavior in ascertaining the standard and its breach.' In reply to the
plaintiff's argument that he "didn't feel any danger" from working so close to
the beaters, the court observed that "the test is not whether the plaintiffactually
knew of the danger confronting him, but whether, in the exercise of reasonable
care, he shouldhave known he was in a situation of peril."'" To the plaintiff's

92. See, e.g., Dillard v. Pittway Corp., 719 So. 2d 188, 193 (Ala. 1998) (holding person
injured in fire while trying to rescue boarder in burning house, even if contributorily negligent,
could maintain negligence claim against manufacturer and seller of smoke detector "unless the
rescuer's own conduct in attempting the rescue is wanton").
93. See Reed, 202 S.E.2d 874.
94. CompareUniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 340 (Tex. 1998)
(noting that customary behavior is evidence of due care), and Nicholson v. Am. Safety Util.
Corp., 488 S.E.2d 240, 245 (N.C. 1997) (noting that customary behavior is evidence of due
care), with Reed, 202 S.E.2d at 877 (holding that customary behavior is not conclusive on due
care).
95. 202 S.E.2d 874.
96. Id. at 875.
97. Id. at 876.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 876.
101. Reed, 202 S.E.2d 874.
102. Id. at 876; see also 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 8,

§§ 2:3, 2:5.

103. See Reed, 202 S.E.2d at 877; see also 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY,
supranote 8, § 2:7, at 61.
104. Reed, 202 S.E.2d at 876 (emphasis added). The court ruled that all reasonable
persons would conclude that the plaintiff in this case should have known of his peril:
The plaintiff, an experienced farmer, admitted that he was familiar
with the operation of the type ensilage wagon in which he was working.
Moreover, the revolving beaters were exposed to his plain view. The
danger posed by the turning, spike-like mechanism was, therefore, open
and obvious to the plaintiff. In exposing himself to this obvious danger, he
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argument that he created ajury issue by showing that farm laborers customarily
used a similar technique in unloading ensilage wagons, the court noted the
longstanding negligence law principle that "the existence of a custom or usage
cannot excuse conduct which is otherwise negligent ....105
B. Warnings Cases
Contributory negligence doctrine operates under a special limitation in
cases involving products with inadequate warnings of hidden dangers or
instructions on safe use. If a warning or instruction is substantively inadequate
in failing to inform users of the nature or seriousness of a hidden danger or
reason for a particular instructed method of use, then a user who has not
otherwise discovered the risk ordinarily will not be contributorily negligent for
using the product in disregard of the danger." However, to be contributorily
negligent for exposing oneself to a hazard, a user generally needs only to be
aware of the generalnature and magnitude of a risk, not the particular chemical
or physical attributes of the product and how they specifically may affect the
user's various organs. This was the holding in Parrisv. MA. Bruder & Sons,
Inc.," where a spray painter of more than twenty years claimed that the
manufacturer of an epoxy product had failed to warn him that inhaling the
epoxy fumes could cause asthma.'0 Because the plaintiff knew generally of the
substantial danger of inhaling paint fumes, even if he was not aware of the
specific risk of contracting asthma, the court held that the jury properly could
find that he was contributorily negligent for failing to wear a mask furnished
by his employer."
C. Children
Especially before the development of comparative fault, when contributory
negligence operated as a complete bar, the courts frequently adapted the
contributory negligence doctrine in a protective manner for especially
vulnerable plaintiffs. Courts and commentators have been particularly solicitous

failed to exercise reasonable care for his own safety.
Id. at 876-77.
105. Id. at 877.

106. This important point was made at an early date by Dillard and Hart:

Though these time-honored defenses [contributory negligence and
assumption of risk] are frequently invoked to defeat recovery ....duty is
based on a failure to warn. To allow these defenses is to indulge in circular
reasoning, since usually the plaintiff cannot be said to have assumed a risk
of which he was ignorant or to have contributed to his own injury when he
had no way of reasonably ascertaining that the danger of injury existed. On

the other hand, if the plaintiff knew of the danger from an independent
source, the manufacturer's failure to warn would not be the proximate
cause of the injury. Nevertheless, many courts hold that the issue of
contributory negligence is involved, and is a question for the jury.

Hardy C. Dillard and Harris Hart, III, Product Liability: Directionsfor Use and the Duty To

Warn, 41 VA. L. REv. 145, 163 (1955) (footnote omitted). See, e.g., Rhodes v. Interstate

Battery Sys. of Am., Inc., 722 F.2d 1517, 1519 (11th Cir. 1984) (applying Georgia law, the

court stated, "Failure to read a warning does not bar recovery when the plaintiff is challenging
the adequacy of the [warning].").
107. 261 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
108. Id. at 408.
109. Id. at 409.
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of young children who fail to appreciate product hazards."' So, when a fiveyear-old plaintiff fell and was injured when she attempted to climb into a
grocery shopping cart manufactured by the defendant, the court held that she
was too young to be contributorily negligent and that her parents' negligence
in failing to instruct or supervise their child should not be imputed to her.' " As
children grow older, however, the child standard of care adjusts according to
the child's age, intelligence, and experience." 2 So, one court upheld a jury
finding of contributory negligence in the case of a thirteen-year-old child who,
while mowing her parents' lawn with a rotary power lawn mower, hit a pipe
imbedded in the ground that protruded one and three-quarter inches above
ground level."' The mower bounced back and over her foot which was injured
by the revolving blade.' The court held that the jury properly found that the
plaintiff either negligently failed to observe the pipe, or that she saw it and
negligently failed to avoid it." 5
Even when older children act very carelessly, courts are not likely to grant
summary judgment to product suppliers but instead may be expected to allow
juries to decide whether such behavior properly amounts to contributory
negligence." 6 But once a child's actions are determined to amount to
contributory negligence, the child's contributory negligence may be imputed
to the child's parent making a claim for wrongful death, loss of services, or
similar injuries." 7
D. Employees
As mentioned earlier, employees are sometimes effectively forced to work
with dangerous machines, on dangerous tasks, or in some dangerous manner
under an implicit threat of punishment or discharge for refusing to do so. In
such situations, if the employee does not have a practical means to avoid the
danger without simply refusing to perform the task, his or her exposure to the
110. See Jerry J. Phillips, ProductsLiabilityfor PersonalInjury to Minors, 56 VA. L.
REv. 1223, 1225 (1970) ("The assumption that children will expose themselves to danger in
ways that a reasonable adult would not precludes the manufacturer's reliance on the obviousness
of the product's danger to the child plaintiff."). Professor Phillips concludes that "even the best
of educational efforts cannot be expected to change the essential nature of children, and, unless
we are prepared to ignore this fact, in many instances better product design presents the only
realistic means available for protecting children against injuries." Id. at 1240-41. See generally
M. Stuart Madden, ProductsLiability, Productsfor Use by Adults, and InjuredChildren: Back
consideration of a
to the Future, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1205, 1207 (1994) ("Lamentably ....
child's inherent limitations in judgment and cognition is too often merely an afterthought.");
Thomas G. Field, Jr., The Young Consumer: A ParadigmAnalysis of the Roles of Publicand
PrivateLaw in Preventing andRedressing Injuries, 29 MERCER L. REv. 523 (1978).
111. See Porter v. United Steel & Wire Co., 436 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (N.D. Iowa 1977).
112. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 50, § 32, at 179, § 65, at 454.
113. Siemer v. Midwest Mower Corp., 286 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1961).
114. Id. at 382.
115. Id. at 384.
116. See Morgan v. Cavalier Acquisition Corp., 432 S.E.2d 915 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993)
(finding that a factual dispute existed on contributory negligence of seventeen-year-old student
crushed to death when he tilted soda machine to get a soft drink and therefore reversing
summary judgment for the machine manufacturer and owner).
117. And a parent's (or guardian's) own negligence (or assumption of risk) will bar the
parent's claim for injuries to or the death of the child. See, e.g., Moss v. Crosman Corp., 136
F.3d 1169, 1176 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying Indiana law and barring a wrongful death claim by
the parents of a seven-year-old child killed while playing with a BB gun they bought for him).
See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILrrY § 6(a) (2000).
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risk may not be unreasonable under the circumstances. As a means of
protecting a worker's rights in this context, some courts "lessen the amount of
caution required of him by law in the exercise of ordinary care.""' And if an
employer discovers but fails to inform its employees of a product danger, the
employer's knowledge of the danger will not be imputed to its workers for
purposes of contributory negligence.19 But workers do not have a license to act
carelessly, and the conduct of a person injured on the job is properly subject to
the normal standard of a reasonably prudent employee in the same or similar
circumstances. 2 °
E. Contributory Negligence as a Defense to Strict Liability in Tort
Claims
While contributory negligence is the classic defense to products liability
claims brought in negligence, most contributorily negligent conduct is not a
defense to a claim for strict liability in tort.'2 ' In cases in which the plaintiff
makes claims in both negligence and strict liability in tort, contributory (or
comparative) negligence will be an available defense to the negligence claim
but not to the strict tort claim." Because of the possibility of confusion by the
jury, a court should clearly instruct the jury as to this difference in the
applicability of the contributory negligence defense to different types of
claims."
Comment n to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A provides that
"simple"' or "ordinary"'" contributory negligence-that is, conduct which is
118. Young v. Aro Corp., 111 Cal. Rptr. 535, 537 (Ct. App. 1973) (quoting plaintiff's
proposed jury instruction that the court held should have been given where a worker who
knowingly operated grinding wheel at excessive speed was killed when wheel exploded).
119. See Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 815 (9th Cir. 1974).
120. See, e.g., Sears v. Waste Processing Equip., Inc., 695 So. 2d 51 (Ala. Civ. App.
1997) (affirming summary judgment for defendant where manager reached into trash compactor
knowing that door cables were broken); Reed v. Carlyle & Martin, Inc., 202 S.E.2d 874 (Va.
1974) (upholding summary judgment for manufacturer and seller of farm equipment on the
ground of farmhand's contributory negligence as a matter of law for carelessly falling into
revolving parts of equipment).
121. See generally Epstein, supra note 3; William J. McNichols, The Relevance of the

Plaintiff's Misconduct in Strict Tort Products Liability, the Advent of Comparative

Responsibility, and the ProposedRestatement (Third) of Torts, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 201 (1994);
Noel, supra note 3; David G. Spivey, Annotation, ProductsLiability: ContributoryNegligence

orAsiumption ofRisk as Defense Under Doctrineof StrictLiability in Tort, 46 A.L.R.3d 240
(1972); John F. Vargo, The Defenses to StrictLiability in Tort: A New Vocabulary with an Old
Meaning, 29 MERCER L. REv. 447 (1978).

122. See, e.g., Ray v. Ford Motor Co., 514 S.E.2d 227 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
123. See, e.g., Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348 (Md. 1985). The
Maryland Court of Appeals noted:
When theories of negligence and strict liability in tort are being
presented to a jury, and the defense of contributory negligence is properly
before the jury, a trial judge may well find it helpful to specifically instruct
the jury that contributory negligence is not a defense to the strict liability
action.
Id. at 357.
124. See, e.g., Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 261 N.E.2d 305, 309 (Ill. 1970)
(characterizing "lack of due care for one's own safety as measured by the objective reasonableman standard" as "simple contributory negligence").
125. See id. at 310; see also Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d 816, 832 (N.J.
1978) (following Williams in rejecting "ordinary" contributory negligence as a defense to claims
for strict products liability in tort).
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merely careless and which does not also amount to a voluntary assumption of
risk-does not serve as a bar to liability under § 402A for harm caused by a
defective product. Comment n provides in full as follows:
n. Contributorynegligence. Since the liability with which
this Section deals is not based upon negligence of the seller,
but is strict liability, the rule applied to strict liability cases
(see § 524) applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff
is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a
failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard
against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand the
form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily
and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger,
and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk,
is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict
liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is
aware ofthe danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably
to make use of 12the
6 product and is injured by it, he is barred
from recovery.
A couple of early decisions rejected the comment n approach and held that
contributory negligence in any form would bar liability under strict liability in
tort, 127 and at least one prominent early commentator was uncertain of the

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965).
127. See Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 266 A.2d 855 (N.H. 1970); Atkins v. Am.
Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134, 143 (Ala. 1976); see also Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622
(N.Y. 1973) (permitting contributory negligence as a defense to an action in strict products
liability in warranty); Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d 55 (Wis. 1967) (allowing comparative fault
in strict liability cases). Alabama still purports to retain a "contributory negligence" defense to
claims for strict products liability in tort, Campbell v. Cutler Hammer, Inc., 646 So. 2d 573
(Ala. 1994) (three judges dissenting and one concurring in part and dissenting in part), but its
case law is confusing and most of the recent decisions define contributory negligence in
assumption of risk terms. This was also true in New Jersey, which had abolished the defense of
assumption of risk inMeistrichv. CasinoArenaAttractions,Inc., 155 A.2d 90 (N.J. 1959), and
McGrath v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196 A.2d 238 (N.J. 1963), and so found a need to leave
"contributory negligence" available as a strict products liability in tort defense to address cases
involving voluntary and unreasonable encounters of product dangers, but it, too, defined the
requisite type of contributory negligence in terms of assumption of risk. See generally Cepeda,
386 A.2d at 831. In addition, New Jersey made an exception for plaintiffs negligently
encountering a known danger where the product is defective precisely because of its failure to
prevent such negligent encounters. See Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Co., 290 A.2d 281, 286 (N.J.
1972) (plaintiff's hand crushed in punch press). In Bexiga the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote:
mhis case presents a situation where the interests of justice dictate
that contributory negligence be unavailable as a defense to either the
negligence or strict liability claims.
The asserted negligence of plaintiff-placing his hand under the ram
while at the same time depressing the foot pedal-was the very eventuality
the safety devices were designed to guard against. It would be anomalous
to hold that defendant has a duty to install safety devices but a breach of
that duty results in no liability for the very injury the duty was meant to
protect against.
Id.; see also Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 148 (N.J. 1979)
(upholding Bexiga's policy as "sound"); cf.Rivera v. Westinghouse Elevator Co., 526 A.2d 705
(N.J. 1987) (noting that the exceptions created by Bexiga and Suter are based on specific factual

126.

settings). Bexiga is noted at Recent Cases, Torts-LiabilityManufacturerMay be Held Strictly
Liable to Employee of PurchaserforFailureto Install Safety Devices DespiteExpectation that
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soundness of abandoning conventional contributory negligence as a defense in
strict liability defective product cases. 2 ' Such courts and commentators
reasoned that strict products liability in tort is based in part upon the likelihood
that product defects are attributable to a seller's negligence, which, although it
usually exists, is often difficult for a plaintiff to prove; that the doctrine
functions as a kind of res ipsa loquitur or negligence per se; and that the
doctrine rests upon a presumption that injured plaintiffs are incapable of
protecting themselves-each of which are rationales consistent with the
contributory negligence defense. 29
Despite comment n's thin reasoning for abandoning the conventional tort
law defense of contributory negligence on the ground that this defense is also
abandoned by the doctrine of strict liability in tort for harm caused by
ultrahazardous activities, 3 ° most courts quickly adopted comment n's rejection
of the defense of simple contributory negligence as a bar to strict products
liability in tort.13 ' These courts emphasized that the doctrine of strict liability
in tort discarded the concept of fault, that strict liability was premised on
requiring suppliers of defective products to internalize the costs of product
accidents as a means of risk administration, and that strict liability was based
on the buyer's reliance upon an implicit representation that the product was
safe.' The doctrine of comparative fault complicates the issue by raising anew
they would be Installed by Purchaser,86 HARV. L. REv. 923 (1973).
128. See Noel, supra note 3, at 105-19, 128-30:
The great expansion of claims and suits for injury from defective products
suggests that something more than the theoretical analogy to ultrahazardous
activities should be considered in determining the effect of contributory
negligence. If the plaintiff could have discovered the defect in a dangerous
product with little effort, it may be that his failure to inspect should be a
defense in this new and expanding area of liability.
Id. at 117.
129. See id. at 105-19.
130. See, e.g., McCown v. Int'l Harvester Co., 342 A.2d 381, 383 (Pa. 1975) (Pomeroy,
J., concurring); Noel, supra note 3, at 115-17. It should be noted, however, that comment n
does faithfully adapt the principles of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 524 to the defective
product context.
131. The leading early case on point was Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 261 N.E.2d 305
(Ill. 1970). See also Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970); Estabrook v. J.C. Penney
Co., 464 P.2d 325 (Ariz. 1970); DeFelice v. Ford Motor Co., 255 A.2d 636 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1969); Martinez v. Nichols Conveyor & Eng'g Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 842 (Ct. App. 1966);
Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 258 N.E.2d 681, 689 (Ind. 1970); Baker v.
Rosemurgy, 144 N.W.2d 660 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966); Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 171
N.W.2d 201, 211 (Minn. 1969); Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo.
1969); Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc., 251 A.2d 278 (N.J. 1969); Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co.,
223 A.2d 746 (Pa. 1966); Richard v. H.P. Hood & Sons, 243 A.2d 910 (R.I. 1968); Shamrock
Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 ('rex. 1967); Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 454
P.2d 205, 208 (Wash. 1969).
132. See, e.g., McCown, 342 A.2d at 382 (allowing a contributory negligence defense
"would contradict this normal expectation of product safety"). Following-Williams, 261 N.E.2d
305, the court in Cepeda remarked:
[A]cceptance of "ordinary" contributory negligence as a defense in actions
for strict liability in tort would be incompatible with the policy
considerations which led to the adoption of strict tort liability in the first
instance. The manufacturer's duty is imposed precisely to avert foreseeable
inadvertent injury to a user of a product.
Cepeda, 386 A.2d at 832 (citations omitted). See also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, 997
S.W.2d 584, 594 ('rex. 1999) ("[A] duty to discover defects, and to take precautions in constant
anticipation that a product might have a defect, would defeat the purposes of strict liability.").
See generally McNichols, supra note 121, at 260; see generally Noel, supra note 3, at 105-19,
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the question of whether plaintiffs should still be specially protected from the
consequences of their "simple" contributory negligence, but many courts in
comparative fault regimes refuse to allow a plaintiff's careless failure to
discover a product defect to be considered in apportioning damages.'
As mentioned, comment n rests upon a division of a user's negligent
misconduct into two categories: failing to discover a defect or to guard against
the possibility of its existence, on the one hand, and conduct which amounts to
assumption of risk, on the other-voluntarily and unreasonably encountering
a known and appreciated danger. In one sense, however, these forms of
negligent misbehavior might be seen to represent only the two extreme ends of
the spectrum of consumer mistakes: the first describing minimally careless
conduct involving a consumer's excessive trust during initial encounters with
an unfamiliar product, and the other describing deliberatively careless conduct
concerning known and appreciated hazards of a familiar product. Arguably,
neither ofthese categories adequately describes a consumer's ordinary careless

128-30.
133. See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 161 n.14 (3d Cir. 1979)
(applying Virgin Islands law); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 92 (Fla. 1976)
("[C]omparative negligence is a defense in a strict liability action if based upon grounds other
than the failure of the user to discover the defect... or.. . to guard against the possibility of
its existence."); Simpson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 483 N.E.2d 1 (111. 1985) (Ryan, J., dissenting)
(arguing against creating separate categories of plaintiff conduct exempt from comparative fault);
Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197, 204 (11.1983) ("[A] consumer's unobservant,
inattentive, ignorant, or awkward failure to discover or guard against a defect should not be
compared as a damage-reducing factor."); Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377,
393-94 (Minn. 1977) ("[A] consumer's negligent failure to inspect a product or to guard against
defects is not a defense .... ."); Hernandez v. Barbo Mach. Co., 957 P.2d 147-53 (Or. 1998)
("Incidental carelessness or negligent failure to discover or guard against a product defect is not
an appropriate defense. . . ."); Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of Gen. Motors, 642 P.2d 624 (Or.
1982) ("'Fault' includes contributory negligence except for ... failure of the injured party to
discover the defect or guard against it . . . ."); Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d at 594 (interpreting
comment n of Second Restatement § 402A narrowly, and quoting ThirdRestatement § 17, cmt.

a); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 432 (rex. 1984) (affirming the rule that
"negligent failure to discover or guard against a product defect is not a defense"); Star Furniture
Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854, 863 (W.Va. 1982) ("[C]omparative negligence
is available as an affirmative defense in a cause of action founded on strict liability so long as
the complained of conduct is not a failure to discover a defect or to guard against it."). Idaho
has addressed this distinction by statute. See IDAHO CODE § 6-1305(l)(a) (Michie 1998). But see

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01.1a (West 2000) (including the "misuse of a product" within the
definition of "fault"). See generally RESrATEMENT

(THIRD)

OF TORTs: PRODUCTS LIABILITY

§ 17, cmt. d, reporters' note, at 262 (1998).
Although the ProductsLiabilityRestatement does not explicitly provide that negligence in
failing to discover or guard against the possibility of a defect should be exempt from
consideration in a comparative fault regime, it is sympathetic to this approach and suggests that
a plaintiffs simple contributory negligence of this sort rarely will breach the standard of
reasonable behavior:
[WI]hen the defendant claims that the plaintiff failed to discover a defect,
there must be evidence that the plaintiffs conduct in failing to discover a
defect did, in fact, fail to meet a standard of reasonable care. In general,
a plaintiff has no reason to expect that a new product contains a defect and
would have little reason to be on guard to discover it. Or when a plaintiff
is injured due to inattention to a danger that should have been eliminated
by a safety feature, there must be evidence supporting the conclusion that
the plaintiffs momentary inattention or inadvertence in a workplace setting
constitutes failure to exercise reasonable care. In the absence of such
evidence courts refuse to submit the plaintiff's conduct to the trier of fact
for apportionment based on the principles of comparative responsibility.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 17, cmt. d, at 259.
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use of a defective product, such as operating the product in a careless
manner.134 But comment n is not a statute, 35 and its provision excluding
contributory negligence for failing to discover or guard against the existence
of a defect may be reasonably interpreted to include the idea of using a product
without due care that it may be defective.'36 In this manner, comment n's two
categories of user misconduct may plausibly be viewed as embracing all forms
ofcontributory negligence by product users. Under comparative fault, however,
there may be good reason to exclude from damages apportionment a plaintiff's
negligence in failing to discover a product's defects, narrowly defined, but3to
7
reduce a plaintiff's damages for using the product in a dangerous manner.
F. ContributoryNegligence as the Sole Proximate Cause ofan Accident
With the loss of the contributory negligence defense in strict liability
claims, counsel for defendants lost the most cherished arrow in their quiver. In
a case involving appreciable plaintiffimisconduct, a plaintiff's lawyer now may
style the claim as one of strict liability in tort in order to avoid argument (and
possibly evidence) on the plaintiff's negligent misbehavior. But, by rejecting
a plaintiffs contributory negligence as a general defense to claims for strict
products liability in tort, the law did not abolish the plaintiffs obligation to
establish that a defect is aproximate cause of the harm.
From an early date, commentators observed that a plaintiff's contributory
negligence sometimes is so significant a factor in producing an injury that it
may amount to the sole proximate cause of the harm.'38 In an appropriate case,
therefore, a defendant may properly offer evidence and argument that the
plaintiff's behavior-rather than any defect in the product-was the "sole
proximate cause" of the harm.' 39 Thus, in cases where substantial consumer
misconduct was overwhelmingly the predominant force in causing an accident,
and where the role of any product defect was manifestly trivial by comparison,

134. See, e.g., McCown, 342 A.2d at 383 (Pa. 1975) (Pomeroy, J., concurring) (stating
that plaintiff's injuries were caused not by a failure to discover a defect but rather careless use
of a tractor).
135. Except in South Carolina, which codified the negligent assumption of risk defense
embraced in the last sentence of comment n. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
136. See Noel, supranote 3, at 111 (citing high-speed driving on a tire not known to be
defective as an example of failing to guard against the possibility of a defect). Cf. PROSSER,
supra note 51, § 102, at 670-71 (describing the negligent driving on a tire known to be unsafe
as the kind of assumption of risk conduct to be distinguished from the simple negligence in
failing to discover or guard against the risk that a product might be defective).
137. See Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d at 593-94 (interpreting narrowly Second Restatement
§ 402A cmt. n, and quoting ThirdRestatement § 17, cmt. d to hold that a plaintiff's negligence
in failing to discover defect should not reduce a plaintiff's damages under comparative fault, but
that negligence in dangerously using product should result in such a reduction).
138. See Noel, supranote 3, at 105.
139. On rare occasions, courts speak loosely of a plaintiffs substantial misconduct as
amounting to a "superseding" cause of an accident. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d
1069, 1078 n.26 (5th Cir. 1994); Wagner v. Clark Equip. Co., 700 A.2d 38, 48 (Conn. 1997);
Sabbatino v. Rosin & Sons Hardware & Paint, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 633, 635 (App. Div. 1998);
Madonna v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 708 A.2d 507, 509 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). However, the
concept of superseding causation traditionally refers only to unforeseeable intervening acts of
God and behavior by third parties. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1965);
PROSSE & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 50, § 44, at 312. Accordingly, while a plaintiff's
extraordinary behavior may amount to the "sole proximate cause" of a particular accident, it
appears preferable not to refer to such behavior as a "superseding" cause of the harm.
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evidence and argumentthatthe plaintiff's conductwas the sole proximate cause
of the harm is entirely proper and will support ajudgment for the defendant in
an appropriate case."O
However, a plaintiffs conduct, whether it be called "contributory
negligence" or something else, can fairly be considered the sole proximate
cause of an accident only if it was plainly the overriding factor in causing the
harm such that, by comparison, any defect in the product, albeit a cause in fact
of the accident, was clearly insignificant and morally trivial. Without close
supervision by the trial court, evidence and argument on the plaintiff s conduct
as the sole proximate cause of an accident may slip easily and impermissibly
into a thinly veiled revival of the contributory negligence defense.
In Sheehan v. Anthony Pools,4 ' the plaintiff was injured when, during a
swimming party at his new pool, he fell offthe side of the diving board onto the
concrete coping at the edge of the swimming pool.' In plaintiff's strict tort
action against the pool company, he claimed that the non-skid material on the
board should have extended to and over the edges of the board and that the
design of the pool's diving board-coping area was unsafe.' Without using the
terms "careless" or "contributory negligence," defense counsel argued
essentially that the injury was caused notby any problem with the design ofthe
4
board or the pool, but by the manner in which the plaintiff used the board.'
140. See McCarty v. F.C. Kingston Co., 522 P.2d 778, 779 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974). See
also Goulah v. Ford Motor Co., 118 F.3d 1478, 1485-86 (11th Cir. 1997) (applying Florida
law). In this design defect case involving the rollover of a Bronco II, when the trailer it was
towing swung around, the manufacturer argued that the "sole legal cause" of the accident was
the improper use of the trailer rather than any defect in the vehicle:
Evidence on the issues of the trailer and driving directly refutes Plaintiffs'
contention that Ford's negligence caused this accident. Ford was not
limited to saying, "we didn't cause this." Ford had every right to tell the
jury who or what it believed made this accident happen.
Id. at 1486. But see Yun v. Ford Motor Co., 669 A.2d 1378, 1379 (N.J. 1996) (finding that
proximate cause to be a jury issue in case where the plaintiff struck by another vehicle while
crossing highway to retrieve spare tire that fell off van), rev'g 647 A.2d 841 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1994) (which had affirmed summary judgement for manufacturer).
Possibly inappropriate uses of the sole proximate cause doctrine are Wilson v. Vermont
Castings, Inc., 170 F.3d 391,396 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Pennsylvania law and upholding jury
finding that plaintiff's conduct was sole cause of accident in case where plaintiff's dress caught
fire on woodburning stove allegedly defective because of the need to leave the door open to keep
the fire going); Wagner, 700 A.2d at 48 (holding that the jury should have been instructed that
it could find that plaintiff's failure to pay attention to surroundings, together with forklift
operator's failure to look over shoulder as he backed up and employer's failure to maintain a safe
workplace, all "combined so as to entirely supersede the lack of additional safety devices on the
forklift as the proximate cause of the accident"); and Sabbatino,676 N.Y.S.2d at 635 (affirming
summary judgment for defendants, where plaintiff failed to heed instructions on drain cleaner
to cover opening after pouring cleaner into drain).
141. 440 A.2d 1085 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982).
142. Id. at 1087.
143. Id.
144. In closing argument, defense counsel argued, over objection, as follows:
"You must find that this defect proximately caused the accident. The clear
testimony here from Mr. Weiner and using your common sense is that if
someone steps on the board with about an inch of their foot on it, they will
fall off the side. That was the proximate cause, the way the board was
used, not the design of the board. I am not willing to concede for a
moment that there is anything defective about the board when you use the
standards which are customary in the industry and any governmental
regulations. Even if you feel there was, I ask you to find that the proximate
cause was the way Mr. Sheehan used it, not the way it was designed."
Id. at 1090 (alteration in original (quoting defense counsel)).
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The trial judge denied the defendant's request to instruct the jury that
contributory negligence was a defense and also denied the plaintiff's request
for a charge that the plaintiff's inadvertence in using the board was not a
defense, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. 4 Reversing and
remanding, the appellate court held that the trial court should have granted the
plaintiffs requested instruction.'4
Perhaps as in Sheehan, argumentation on a plaintiffs contributions to an
accident may easily mislead ajury as to the proper role of a plaintiff
s conduct
in establishing liability and damages in a products liability case. 147 Thus, in
addition to closely monitoring such arguments to avoid their abuse, courts
should be prepared to instructjuries carefully on the limited roles and effect of
sole
proximate
liability
in tort. cause and consumer carelessness in the law of strict products
III. ASSUMPTION OF RISK
A.

In General

4
Originating as a defense to negligence claims about two centuries ago, 1
assumption of risk has long been one of the classic defenses to products

liability claims.'49 As a common law and statutory 50 defense in many

jurisdictions, even to claims for strict products liability in tort, assumption of
risk remains a total bar to liability in a good number of states, thus significantly
distinguishing it from contributory negligence which now serves merely to
reduce damages in most cases.'' Because the situations which give rise to the
assumption of risk defense are often quite normal and foreseeable, the
assumption
of risk defense is not restricted, like the defense of product
"cmisuse,' 2 to product use situations so unusual as to be characterized as
unforeseeable. For these reasons, assumption of risk may well be the most
potent of all the plaintiffmisconduct defenses of modem products liability law.

145. Id. at 1087.
146. Id. at 1092.
147. See the several questionable cases cited supra note 131.
148. See Cruden v. Fentham, 2 Esp. 685, 170 Eng. Rep. 496 (K.B. 1799). See generally
PROSSER & KEnTON ON TORTS, supra note 50, § 68, at 480.
149. See generallyEpstein, supranote 3; Robert E. Keeton, Assumption ofProductsRisks,
19 Sw. L.J. 61 (1965); Robert E. Keeton, Assumption of Risk in ProductsLiability Cases, 22
LA. L. REv. 122 (1961) [hereinafter Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases];
McNichols, supra note 121; Noel, supra note 3; Spivey, supra note 121 (discussing contributory
negligence and assumption of risk as defenses to claim for strict products liability in tort); Aaron
D. Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-RestructuringAssumption of Risk in the Products
LiabilityEra, 60 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1974); Vargo, supra note 121; Note, Assumption of Risk and
Strict ProductsLiability, 95 HARv.L. REV.872 (1982) (discussing assumption ofrisk as defense
to strict products liability). For an excellent theoretical consideration of the doctrine, see
Kenneth W. Simons, Assumption of Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory of Full
Preference, 67 B.U. L. REv. 213 (1987).
150. While assumption of risk is a common law doctrine, tort and products liability
legislative reform provisions in many states govern the effect of various forms of user
misconduct including assumption of risk. For a discussion of such statutes, see supra Part I.
151. See supraPart II. Under the comparative fault reforms of the great majority of states,
a plaintiff's contributory negligence, at least if less than the defendant's negligence, serves only
to diminish a plaintiff's damages, not to bar the claim altogether. See also supra Part I; 2
MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILrrY, supra note 5,ch. 15.
152. See infra Part IV.
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Assumption of risk may be distinguished from the other "misconduct"
defenses in a more fundamental way. Conduct which gives rise to an
assumption of risk may be unreasonable; if so, it overlaps the defense of
contributory (or comparative) negligence which separately may operate to bar
liability (or to reduce the plaintiff's damages). But conventional assumption of
risk doctrine does not require that a plaintiffs decision to incur a risk be
unreasonable; as discussed below, a plaintiff will be barred from maintaining
a negligence claim if he or she assumes a risk for reasons and in a manner
reasonable in all respects.' Nor, asjust mentioned, does the assumption of risk
defense require that the plaintiff have used a product outside the boundaries of
its intended and foreseeable limits of fair use, as required by the misuse
defense. Thus, unlike the defenses of contributory negligence and product
misuse, which arise from user conduct that may be conceived as "improper,"' 54
and so fairly classified as "misconduct," conduct giving rise to the conventional
assumption of risk defense does not so comfortably fit the "misconduct" mold.
The underlying idea of the assumption of risk defense is that a user has
fully consented to incur a risk which the user fully comprehends.' By the act
of incurring the risk, the user thus implicitly agrees to take responsibility for
any harmful consequences that may result from the encounter and so relieves
the person who
created the risk from responsibility. In other words, volenti non
6
fit injuria.1
Thus, a person may assume the risk of injury if he uses his hand instead of
a metal stomper to push meat into a grinder;"' reaches from outside a forklift
between horizontal cross bars to engage the throttle and so lowers a bar upon
his arm;... slips from the top of a tanker truck covered with oil that he knows
is "real slick";" is run over while jump-starting a tractor that he knows may
lurch forward when it starts; ° slips and is cut by a power mower blade left
spinning while he moves an obstacle in the mower's path;' 6 ' inflates a truck tire
on a multi-piece rim that he fears may be improperly assembled and could

153. See, e.g., Rahmig v. Mosley Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 74 (Neb. 1987) (stating
that assumption of the risk negates liability even if plaintiff acts with due care). See generally
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 50, § 68, at 481, 485 ("Mhe plaintiff may be acting
quite reasonably, and not be at all negligent in taking the chance. .. ").
154. "Improper" conduct can be characterized as conduct which is either unreasonable
(contributory negligence) or unforeseeable (misuse). See supra Part II and infra Part IV,
respectively.
155. "[A]ssumption of risk is a user's willingness or consent to use a product which the
user actually knows is defective and appreciates the danger resulting from such defect." Rahmig
v. Mosley Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 74 (Neb. 1987).
156. "[A] person is not wronged by that to which he or she consents." BLACK'S LAW
DIcnoNARY 1569 (7th ed. 1999). See generally PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 50,
§ 68, at 480.
157. Green v. Sanitary Scale Co., 431 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1970) (applying Pennsylvania
law).
158. Moran v. Raymond Corp., 484 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1973) (applying Illinois law).
159. Hedgepeth v. Fruehauf Corp., 634 F. Supp. 93, 96 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (indicating that
oil tanker truck driver, who slipped while walking on rounded top of tanker, testified that he
knew top was "real slick and real cruddy").
160. Novak v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 46 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying South
Dakota law).
161. Denton v. Bachtold Bros., 291 N.E.2d 229 (I11.
App. Ct. 1972).
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explosively fly apart; 62 or entangles his pants in a moving part of a machine
that he knows could injure him if he gets too close.
For a product user 64 to assume responsibility for a risk to the exclusion of
the defendant, his or her decision must be based upon an understanding of the
nature of the risk, and it must be a choice that is freely made: a person cannot
"consent" to what he does not know nor to what is forced upon him. For this
reason, assumption of risk arises only when a user's encounter with a risk is
both "informed" and "voluntary." These two basic requirements are reflected
in the definition, or statement of elements, of the assumption of risk doctrine:
first, the plaintiff must know and understand the risk, and, second, the
plaintiff's choice to encounter it must be free and voluntary. '
Because each aspect of assumption of risk involves an inquiry into a
particular person's state of mind-the person's knowledge of and appreciation
of risk and the extent to which the person's choice to encounter it was free and
voluntary-the assumption of risk determination is peculiarly one of fact for a
jury to resolve.'"
The ideas of knowledge and appreciation go together like a horse and
carriage: in order to truly "know" something, a person must understand or
appreciate it; and knowledge is a sine qua non of appreciation, for one cannot
"appreciate" what one does not know. Because knowledge and appreciation of
a risk are intertwined in this manner, the defense is sometimes defined in terms
of two elements: (1) knowledge and understanding, and (2) voluntariness. 67
Yet many courts and commentators subdivide the first element into its two
components, and so divide the defense into three separate elements: (1)
knowledge, (2) appreciation, and (3) voluntariness. 68 Some courts define this

162. Bishop v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 814 F.2d 437, 446 (7th Cir. 1987) (showing
that plaintiff stated, prior to explosion of tire mounted on multi-piece rim, that he "hoped the
tire would not explode").
163. Johnson v. Mid-South Distrib., Inc., Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 7984 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1977).
164. While most products liability cases involve product users, the assumption of risk
defense may also apply to claims by injured bystanders. See, e.g., Brown v. Link Belt Corp.,
565 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding that worker was run over by crane when worker
wandered into area he knew was in crane operator's blind spot); Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 127
Cal. Rptr. 745 (Ct. App. 1976) (finding that pedestrian, hit by allegedly uncrashworthy car with
protruding metal headlight protector, ran across street trying to beat oncoming car). But see Barr
v. Rivinius, Inc., 373 N.E.2d 1063, 1068 (111.App. Ct. 1978) (2-1 decision) (holding that
worker hit by roadgrader/shoulder-spreader machine could not assume risk because he was not
a user).
165. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 50, § 68, at 486-87.
166. See, e.g., Rahmig v. Mosley Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 74 (Neb. 1987) (holding
that the question of assumption of risk is ordinarily for jury); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d
916, 921 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) ("Whether an injured person actually knew of the danger is
peculiarly within the province of the jury."). But see Frey v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 734
A.2d 1, 9 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) ("[A]ssumption of the risk, particularly in product liability
cases, is a question of law to be determined by the court.").
167. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 50, § 68, at 487 ("[F]irst, the plaintiff
must know that the risk is present, and he must further understand its nature; and second, his
choice to incur it must be free and voluntary .... ").
168. See, e.g., Mid-South Distrib., Inc., Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 7984 ("[A]ssumption
of the risk acts in bar of recovery when the proof shows that the plaintiff has (1) knowledge of
the danger, (2) an appreciation of that danger, and (3) voluntarily exposed himself to that
danger.").
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defense in slightlyvarying ways,"6 sometimes without specifically enumerating
the elements but usually emphasizing the basic nature of the plaintiff's conduct
a free and voluntary encounter with a known and appreciated
as reflecting
1 70
risk.
B. Knowledge andAppreciation
"Knowledge," it is said, "is the watchword of assumption of risk."' 7' A
plaintiff's vague and general understanding that a product may be dangerous
if not carefully used is neither "knowledge" nor "appreciation" of a particular
risk of harm. If the plaintiff does not know just how a product may be
hazardous, then the plaintiff cannot assume the risk that he may be injured by
that hazard. 72 Particularly in jurisdictions which do not separately require that
the risk be "appreciated," courts sometimes require that the plaintiff know of

169. See, e.g., Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 616 S.W.2d 720, 724 (Ark.
1981) ("[A]ssumption of risk bars recovery where (1) a dangerous condition exists which is
inconsistent with the injured party's safety, (2) the injured person is actually aware of the
condition and appreciates the danger, and (3) the injured person voluntarily exposes himself to
the danger which produces the injury."); Gann v. Int'l Harvester Co., 712 S.W.2d 100, 105
(Tenn. 1986) ("[I]t must be shown that the plaintiff, (1) discovered the defect, (2) fully
understood the danger it presented, and (3) disregarded this known danger and voluntarily
exposed himself or herself to it.").
170. See, e.g., Mid-South Distrib., Inc., Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 7984; see alsoHeil
Co., 534 S.W.2d at 920 (analyzing the facts separately in terms of knowledge, appreciation, and
voluntariness, but stating the nature of the theory in blended fashion: "The theory of the
assumption of risk defense is that a person may not recover for an injury received when he
voluntarily exposes himself to a known and appreciated danger.").
171. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supranote 50, § 68, at 487 (quoting Cincinnati, New
Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 236 F. 1, 9 (6th Cir. 1916)); see also Mid-South
Distrib., Inc. Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 7984 ("Knowledge on the part of the plaintiff is the
keystone of the doctrine."); Jara v. Rexworks Inc., 718 A.2d 788, 795 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)
("Nearly all cases in this area focus on the element of the defense encompassing knowledge of
the risk.").
172. "Knowledge of the general hazard involved in operating a punch-press machine will
not support the assumption of risk defense." Rhoads v. Service Machine Co., 329 F. Supp. 367
(E.D. Ark. 1971), cited in Heil Co., 534 S.W.2d at 921. See also Burch v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 467 A.2d 615, 620 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). InBurch, the plaintiff's electric mower shut off
twice and would not restart until he pushed the reset button. Id. at 618. The third time the motor
shut off, plaintiff leaned the mower on its side, without disturbing the reset button, and reached
into the blade area to remove the accumulated clumps of grass. Id. The motor unexpectedly
restarted and severely injured plaintiff's hand. Id. Plaintiff's suit was based upon the mower's
failure to have a deadman's device that would have stopped the blade automatically once the user
stopped pushing the mower. Id. Affirming a lower court decision for the plaintiff, the appellate
court held that the jury could reasonably find that the plaintiff had not assumed the risk because
he believed that the motor blade was stopped and could be restarted only if the reset button were
depressed. Id. at 620.
Contrast Denton v. Bachtold Bros., 291 N.E.2d 229, 231 (II!. App. Ct. 1972), where the
plaintiff understood that the blade of the mower remained spinning. As plaintiff was mowing his
grass up an incline with a rotary lawn mower manufactured by defendant, he approached a barrel
in his path. Id. at 230. He disengaged the driving clutch and stopped pushing the mower, but did
not release the clutch controlling the blades. Id. As he worked to move the barrel, his feet
slipped on the newly mown grass and into the machine. Id. Plaintiff sued, claiming that the
mower was defective because it was not equipped with a "deadman's throttle." Id. at 231.
Affirming a directed verdict for the defendant, the court held that the plaintiff had assumed the
risk.
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the specific risk.' This means the plaintiff must know more than that the
product encountered may be dangerous. 74 The plaintiffimust further understand
with some particularity how the product may cause an injury, so that he or she
is able to evaluate the likelihood and seriousness of potential injury and thereby
make an informed decision on whether or not to engage the risk.
If one were to apply the appreciation of specific risk requirement quite
literally, this aspect of the doctrine would swallow the rule and prevent it from
ever being applied. In the first article devoted to assumption of risk in the
products liability context,'75 Robert Keeton pointed out the apparent "enigma,"76
or self-contradiction, inherent in the "full appreciation of risk" requirement.
"'Risk' implies a degree of want of appreciation of the forces that are at work
in a given factual setting, since if one knew and understood all these forces he
would know that injury was certain to occur or that it was certain not to
occur.""' Rejecting the defense, a court made a similar point in a case brought
by a wireman who was severely shocked when he began to clean electrical
equipment that was not de-energized, due to a defect in the way the equipment
was configured.' "To conclude that [the plaintiff] was aware of the specific
defect in this configuration would be tantamount to believing that he intended
to commit suicide."' 79 But most courts have interpreted the appreciation
requirement more loosely, ruling that this element requires that a plaintiff
understand neither the precise nature and operation of the mechanical,
chemical, or biological mechanisms that may result in harm
' nor the precise
8
manner in which a product may be legally "defective."' '

173. See, e.g., Austin v. Lincoln Equip. Assoc., 888 F.2d 934, 937 (lst Cir. 1989)
(applying Rhode Island law to require the defendant to show that plaintiff "appreciated the
specific danger" of the product to prevail on a motion for directed verdict); Jackson v. Harsco
Corp., 673 P.2d 363, 366 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) ("The defendant must demonstrate that the
plaintiff had actual knowledge of the specific danger posed by the defect in design, and not just
general knowledge that the product could be dangerous."); Warner Fruehauf Trailer Co. v.
Boston, 654 A.2d 1272, 1275 (D.C. 1995) ("[I]n order to establish an assumption of risk defense
in a strict liability action, the defendant must show that the plaintiff knew of the specific defect
in the product and was aware of the danger arising from it").
174. See Rhoads v. Service Mach. Co., 329 F. Supp. 367, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Rahmig
v. Mosley Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 74 (Neb. 1987) ("Auser's knowledge about the general
danger or hazard in using a product will not support the defense."); Heil Co., 534 S.W.2d at
921.
175. Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, supra note 149.
176. Id. at 124.
177. Id.
178. Campbell v. ITE Imperiai Corp., 733 P.2d 969, 971 (Wash. 1987).
179. Id. at 976.
180. See, e.g., Ensor v. Hodgeson, 615 S.W.2d 519, 525 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)
("[K]nowledge of the precise engineering explanation of the defect is not necessary. It is
sufficient that the user realizes that there is a problem with the product that renders it dangerous
to use."); Heil Co., 534 S.W.2d at 922 ("The assumption of risk defense is based upon the
injured person's awareness of the danger of injury rather than an awareness of the producing
causes of the injury.").
181. See Heil Co., 534 S.W.2d at 921 ("mhe assumption of risk defense is premised upon
knowledge of the dangerous condition of a product rather than recognition of its
defectiveness."). But see Warner Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272, 1275 (D.C.
1995) (noting that evidence failed to show that plaintiff "had actual knowledge of the liftgate's
alleged design defect-the lack of a back-up system (e.g., a second cylinder or other safety
device) to prevent the heavy liftgate from free-falling in the event of a mechanical failure").
Although the courts in Pennsylvania have purported to require the defendant to prove that
the plaintiff knew of the specific "defect" which caused his injury, they appear not to have really
meant it. In Mackowick v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 541 A.2d 749 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988),
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8 2 the plaintiff's decedent was crushed
For example, in Heil Co. v. Grant,"
to death while he and his brother were performing repair work under a dump
truck.' The raised bed suddenly descended when one of the men accidentally
bumped the "pullout cable" attached to the hydraulic valve that controlled the
raising and lowering of the bed.'" Just before the accident, the decedent's
brother had warned him that the bed would crash down if he hit the cable." 5
The plaintiff sued the manufacturer, claiming that the hoist mechanism was
defectively designed, and the defendant asserted assumption ofrisk.8 6 The trial
court excluded certain testimony going to assumption of risk, thejury found for
the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed. 7 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals
To the plaintiff's argument that the decedent had general
reversed.'
knowledge that working beneath the dump truck could be dangerous, but had
no knowledge of the specific defect involved, the appeals court noted that the
specific danger was that hitting the cable would cause the bed to descend,
which the decedent knew.'89 To the plaintiff's contention that the requisite
knowledge must pertain to a "defect," rather than a danger, the court noted that
"the assumption of risk defense is premised upon knowledge of the dangerous
condition of a product rather than recognition of its defectiveness."'"
191the plaintiff
In another case, Haugen v.Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.,
was injured when the grinding wheel he was working on exploded into three
pieces, one of which hit him in the eye."9 The plaintiff was not wearing safety
goggles at the time of the accident, although two pair were available in the

Judge Brosky, writing in dissent, noted that:
[U]se of the term "defect", with its mechanical and technological
connotations, has caused much confusion among members of the bench and
bar. Some have argued that a plaintiff is aware of a specific defect only if
he understands the mechanical process which causes the item to be
dangerous. This interpretation is an overly technical misstatement of the
law. For assumption of the risk to apply, a plaintiff needn't understand the
mechanical process, but must be subjectively aware of the nature,
character, and extent of the danger posed by the specific attributewhich is
allegedly defective; this requires more than a general awareness by the
plaintiff that the product is somehow dangerous.
Id.at 753 (Brosky, J., dissenting); see also Lonon v. Pep Boys, Manny, Moe & Jack, 538 A.2d
22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). InLonon the plaintiff was injured while attaching jumper cables to his
at 24. His expert theorized that
battery, which exploded, splashing sulfuric acid into his eyes. Id.
the explosion was caused by a defective weld in the battery; the defendant's expert opined that
the explosion was due to the plaintiff's failure to use the spark-free jump-starting procedures
specified in the instructions referred to by a warning on the battery. Id. The plaintiff had worked
at a service station, knew that batteries contain acid, had jump-started cars fifty times or more,
had witnessed sparks created during jump starts, and had heard of batteries exploding. Id. at 25.
The superior court held that the plaintiff could not have assumed the risk of the defect in the
battery because he did not know about it. Id. However, he may have assumed the more general
risk that the battery might explode if he did not use the jumper cables properly. Id. at 26.
182. 534 S.W.2d 916 (rex. Civ. App. 1976).
183. Id.at 919.
184. Id.

185. Id.
186. Id.at 920.

187. Id.
188. Heil Co., 534 S.W.2d at 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
189. Id.at 922.
190. Id.at 921.
191. 550 P.2d 71 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976), supersededby statute, Van Hout v. Celotex
Corp., 853 P.2d 908, 912 (Wash. 1993).
192. Id.at 75.
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shop, and he knew oftheir importance from his prior safety training. 93 The trial
court instructed the jury: "It is not enough to bar recovery by the plaintiff on
the defense of assumption of risk that the plaintiff knew that there was a
general danger connected with the use of the product, but rather it must be
shown that the plaintiff actually knew, appreciated, and voluntarily and
unreasonably exposed himself to the specific defect and danger which caused
his injuries."'" On appeal, affirming judgment for the plaintiff, the court held
the instruction to be proper:
[P]laintiff testified that he was aware that dust or small
particles of wood were likely to be thrown from the
dashboard while he was grinding on it. He further testified
that he did not deem it necessary to wear the available safety
goggles because he felt that his eyeglasses would provide
adequate protection from this danger. If plaintiff assumed any
risk at all, it was the risk of having dust or small particles of
wood or metal lodged in his eye during the grinding process.
He was obviously not aware of the latent defect in the
structural integrity of the disc itself and the danger posed by
that defect. This latent defect was not and probably could not
have been known by the plaintiff. Plaintiff, therefore, could
not have assumed the risk engendered by the defect. 9
Whether and the extent to which a plaintiff in fact was aware ofa particular
risk involves a subjective inquiry into the plaintiff's state of mind." Stated
otherwise, the knowledge question in such cases concerns the peculiarly factual
issue of what the plaintiff himself knew and understood, not what a reasonable
or normal person would or should have known and understood in similar
circumstances. Sometimes courts speak loosely and misstate the principle, 97
but it is plainly wrong for a lawyer to argue or for a court to instruct ajury that
assumption of risk involves a question of whether the plaintiff "shouldhave
known" of the risk; the only proper question is what the plaintiff did in fact
know.'" Nor does the plaintiff s age, intelligence, experience, information, or
judgment directly help establish, as it does in setting a child's standard of care

193. Id.
194. Id. at 74.
195. Id. at 75.
196. See, e.g., Jackson v. Harsco Corp., 673 P.2d 363, 366 (Colo. 1983) (en banc);
Warner Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272, 1275 (D.C. 1995); Labrie v. Pace
Membership Warehouse, Inc., 678 A.2d 867, 872 (R.I. 1996) ("The standard is a subjective one
requiring us to review the evidence to determine what this particular plaintiff actually saw,
knew, understood, and appreciated at the time of his injury."); see alsoPROSSER & KEETON ON
TORTS, supra note 50, § 68, at 487.
197. See, e.g., Bereman v. Burdolski, 460 P.2d 567, 569 (Kan. 1969) (approving
instruction that plaintiff was barred if he continued to use a vehicle once he was aware of a
defect in the brakes or "should have been aware of it").
198. See, e.g., Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 921 (rex. Ct. App. 1976) ("The fact
that the injured person shouldhave known of the danger will not support the assumption of risk
defense.").
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for negligence and contributory negligence, a standard of proper behavior. 9 9
The assumption of risk question is properly framed as whether this particular
plaintiff infact was subjectively aware of and appreciated this particular risk.
That said, ajury is not required to believe the plaintiff's testimony as to his or
her state ofmind, and the jury may test the plaintiff's avowals of what he or she
understood against what the jury believes people with similar personal
characteristics-such as "age, or lack of information, experience, intelligence,
or judgment" 2 °-ordinarily understand when confronting a similar product
hazard.2"' This distinction is a fine one, and it is easy for a lawyer or court to
confuse the subjective standard that properly is at issue with the kind of
objective framework that may help a jury resolve the subjective issue of the
plaintiff's state of mind. While such confusion is understandable, it may quite
easily upset the outcome of a case and so should be scrupulously avoided. 2"
199. However, these factors provide circumstantial evidence of what the plaintiff in fact
did know and understand. An intelligent adult familiar with the product is more likely to be
found to have assumed a risk than is an inexperienced or dim-witted adult, or a child. Compare
Bakunas v. Life Pack, Inc., 531 F.Supp. 89 (E.D. La. 1982) (finding assumption of risk where
a movie stuntman performed free fall from 323 feet into air-inflated cushion rated only to 200
feet), Barnes v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 357 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (finding
assumption of risk where a motorcyclist of nearly 20 years, who collided with stalled car at
night, claimed that motorcycle should have been equipped with crash bars as standard equipment
and that head-lamp provided too little light at high-speed), and Mackowick v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 541 A.2d 749 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (finding assumption of risk where an
experienced electrician stuck screwdriver into energized capacitor-box), with Nettles v.
Electrolux Motor AB, 784 F.2d 1574 (1 th Cir. 1986) (finding no assumption of risk where an
experienced but dim-witted woodcutter, who was injured when chain saw kicked back and had
been injured by kickbacks before, knew that saws were available which were less likely to cause
injury from kickbacks), and Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 616 S.W.2d 720
(Ark. 1981) (finding no assumption of risk where an eight-year-old caught pants in rotating
power take-off shaft attached to tractor while climbing off grain cart).
200. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 496D, cmt. c (1965); see also id. §§ 496A cmt.
d, and 496C cmt. e.
201. The Texas court explains this well:
An injured person's knowledge of a dangerous condition or defect is
measured subjectively; i.e., by that person's actual, conscious knowledge.
The fact that the injured person should have known of the danger will not
support the assumption of risk defense. Sometimes, however, that person
may know such facts as to be charged with knowledge of the danger. This
standard would be applied when it was difficult or impossible to determine
the state of the injured person's mind; as it was in the instant case of a fatal

injury.

Hell Co., 534 S.W.2d at 920-21 (citations omitted). The Texas court sensitively tested the
decedent's probable knowledge against a standard based upon his own level of age, intelligence,
experience, and other factors. Id. at 922.
202. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 50, § 68, at 76 (Supp. 1988)
which observes:
[To] state the doctrine in terms of what the plaintiff "knew or should have
known" about the danger ... is calculated at best to confuse the jury, and
it is usually seriously misleading, since the apparent question put by such
a standard is whether the plaintiff ought to have perceived the danger-by
some external, objective standard of proper behavior-rather than the
subjective question of whether the plaintiff himself actually knew the risk
was present. But this is plainly wrong, and the use of "should have known"
language in such instructions to the jury should therefore be prohibited.
What the courts have here been searching for is some way to let the jurors
know that they do not have to take the plaintiff at his word, but that they
may instead test his protestations of ignorance of the risk by some external
standard based on ordinary principles of credibility and common sense. It
would be much better if the courts would simply say so.
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If a plaintiff does not know of or understand a risk, it is axiomatic that the
assumption of risk defense will not bar his injuries resulting from that risk, as
discussed above. Accordingly, if a product is defective because the
manufacturer has not warned of a hidden risk, then a plaintiff unaware of that
risk cannot be barred by the doctrine of assumption of risk.2 3 If2a5 defendant
denies the existence of the risk,2" or conceals it from consumers, as did the
manufacturers of cigarettes for several decades, the assumption of risk defense
may be disallowed.' But a plaintiff's knowledge may come from any source,
and assumption of risk may be one reason2 °7 to bar a claim that a manufacturer
failed to provide an adequate warning of a risk which the plaintiff already
knows and understands.'
C. Voluntary Encounter
The second important limitation on the assumption of risk defense is that
a plaintiff's decision to encounter a risk must be "free and voluntary." 2' The
notions of appreciation and voluntariness to some extent overlap, in that the
notion of consent supporting assumption of risk suggests that the plaintiff
makes a true and meaningful choice to engage a particular risk, to expose
himself to a particular risk of harm, presumably to advance an interest (even
mere convenience) that the plaintiffconsiders more valuable than avoidance of
the risk. "Choice" in this context means, first, that the plaintiff understands the
nature of the risk encountered; second, that the plaintiff has available one or
more alternative courses of action by which he or she may reasonably avoid the
risk; and third, that the plaintiff then decides that his or her interests will best
be served by encountering the danger.
If a plaintiff's only or best "choice" is to encounter a known risk, then the
encounter is not "voluntary." As just discussed, the voluntary requirement in
assumption ofrisk essentially means that the plaintiff has a true choice, that he
or she has reasonableoptions available to avoid the risk. While defining the
consensual notions of voluntariness and choice in reasonableness terms may
appear to be mixing apples and oranges, it probably is the best way to give
content to this requirement. There is something wrong, indeed illogical and
perverse, with a doctrine based on a plaintiff s consent that permits a defendant
Id.
203. For the classic statements of this principle, see generally Wright v. CarterProducts,
Inc., 244 F.2d 53, 60 (2d Cir. 1957); McClanahan v. California-SprayChem. Corp., 75 S.E.2d
712, 725 (Va. 1953); and Keeton, Assumption ofRisk in ProductsLiability Cases, supra note
149, at 145. A more recent application is Warner FruehaufTrailer Co. v. Boston, 654 A.2d
1272, 1275 (D.C. 1995).
204. See Wilks v. Am. Tobacco Co., 680 So. 2d 839, 843 (Miss. 1996).
205. See, e.g., Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 146-49 (3d Cir. 1998)
(applying Pennsylvania law and affirming decertification of Pennsylvania class action).
206. But see Gilboy v. Am. Tobacco Co., 582 So. 2d 1263, 1265-66 (La. 1991)
(recognizing this defense but denying defendant's motion for summary judgment on this issue).
207. The absence of cause in fact may be another reason. See Haesche v. Kissner, 640
A.2d 89, 92 (Conn. 1994); see also Plummer v. Lederle Labs. 819 F.2d 349, 359 (2d Cir. 1987)
("'no harm could have been caused by failure to warn of a risk already known,'" quoting
Rosburg v. Minnesota Mining &Mfg. Co., 226 Cal. Rptr. 299, 305 (Dist. Ct. App. 1986)). See
generally 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILrY, supra note 8, ch. 12.
208. See, e.g., Heil Co., 534 S.W.2d. at 922-23. In Heil the plaintiff alleged that the
dump truck was defective because the manufacturer had failed to provide a warning of the
pullout cable hazard, but the decedent's brother had warned him of just that risk. Id.
209. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTs, supra note 50, § 68, at 490.
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to avoid responsibility for causing harm by forcing a danger upon the plaintiff,
"forcing" because the plaintiffhas no reasonable means to avoid it. "Where the
defendant puts him to a choice of evils, there is a species of duress, which
destroys the idea of freedom of election .... By placing him in the dilemma,
the defendant has deprived him of his freedom of choice, and so cannot be
heard to say that he has voluntarily assumed the risk."21 On the other hand, if
a plaintiff has a perfectly reasonable way to avoid a danger created by the
defendant, yet knowingly chooses to encounter it, then he cannot complain that
he was compelled to take this path, for such a choice is free and voluntary.2 '
The voluntariness aspect of assumption of risk is a chimerical concept, for
it is difficult to imagine why a person who truly understands a substantial risk
of harm would not avoid it if there were a reasonable way to do so. No doubt
there are occasional cases where a plaintiff acts with complete abandon of
dangers that he or she full well knows to lie within a product-as when a
person sticks his hand into a meat grinder because it is "more convenient" than
using the metal stomper that is provided;" 2 continues to ride at high speed a
motorcycle with a wobbly front end on a pleasure trip without "the slightest
compulsion of business or otherwise";2" 3 or sticks his arm through the cross
bars of a fork lift to activate the control lever to lower the bars, rather than
going inside the vehicle to do so, because he is "in a hurry and [decides to take]
a calculated risk that he could get his hand out of the way before the forks hit
him." 4 In "calculated risk" cases such as these, assuming that the plaintiff
truly appreciates the specific risk, the plaintiff's risk encounter is clearly
advertent and so in that sense voluntary.

210. Id. at 490-91; see, e.g., Wallace v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 300 S.C. 518, 389 S.E.2d
155 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989). In Wallace, in which the plaintiff was injured while cleaning up
effects of a soft drink bottle explosion, Judge Bell reasoned:
The plaintiff's acceptance of a risk is not voluntary if the defendant's
wrongful conduct leaves him no reasonable alternative course of conduct
in order to avert harm to himself or another. ... [The explosion of the
defective bottle left him with no reasonable alternative. He had a choice
between two evils: he could leave the spill on the floor with the risk that
he or others might be injured by its presence or he could undertake to
remove the spill with the risk that he or another would be injured in the
process of cleaning up. In other words, either choice entailed risk. In these
circumstances, his choice to remove the hazard was not a voluntary
assumption of risk. The Defendants had created a condition of peril which
involved a risk of harm no matter which choice Wallace made. Risk was
unavoidable in the circumstances.
Id. at 158-59 (citations omitted).
211. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 50, § 68, at 491 provides:
In all of these cases, of course, the danger may be out of all proportion to
the value of any benefits involved, and so the plaintiff may be charged with
contributory negligence for unreasonably choosing to confront the risk.
And where there is a reasonably safe alternative open, the plaintiff's choice
of the dangerous way is a free one, and may amount to assumption of risk,
negligence or both.
212. Green v. Sanitary Scale Co., 431 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1970) (applying Pennsylvania
law).
213. Saeter v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 8 Cal. Rptr. 747, 753 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
214. Moran v. Raymond Corp., 484 F.2d 1008, 1016 (7th Cir. 1973) (applying Illinois
law).
215. In workplace settings, such "advertent" encounters may not be truly voluntarily if
they are compelled in some manner by the employment situation, as discussed infra text
accompanying notes 226-32.
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More typical, however, are cases where the plaintiff may fully understand
a specific risk but momentarily forgets about it or becomes distracted and then
encounters it inadvertently. For example, a plaintiff might appreciate with
specificity that if one's foot slips under a power mower with the blade
revolving it is likely to be cut,2" 6 that getting clothing caught in a rotating part
of machinery may well cause a limb to become entangled in the machine,"' or
that hitting the pullout cable beneath a dump truck is likely to cause the bed to
come crashing down.21s When such a plaintiff thereafter accidentally engages
such a risk, which though earlier appreciated was not in the plaintiff's mind at
the time of the accidental encounter, courts often apply the assumption of risk
defense on a finding that the encounter was "voluntary."2 9
While it is true that such plaintiffs have the last and sometimes best chance
to prevent such injuries," since risk control at the time of the risk encounter
lies exclusively with them, inadvertent encounters with the product itself may
more appropriately be viewed as careless mistakes than as consensual
("voluntary") decisions to incur particular risks of harm. Plaintiffs in such
situations may choose to work around a risk which they understand may cause
them harm ifthey were accidentally to engage certain parts of the machine, and
so in this manner they may be said to voluntarily encounter such risks of harm.
But the "encounter" ofrelevance in such cases might more properly be viewed
as the specific encounter with the unreasonably dangerous aspect of a machine
at the time of the accident,rather than the encounter of a generalrisk that such
a specific encounter might sometime occur."' If an accident results from the
plaintiffs inadvertent causative behavior, as from slipping into or otherwise
accidentally contacting the dangerous parts of a machine, the plaintiffs
operative behavior is purely inadvertent; being inadvertent, it is by definition
"involuntary."
The appeal of the assumption of risk doctrine lies in grounding
responsibility for accidents in a person's choices concerning risk control. And
there are at least two perspectives that help illuminate the sign of risk control
choices. The first perspective concerns the reasonableness of a plaintiffs
choice to encounter a risk, which is injected into the concept of voluntariness
by defining it in terms ofthe availability of reasonable alternatives for avoiding
the risk, as discussed above. If circumstances force a plaintiff to encounter a
defective product condition, then the plaintiffs encounter is not voluntary
because of the absence of choice, as discussed above. And because of the

216. Denton v. Bachtold Bros., 291 N.E.2d 229 (I11.
App. Ct. 1972).
217. Johnson v. Mid-South Distrib., Inc., Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCII) 7984 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 1977).
218. Heil Co., 534 S.W.2d at 919.
219. See Denton, 291 N.E.2d at 251 (slipping under lawn mower); Mid-South Distrib.,
Inc., Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 7984 (catching pant leg in rotating machinery shaft); Heil Co.,
534 S.W.2d at 922 (hitting dump truck pullout cable). But see Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 547
P.2d 132, 141 (Or. 1976) (activating, inadvertently, control on forklift).
220. See Nelson v. Brunswick Corp., 503 F.2d 376, 383 (9th Cir. 1974) (applying
Washington law and stating "the rationale is essentially that when the plaintiff knows and
appreciates the danger, he is in a position as good as the defendant's to avoid his injury").
221. See, e.g., Jackson v. Harsco Corp., 673 P.2d 363 (Colo. 1983) (en bane) (relying on
reasoning of Culp v. Rexnord & Booth-Rouse Equip. Co., 553 P.2d 844, 845 (Colo. Ct. App.
1976)). The court in Jackson stated that "[tihere was ...no evidence that plaintiff had actual
knowledge of the specific dangers arising out of the precise defect asserted, or that he voluntarily
and unreasonably proceeded to encounter those dangers despite his awareness of the defect." Id.

at 367.
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absence of choice resulting from the plaintiff being forced into the encounter,
the plaintiff's will is removed from a causative analysis of the accident, leaving
the manufacturer's sale of a defective product as the last and sole proximate
cause of the accident.
The second perspective on a person's risk control choices concerns the
time when a person decides to encounter a risk. A product user may understand
and voluntarily accept a general risk of harm at the time of employment or
when a particular project with a product first begins. Yet, at the precise moment
a potential accident victim interacts with a product in a manner that erupts into
accidental injury, the victim is rarely deliberating upon the nature and degree
of risk in, and the desirability of, the specific interaction. Instead, as mentioned
earlier, the actual, physical interactions-the "specific" risk encounters-in
most situations are inadvertent mistakes, not deliberative choices. To put the
matter slightly differently, while persons often voluntarily decide to encounter
future risks in a general way, they rarely encounter particular risks voluntarily
at the moment of an accident.
It is only when a person's risk encounter is "voluntary" from both the
reasonableness and temporal perspectives that the person fairly may be deemed
to have assumed the risk. Thus, accidents caused by a plaintiff's unreasonable
decision to take a truly calculated risk--one that consciously involves the
specific physical interaction with the product that results in injury-may be the
only type of case in which the assumption of risk defense provides a proper
basis for barring recovery. In such situations, where a prudent person would not
knowingly and voluntarily act in such a dangerous manner for such a trivial
benefit, the doctrine of sole proximate cause could quite easily be substituted
for assumption of risk as a mechanism for placing full responsibility upon the
plaintiff.'
There are at least two contexts in which the courts have been especially
open to challenges to the voluntariness of risk encounters: rescues and
workplace accidents. In the rescue situation, as with the contributory negligence
defense,' a number of courts have held that a rescuer of a person endangered
by a defective product may not be barred by the defense of assumption of
risk.22
The second context in which courts are more skeptical of the voluntariness
of a plaintiff's risk encounter is the employment setting where a worker is
injured by a dangerous industrial machine or other workplace product. For
example, in Rhoads v. Service Machine Co.,' s the operator's arm and hand
slipped into a large punch press when she lost her balance while activating the
press. Upholding the jury's rejection ofthe assumption of risk defense, despite
the plaintiffs knowledge of the unguarded nature of the machine, the court
incisively remarked: "The 'voluntariness' with which a worker assigned to a
dangerous machine in a factory 'assumes the risk of injury' from the machine

222. See supra Part II (discussing the sole proximate cause doctrine, applicable to both
contributory and comparative negligence).
223. See supra Part II.
224. See, e.g., Dillard v. Pittway Corp., 719 So. 2d 188, 193-94 (Ala. 1998) (identifying
the relevant cases and explaining that neither contributory negligence nor assumption of risk are
available as a defense unless rescuer's conduct was "manifestly rash and reckless").
225. 329 F. Supp. 367, 370 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
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is illusory." 22 Other courts 7 and commentators 22 have agreed that such
workplace encounters often are not "voluntary." The Supreme Court of Ohio
has abolished the assumption of risk defense in the workplace setting on the
ground that workers often are effectively trapped into performing dangerous
activities, a situation which destroys any voluntariness in many suchjob-related
risk encounters. 9
However, some courts continue to treat the voluntariness of encounters in
the workplace like any other encounter, sometimes without giving adequate
consideration to the propriety of its application in this context," and so apply
the assumption of risk defense if deemed warranted on the facts."' These courts
sometimes reason that any compulsion comes not from the defendant

226. Id. at 381.
227. See, e.g., McCalla v. Harnischfeger Corp., 521 A.2d 851, 856 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1987) ('[A]n employee engaged in his assigned task... has no meaningful choice." (citations
and internal quotations omitted)). Other courts have found the assumption of risk defense
improper in the workplace setting on the ground that such encounters are not unreasonable. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 547 P.2d 132, 139-40 (Or. 1976); Jara v. Rexworks Inc.,
718 A.2d 788, 795 (Pa. Super. 1998) (2-1 decision). The Jara court held that the trial court
erred in instructing on assumption of risk and stated:
To suggest that Mr. Jara was required to choose between performing his
duties or use the defective product would permit [Defendant], by its own
wrong, to deny Mr. Jara the right and privilege of his employment.
Therefore, he could not voluntarily assume the risk as [Defendant]
suggests. Where an employee, in doing ajob, is required to use equipment
as furnished by the employer, this defense is unavailable. An employee
who is required to use certain equipment in the course of his employment
and who uses that equipment as directed by the employer has no choice in
encountering a risk inherent in that equipment.
Jara,718 A.2d at 795.
228. See Noel, supra note 3, at 127. Noel explains:
When an employee consents to work under dangerous conditions, this
consent ordinarily is not regarded as effective in a suit against the employer
because of the economic pressure involved. It would seem that when a
manufacturer supplies a dangerous machine for use by employees, the
workman injured because of the unsafe design is subject to comparable
economic pressure and that his consent to use the dangerous machine,
perhaps in order to retain his job, is likewise not free and voluntary.
Id.; see also Note, Assumption of Risk and Strict ProductsLiability, 95 HARV. L. REV. 872,
889-90 n.68 (1982) ("It is illogical to prevent the employer from raising the defense of
assumption of risk on the ground that the employee lacks freedom of choice, while
simultaneously allowing the manufacturer of the product used in the workplace to escape liability
on the ground that the employee voluntarily assumed that same risk." (citation omitted)).
229. SeeCremeansv. Willmar Henderson Mfg. Co., 566 N.E.2d 1203, 1207 (Ohio 1991).
230. For example, in Hedgepeth v. FruehaufCorp., 634 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Miss. 1986),
the driver, whose job required walking on the rounded top of a tanker truck to open hatches,
complained that the truck's top was "real slick and real cruddy" with oil residue and needed to
be cleaned. Id. at 95, 96. The supervisor ordered him to use the truck anyway, or just to leave.
Id. at 95. After a delivery, while walking on the top to close a hatch that had been left open, he
slipped and fell. Id. Although the driver in this case surely knew of the specific risk, the absence
of reasonable alternatives-the compulsion to use the product in its hazardous condition in order
to work at all-would seem to render his decision to work completely devoid of choice and

hence "involuntary." Yet the court disagreed and held the driver's actions to be "voluntary."

Id. at 99.
231. See Campbell v. Nordco Products, 629 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1980) (applying Illinois
law); Hedgepeth, 634 F. Supp. at 99; Vargus v. Pittman Mfg. Co., 510 F. Supp. 116 (E.D. Pa.
1981), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1301 (3d Cir. 1981); Carroll v. Getty Oil Co., 498 F. Supp. 409 (D. Del.
1980) impliedly overruledon other groundsby Figgs v. Bellevue Holding Co., 652 A.2d 1084
(Del. Super. Ct. 1994); Alley v. Praschak Mach. Co., 366 So. 2d 661, 664 (Miss. 1979).
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manufacturer but from a third party, the employer, 2 and that even in this
setting workers not infrequently make entirely deliberate (and sometimes
entirely foolish) decisions exposing themselves to risks that they fully
understand and know to be unreasonable. 3
D. Assumption of Risk as a Defense to Strict Liability in Tort Claims
While assumption of risk as classically defined is a standard defense to
products liability claims brought in negligence, many jurisdictions alter its
definition, and a couple alter its availabilitY and effect, in claims for strict
liability in tort.216Restatement (Second)of Torts § 402A comment n, examined
above in connection with the contributory negligence defense,"37 provides in
part:
[T]he form of contributory negligence which consists in
voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a
known danger, and commonly passes under the name of
assumption ofrisk, is a defense under this Section as in other
cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the
defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds
unreasonably to make use ofthe product and is injured by it,
he is barred from recovery."
As discussed above,"39 a few states ignored comment n and continued applying

the traditional elements of assumption of risk even for claims brought in strict
products liability in tort.240 However, especially before the widespread adoption
" ' many jurisdictions adopted comment n's approach of
of comparative fault,24

232. See, e.g., Hedgepeth, 634 F. Supp. at 99 n.3 (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 496E cmt. b).
233. See, e.g., Moran v. Raymond Corp., 484 F.2d 1008, 1016 (7th Cir. 1973) (applying
Illinois law and finding that worker stuck his arm through moving cross bars on fork lift,
activating them). The court in Moran stated, "Workmen often take risks which they should not
take... ."Id.
234. See, e.g., Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County Sch. Dist., 437 A.2d 1198, 1209
(Pa. 1981) (explaining that assumption of risk may be abolished as a defense to tort claims
generally, but be retained to operate as a bar to claims for strict products liability in tort).
235. Assumption of risk may operate only to reduce damages on a comparative fault basis,
except in strict products liability in tort where it may serve as a total bar. See Bowling v. Heil
Co., 511 N.E.2d 373,375 (Ohio 1987); Onderko v. Richmond Mfg. Co., 511 N.E.2d 388, 391
(Ohio 1987).
236. See Epstein, supra note 3, at 268; Noel, supranote 3, at 94-95; Spivey, supra note
121, at §§ 4, 5 (contributory negligence and assumption of risk as defenses to claim for strict
products liability in tort); Twerski, supranote 149, at 2; Vargo, supra note 121, at 448.
237. See supra Part II (discussing comment n in full).
238. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965).
239. See supra Part II.
240. See Rahmig v. Mosley Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 74 (Neb. 1987); see also CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-5721 (1991) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed as
barring... the defense of knowingly using the product in a defective condition in an action
based on strict tort liability.").
241. After the adoption of comparative fault, many (but not all) jurisdictions saw no need
to distinguish between forms of plaintiff fault and so included all forms of plaintiff misconduct
in the comparative calculus. See generally ScHwARTz, supra note 5, ch. 11-1 (explaining the
interface of strict liability and comparative fault); 2 MADDEN &OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY,
supra note 5, ch. 15.

2000]

USER MISCONDUCT DEFENSES

restricting the availability of the assumption of risk defense in strict products
liability in tort to cases of unreasonable("negligent"242) assumptions of risk.243
In effect, such jurisdictions add an additional element-unreasonableness-onto
the traditional elements which comprise the assumption of risk defense as
applied to claims of negligence. So altered, the assumption of risk defense to
claims for strict products liability in tort requires that a plaintiff know and
it, and that the
appreciate the risk, that he or she voluntarily encounter
plaintiffs decision to encounter it be unreasonable. 2"
As with the issue of voluntariness discussed above, some courts have
stressed that workplace decisions to encounter risk may be found not to be
"unreasonable" if the practical demands of the job sabotage an opportunity for
truly consensual decisionmaking about such encounters. 4 Although there is
242. See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Holt, 875 S.W.2d 543, 548-49 (Mo. 1994) (en bane) (using
"negligent assumption of risk" expression, but applying it to wrong statutory provision).
243. Some of the earlier cases adopting this approach include Johnson v. ClarkEquipment
Co., 547 P.2d 132, 138 (Or. 1976); Ferrarov. FordMotorCo., 223 A.2d 746, 748 (Pa. 1966);
and Haugen v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 550 P.2d 71, 75 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976). South
Carolina did so by adopting a key sentence of comment n statutorily. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7320 (Law. Co-op. 1976). More recent adoptions, applications, and statements of this principle
include Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 904 P.2d 861, 864 (Ariz. 1995); Jackson v. Harsco
Corp., 673 P.2d 363, 366 (Colo. 1983) (en banc); WarnerFruehaufTrailer Co. v. Boston, 654
A.2d 1272, 1275 (D.C. 1995); Deere & Co. v. Brooks, 299 S.E.2d 704, 706 (Ga. 1983); and
Berg v. Sukup Manufacturing Co., 355 N.W.2d 833, 835 (S.D. 1984).
In Clark Equipment Company the court explained:
The concept of assumption of risk in a products liability case differs
somewhat from the traditional tort doctrine of assumption of risk. ... In
contrast to the more traditional defense which includes only two
elements-subjective knowledge and voluntary encounter-Commentn sets
forth three elements which must be shown before the plaintiff can be
barred from recovery. The defendant must show, first, that the plaintiff
himself actually knew and appreciated the particular risk or danger created
by the defect; second, that plaintiff voluntarily encountered the risk while
realizing the danger; and, third, that plaintiff's decision to voluntarily
encounter the known risk was unreasonable.
Clark Equip. Co., 547 P.2d at 138. C. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. San Diego Cty. Super.
Ct., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 423, 431 (Ct. App. 1992) (stating that to bar recovery for breach of
warranty, jury must find that plaintiff used product after discovering defect and that a reasonable
person would not have used product knowing of its condition); Allen v. Chance Mfg. Co., 494
N.E.2d 1324, 1326 (Mass. 1986) (stating that plaintiff must have actual knowledge to recover
for breach of implied warranty).
244. See, e.g., Berg v. Sukup Mfg. Co., 355 N.W.2d 833, 835 (S.D. 1984). In Berg the
court, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. n, observed:
In applying the doctrine of assumption of the risk to products liability
cases the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) requires
that... the manufacturer must show:
(1) That the plaintiff knew and appreciated the risk or danger created
by the defect,
(2) that the plaintiff voluntarily encountered the risk while realizing
the danger, and
(3) that the plaintiffs decision to voluntarily encounter the risk was
unreasonable.
Id.
245. See, e.g., Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 454 P.2d 205, 208 (Wash. '1969) ("It could
never be said as a matter of law that a workman whose job requires him to expose himself to a
danger, voluntarily and unreasonably encounters the same."); Clark Equip. Co., 547 P.2d at
140-41. The Clark Equipment court reasoned:
[Wiorking conditions and related circumstances are a particularly relevant
consideration in an inquiry into the reasonableness of a decision to
encounter a job-related danger. Such factors often will have a strong
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very little recent law on point, it would seem quite clear that, even in the
workplace context, a person may unreasonably (and voluntarily) choose to
engage a known and appreciated risk.246
The reasonableness issue in strict liability in tort cases concerns the
plaintiff's decision to encounter a particular risk, or to encounter it in a
particular way, not the reasonableness of the physical execution of that
decision.247 Unlike the other elements of assumption of risk, the
unreasonableness element adds an objective determination ofwhether a prudent
person would have decided to encounter the particular risk based on all the
surrounding circumstances.248
While adding an "unreasonableness" requirement to the definition of
assumption of risk for strict liability in tort claims formally narrows and
restricts the availability of the defense, and while it may provide a plaintiff's
lawyer with a convenient peg on which to hang an argument, the effect of this
element may be more apparent than real. No doubt it is true that the orthodox
definition of assumption of risk does not require that a plaintiff's choice to
incur a known risk be unreasonable, so that the defense may theoretically arise
even if an encounter was reasonable in all respects. 2" 9 However, if the
"voluntary" element of assumption of risk is defined as the absence of
reasonable alternatives, as discussed above, the set of reasonable assumptions
of risk essentially disappears.
Assume, for example, that a pregnant woman living deep in the country
goes into labor, and her doctor counsels her by telephone that complications in
her pregnancy threaten her life if she does not immediately begin to drive to the
distant hospital. When her husband helps her into their only car, he first notices
a large bubble defect that has formed on the sidewall of a newly purchased
front tire on the car. Being a tire salesman, he knows that the bubble may cause
the tire to fail at anytime. However, because there are no neighbors, nor time
to call an ambulance, the husband proceeds to drive slowly and carefully to the
hospital. But the tire bursts en route, causing the car to careen into a ditch,

influence on that decision, and, in some cases, they may represent the most
important motivational factors. For example, a worker might fear that a
slowdown in his individual production would slow down the entire
production team and thereby draw the attention of his boss. If he has a
history of such slowdowns, or of causing excessive spoilage or ruining
machine parts, he may have good cause to fear dismissal. The job market
could be tight, and he may have little hope of being able to find a new job.
Moreover, the situation may demand an immediate, hurried decision. It is
certainly possible that, under such circumstances, a reasonable jury could
find that his decision to encounter a known risk was not unreasonable.
Id.; see also Berg, 355 N.W.2d at 835-36 (explaining that working conditions are relevant in
determining the reasonableness of a decision).
246. See, e.g., Moran v. Raymond Corp., 484 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1973) (applying Illinois
law). In Moran the plaintiff, to avoid getting back inside the operator's cage, reached from
outside a forklift between the horizontal cross bars to engage the throttle, lowering a cross bar
upon his arm which he could not extract in time. Id. This case presents a good example,
although the court did not there examine the reasonableness of the plaintiffs conduct or decision.
247. See Clark Equip. Co., 547 P.2d at 140 ("We are not concerned with the apparent
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the physical conduct through which plaintiff encountered
the danger, but rather the reasonableness of his decision to do so.").
248. See id. at 138 n.5.
249. See, e.g., Rahmig v. Mosley Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 74 (Neb. 1987) (stating
that assumption of the risk negates liability even if plaintiff acts with due care). See generally
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 50, § 68, at 481.
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injuring the husband. No doubt ajury would find that the husband's decision
to incur the risk of driving on the defective tire was reasonable, and quite
probably that it was informed. But the decision to incur this risk was not
voluntary; it was reasonable for the very same reason that it was
involuntary-the husband had no choice, no reasonable alternative to
attempting the journey on a tire he knew to be dangerously defective.
Thus, if voluntariness means the absence of choice, and choice means the
availability of reasonable alternatives, voluntariness and reasonableness may
be seen to collapse into one another, rendering the notion of a reasonable
assumption of risk a contradiction in terms and a virtually empty set."' In the
problem above, the husband would be protected from an assumption of risk
defense because his choice to incur the risk was reasonable, but he would avoid
it as well because the decision was involuntary. These results would be
reversed if the husband had no good reason to drive on the defective tire, that
is, if a reasonable alternative were available. So, if the husband chose to drive
to a baseball game on the defective tire, failing to take time to change the tire
with an available spare in order to arrive earlier and get a better parking space,
then his choice to incur the risk would be voluntary, his decision would also be
unreasonable, and his assumption of risk would bar recovery. Either way,
because reasonableness is bound up in the notion of voluntariness, adding the
unreasonableness of a decision to encounter a risk as a formal element to
assumption of risk may not materially alter the scope of the defense. 5
E. Reform

Assumption of risk is on the run. The doctrine is plainly problematic: it
may unfairly place responsibility for injuries upon a victim whose only fault lay
in making a choice, perhaps correctly, that was forced improperly upon him by
a tortfeasor. To the extent that a plaintiff truly was at fault in encountering a
risk, the doctrines of(no) duty,"s2 contributory (and comparative) negligence, "
and (sole) proximate causation 4 would appear to cover virtually every case
where assumption of risk properly bars recovery. For these reasons, the

250. "Virtually empty" is more accurate than "completely so" because the risks and other
costs of an alternative course of action may be equal to, rather than less than, those of the course
of action encountered. In such a case, either decision would be reasonable.
251. See, e.g., Berg v. Sukup Mfg. Co., 355 N.W.2d 833 (S.D. 1984). InBerg the court,
applying the unreasonableness element of Restatement (Second) ofTorts §402A cmt. n, defined
the element in terms of the presence of a reasonable alternative, a standard more typically used
to define voluntariness. Id. at 835. The court remarked: "Reasonableness refers to whether the
plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to elect whether or not to subject himself to the danger."
Id. at 835. The court further stated the issue in terms of "[w]hether or not [plaintiff] had a
reasonable opportunity to avoid the risk." Id. at 836.
252. See, e.g., Barkewich v. Billenger, 247 A.2d 603, 605-06 (Pa. 1968) (finding that
manufacturer of glass breaking machine had no duty to design machine to prevent operators from
reaching their hands in machine in an attempt to release a jam).
253. See generally2 MADDEN &OWEN ON PRODucTs LIABILrrY, supra note 5, ch. 15.
254. See, e.g., Horton v. American Tobacco Co., 667 So. 2d 1289, 1307 (Miss. 1995)
(Lee, P.J., concurring and dissenting in part) ("Under assumption ofthe risk theory, if a plaintiff
is found to have assumed the risk of his own injury, he is, in fact, the sole proximate cause of
his injury and thus, no liability lies on the defendant .... ").
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assumption of risk defense has long been roundly criticized,25 and it is being
abolished, partiallys or completely,s 7 by an increasing number of courts and
legislatures. And, with the widespread adoption of the comparative fault
doctrine beginning in the 1960s, other courts and legislatures have done what
amounts to the same thing by "merging" assumption of risk into a broad
doctrine ofcomparative fault.y In many of the remaining states which continue

255. The critical scholarly literature includes Francis H. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption
of Risk, 20 HARV. L. REV. 14 (1906); Flemming James, Jr., Assumption of Risk: Unhappy
Reincarnation,78 YALEL.J. 185 (1968); Simons, supra note 149 (excellent theoretical inquiry);
and John W. Wade, The PlaceofAssumption of Risk in the Law ofNegligence, 22 LA. L. REV.
5 (1961). See also 4 FOWLER V. HARPER Er AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 21.8, at 259 (2d ed.
1986); PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supranote 50, at 493-95. For an interesting debate among
the tort law scholars of an earlier generation, see "The Battle of the Wilderness," in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 893, at 70 (rent. Draft No. 9, 1963).
256. For example, a few jurisdictions have abolished the implied assumption of risk
defense in all cases except those involving claims of strict products liability in tort. See, e.g.,
Cent. Tel. Co. v. Fixtures Mfg. Corp., 738 P.2d 510, 512 (Nev. 1987) (assumption of risk
absorbed into comparative fault act except in strict liability cases); Bowling v. Heil Co., 511
N.E.2d 373, 377 (Ohio 1987); Onderko v. Richmond Mfg. Co., 511 N.E.2d 388, 392 (Ohio
1987); Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County Sch. Dist., 437 A.2d 1198, 1209 n.5 (Pa. 1981)
(noting that nineteen other jurisdictions that have abolished or "seriously modified" the defense,
and concluding that "the difficulties of using the term 'assumption of risk' outweigh the
benefits").
At least Connecticut accomplishes the same result statutorily. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-572h(1) (1991 & Supp. 1999) (abolishing the doctrine of assumption of risk in negligence
actions) with CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-5721(1991) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed
as barring... the defense of knowingly using the product in a defective condition in an action
based on strict tort liability.").
257. New Jersey was the first such state to do so. See McGrath v. Am. Cyanamid Co.,
196 A.2d 238, 240 (N.J. 1963); Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90, 93
(N.J. 1959). See also Bolduc v. Crain, 181 A.2d 641 (N.H. 1962); Hombeck v. Western States
Fire Apparatus, Inc., 572 P.2d 620, 622 (Or. 1977).
The Ohio court abolished the defense for risks encountered by workers in the normal
performance of their job-related duties. See Cremeans v. Willmar Henderson Mfg. Co., 566
N.E.2d 1203, 1207 (Ohio 1991).
New Jersey, which abolished the doctrine, had an interesting struggle dealing with
aggravated user misconduct in products liability cases without this defense. Its solution was to
recognize "a defense of contributory negligence to strict liability in tort based upon a voluntary
and unreasonable encountering by the plaintiff of a known safety hazard of a machine where
proximately contributive to the accident." Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g. Co., 386 A.2d 816,
833 (N.J. 1978), overruledon other grounds by Sutter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co.,
406 A.2d 140 (N.J. 1979). Under New Jersey's system of comparative fault, this is now the only
type of plaintiff misconduct that may be used to reduce damages. See, e.g., Lewis v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., 715 A.2d 967, 974-76 (N.J. 1998).
258. See, e.g., Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 837 P.2d 1273 (Haw. 1992) (stating that
assumption of risk bar, "absurd" in products liability setting, merged into comparative fault);
App. Ct. 1993) (stating that since landscaper,
Calderon v. Echo, Inc., 614 N.E.2d 140 (Ill.
contrary to instructions, failed to wear safety goggles while operating trimmer-brush-cutter, he
was 90% at fault); Austin v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 471 A.2d 280 (Me. 1984); Zahrte v.
Sturm, Ruger & Co., 661 P.2d 17 (Mont. 1983) (Gulbrandoson, J., dissenting); Perez v.
McConkey, 872 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. 1994) (abolishing implied assumption of risk; fault aspects
included in comparative fault); South v. A.B. Chance Co., 635 P.2d 728 (Wash. 1981) (7-2
Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 292-93 (Fla. 1977). In Blackburn the court
decision);
explained:
We find no discernible basis analytically or historically
to maintain
a distinction between the affirmative defense of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk. . . . [Would the fault principles of tort law and
comparative negligence be advanced by] a doctrine which would totally bar
recovery by one who voluntarily, but reasonably, assumes a known risk
while one whose conduct is unreasonable but denominated "contributory
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to apply the assumption of risk defense, courts not infrequently recognize its
harshness. 9 and, refusing to apply it except where clearly mandated by facts
and precedent, proclaim that it will not be extended.2'
The principal theoreticalbenefit of the assumption of risk doctrine is that
it grounds the law on choice and so ties legal responsibility at least in part to
this important philosophic value. But a manufacturer's choices usually are
relevant to product accidents as well, and a manufacturer should not necessarily
escape all responsibility for accidents when it designs and sells a product that
may force consumers to confront difficult choices subjecting themselves to risk.
If a product defect leaves a user with no choice of an effective way to avoid a
risk of harm, then the manufacturer fairly should shoulder the entire loss. But
if a plaintiff knowingly, affirmatively, and unreasonably exercises substantial
control over a product hazard, and simply opts to take a calculated and
unreasonable risk, then the plaintiff s decision and action-whether viewed as
choice or fault or both--should usually be considered the sole proximate cause
of any resulting harm. Finally, if moral responsibility for a product accident is
divided between the choices and conduct of both parties, then comparative fault
provides a sound system for dividing damages. Basing responsibility on choice
is a two-way street, and it would seem that a system of comparative
responsibility generally offers a better method for doing justice when a product
user assumes a risk of injury.
Probably the most important practicalbenefit of the assumption of risk
doctrine is to provide a basis for summary judgment when a plaintiff is shown
to have knowingly engaged an unreasonable risk and so should bear full
responsibility for his or her injuries. Although courts are understandably shy to
apply comparative fault principles to grant summary judgment against faulty
plaintiffs, it would seem that courts might appropriately provide a small
window for granting defendants summary judgment when a plaintiff's fault can
fairly be characterized as the sole proximate cause of an accident."" This will
often be the case when the facts are clear that the plaintiff knowingly and
unreasonably took a calculated risk that resulted in accidental harm.
In conclusion, while the assumption of risk doctrine's grounding in choice
theory renders it alluring at some levels, a complete choice theory requires
consideration not only of a plaintiff s choices, but of a manufacturer's choices,
too. Viewed from a welfare or economic perspective, the doctrine's mischief

negligence" is permitted to recover a proportionate amount ofhis damages
for injury? Certainly not. Therefore, we hold that the affirmative defense
of implied assumption of risk is merged into the defense of contributory
negligence and the principles of comparative negligence . . . shall
apply ....
Id. at 292-93.
259. See, e.g., Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 616 S.W.2d 720, 724 (Ark.
1981) (stating that assumption of risk is a "harsh doctrine").
260. See, e.g., Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (applying
it to facts, but stating, "The doctrine of assumed risk is harsh and will not be extended.").
261. While courts in pure comparative fault jurisdictions might reasonably be more
cautious in so ruling, courts in modified (50%) comparative fault jurisdictions should more often
confront situations appropriate for granting summary judgment motions on assumption of risk
in favor of defendants. Even in pure comparative fault states, however, a plaintiff's
extraordinary misconduct may sometimes authorize summary judgment for the defendant.
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quite clearly outweighs its benefits.262 And, viewed on its own terms, courts and
legislatures increasingly appreciate the shortcomings of the assumption of risk
defense and recognize the availability of reasonable alternative doctrines that
fill the void well. Now that the new Restatement of.Apportionment has taken
the position that assumption of risk as a separate doctrine should be
abolished,263 the trends toward abolishing the doctrine and merging it into
comparative fault appears inexorable. No doubt assumption of risk will linger
on in some jurisdictions for some time, yet it clearly is a doctrine that is
doomed.
F. Express Assumption ofRisk
The discussion above pertains to implied assumption of risk, in which
context a plaintiff's conduct suggests or implies consent to incur a risk.2" The
issues are quite different when a defendant claims that a product user expressly
agreed to accept full responsibility for the possibility that the use of a product
would result in an injury-usually by means of a written waiver or disclaimer
signed by the plaintiff. The principles of express assumption of risk depend
upon the theory of recovery: negligence, strict products liability in tort, or
warTanty.
In negligence, the products liability cases parallel the general tort law
principles: a disclaimer is effective only if it clearly and unequivocally relieves
the defendant of responsibility for harm caused by the defendant's negligence.
To most courts this has meant that the word "negligence" or "fault" (rather than
more general words such as "liability") must appear in the disclaimer provision
in a manner that makes it entirely clear that the shift of responsibility between
the parties includes a shift of liability for harm caused by the defendant's
negligence. 5 The negligence disclaimer cases have usually involved
commercial parties suffering commercial losses, but the few that have involved
garden-variety consumer claims against manufacturers for personal injuries
caused by defective products follow similar principles of limitation, as
explained below.
Several courts have held that a disclaimer is void if the defendant's
negligence resulted in a violation of a duty imposed by statute for the benefit

262. See, e.g., Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County Sch. Dist., 437 A.2d 1198, 1209
(Pa. 1981) (abolishing implied assumption of risk defense, except for strict tort products
liability, on grounds that "the difficulties of using the term 'assumption of risk' outweigh the
benefits").
263. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY §§ 2 cmt. i,
3 cmt. c (2000).
264. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTs, supra note 50, § 68.

265. See, for example, Willard Van Dyke Productions,Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 189
N.E.2d 693 (N.Y. 1963), and PosttapeAssociates v. Eastman Kodak Co., 387 F. Supp. 184,
186 (E.D. Pa. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 537 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1976) (against the same
defendant as in Willard Van Dyke on nearly identical facts, where the disclaimer, which was
redrafted in an attempt to comply with Willard Van Dyke's requirements, was found still
inadequate).
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of the public. 2" As under the principles of warranty law,267 the plaintiff must

be made aware of a disclaimer of negligence responsibility at the time of sale,
and such a provision will be ineffective if it is buried in fine print in an owner's
manual not given to plaintiff until after sale.26 Even if a products liability
defendant effectively avoids negligence responsibility toward the user who
signed the contractual disclaimer, such a provision will not bar a negligence
action brought by an injured third party against the manufacturer or other
seller.

9

As for strict products liability in tort, the law is clear: a seller's attempt to
disclaim responsibility to consumers for injuries from new products is against
public policy, void, and of no effect. Indeed, the untoward use of disclaimers
by sellers of dangerously defective consumer goods, allowable under warranty
law, was a principal reason for the development of the doctrine of strict
products liability in tort in the 1960s.27 Both the Second2 7 ' and Third
Restatements of Torts272 agree that such disclaimers of responsibility for
injuries caused by product defects violate the law and are thus invalid.273 Most
of the difficult problems with disclaimers in strict tort involve their
effectiveness in commercial contexts involving economic losses, a topic
examined elsewhere.274
A tyical case illustrating the prevailing tort law principles is Diedrichv.
Wright, in which the plaintiff was severely injured when her parachute failed
to open fully because its lines were crossed. In her suit against the parachute
center for supplying her with an unsafe parachute, the defendant asserted that
she had waived her rights by signing a release form that generally exculpated
the defendant from liability for injuries from parachuting. The court held that

266. See, e.g., Dessert Seed Co. v. Drew Farmers Supply, Inc., 454 S.W.2d 307, 310
(Ark. 1970) (stating that a seed grower could not limit liability, by disclaimer, when the
certification on the seeds was required by statute and when the certification created great
reliance).
267. See generally 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODucTs LIABILrrY, supra note 8, §§ 4:12
.19 (discussing warranty disclaimers and limitations).
268. See Omni Flying Club, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 315 N.E.2d 885, 888 (Mass.
1974).
269. See Blanchard v. Monical Mach. Co., 269 N.W.2d 564, 566 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978)
(involving an "as is" sale of used machine from defendant to plaintiffs employer).
270. See generally I MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 8, §§ 5.2,
5.3.
271. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. m (1965) ("The consumer's cause
of action does not depend upon the validity of his contract with the person from whom he
acquires the product, and it is not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement. .. ").
272.

RESTATEMENT (HMIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 18 (1998) provides:

"Disclaimers and limitations of remedies by product sellers or other distributors, waivers by
product purchasers, and other similar contractual exculpations, oral or written, do not bar or
reduce otherwise valid products liability claims against sellers or other distributors of new
products for harm to persons."
273. See, e.g., McGraw-Edison Co. v. Northeastern Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 647
N.E.2d 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that under common law and statute patterned
substantially after § 402A manufacturer is prohibited from disclaiming or limiting liability);
Wheelock v. Sport Kites, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 730, 737 (D. Haw. 1993).
274.

See 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 5, § 17:13. See

generallyWilliam J. McNichols, Who Says that Strict TortDisclaimersCan Never Be Effective?
The Courts Cannot Agree, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 494 (1975); Stephen C. Parker, Note, The
WarrantyDisclaimerv.Manufacturers'ProductsLiability-SternerAeroABv. PageAirmotive,
Inc.: Didthe Tenth CircuitBury the DisclaimerAlive?, 10 TULSA L.J. 612 (1975).
275. 550 F. Supp. 805, 806 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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the release could not bar a strict liability action and that it did not bar the
negligence action because it failed clearly to state that the plaintiff was
relieving the defendant of liability for negligence.27
In warranty law, disclaimers are addressed by § 2-316 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. The commercial code law on disclaimers is treated
extensively elsewhere.277 Basically, disclaimers are allowed under state law,
provided they are clearly made pursuant to the requirements of the Code, but
their use is substantially restricted by federal law in significant consumer goods
transactions.27
G. Fireman'srule
One special, narrow doctrine that concerns assumption of risk in its
"primary" or no-duty sense279 is the "fireman's rule," now sometimes called the
"firefighters' rule," which applies to firefighters, police officers, and other
professionals trained to rescue and preserve persons and property in emergency
situations.28 Most states hold that such emergency professionals, such as a
firefighter injured in fighting a fire, may not recover against a party who
tortiously caused the fire or other exigency because the firefighter is deemed
to have assumed the normal risks incident to the job.28' But the fireman's rule
generally will not apply, and so will not bar recovery, ifthe product's defective
condition does not cause the fire or other emergency situation which provided
the need for the plaintiff's professional skills.2 2

276. Cf. Ghionis v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 839 F. Supp. 789, 797 (D. Utah 1993)
(finding, notwithstanding release, that skier was not aware that her rented bindings would fail
to release because they were incompatible with her boots); Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc., 22 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 781, 790 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that ski equipment rental disclaimer against public
policy); Moore v. Sitzmark Corp., 555 N.E.2d 1305, 1307 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
skier's signature on release simply acknowledged laws of physics and did not show she knew of
defect in bindings). But see Johnson v. Paraplane Corp., 319 S.C. 247, 254, 460 S.E.2d 398,
402 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding that release and video fully explained nature and assumption of
risks of flying ultralight aircraft).
277. See generally 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 8, § 4:21.
278. See generally id. § 4:23.
279. See generally PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 50, § 68, at 481 n.10.
280. See generally id. § 61, at 429.
281. See, e.g., Brownv. General Elec. Corp., 648 F. Supp. 470 (M.D. Ga. 1986) (finding
that fireman, who was fighting fire caused by defective coffee pot, was injured from jumping
off roof of burning building that exploded).
282. See McKernan v. General Motor Corp., 3 P.3d 1261 (Kan. 2000) (holding that since
firefighters were injured while fighting a car fire caused by explosion of gas filled strut that
supported hood, firefighter could maintain products liability action against automaker;
firefighter's rule did not bar suit); Labrie v. Pace Membership Warehouse, Inc., 678 A.2d 867,
868 (R.I. 1996) (concluding that where fire department employee was injured by waterline valve
during routine inspection of merchant's sprinkler system, "the Superior Court responded to a
false alarm when it used the firefighter's rule to torch plaintiff's complaint"); Hauboldt v. Union
Carbide Corp., 467 N.W.2d 508 (Wis. 1991) (holding that doctrine did not apply when defective
acetylene tank exploded, directly injuring firefighter). But see White v. Edmond, 971 F.2d 681
(11th Cir. 1992) (holding that doctrine barred recovery when firefighter injured when car's
shock absorbers exploded in fire).
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IV. MISUSE
A.

In General

A user's "misuse" of a product, putting it to a clearly improper use,
generally bars recovery in a products liability action.2"3 Thus, like assumption
of risk, product misuse is apowerful common law "misconduct defense" in
products liability litigation.' Although afewjurisdictions have merged misuse
into the comparative fault system,285 so that some or all forms of product misuse

serve onlj to reduce a plaintiff's damages rather than to bar recovery altogether,
a user's 6 unforeseeablemisuse is widely considered to be an absolute bar to
recovery.287 While product misuse is a common law doctrine,88 products

283. See generally William D. Dale & Frank H. Hilton, Jr., Use of the Product-When
is it Abnormal?, 4 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 350 (1967); David A. Fischer, Products
Liability-Applicability of ComparativeNegligence to Misuse andAssumption of the Risk, 43
Mo. L. REv. 643 (1978); McNichols, supra note 121 (providing comprehensive review and
consideration of early draft of Third Restatement); Noel, supra note 3; Aaron D. Twerski, The
Many Facesof Misuse: An Inquiry into the Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29
MERCER L.REv. 403 (1978) [hereinafter Twerski, The Many Faces ofMisuse]; Vargo, supra
note 121; Comment, Torts-forseeability-ManufacturerHeld Liable for Injury Caused by
Unintended Use, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 381 (1967). On related regulatory issues, see Robert S.
Adler, Redesigning People versus Redesigning Products: The Consumer Product Safety
Commission Addresses ProductMisuse, 11 J. L. & POL. 79 (1995); David E. Gardel, Note,
Overuse in ProductsLiability, 57 NEB. L. REv. 817 (1978); Randy R. Koender, Annotation,
Products Liability: Product Misuse Defense, 65 A.L.R. 4th 263 (1988) (providing
comprehensive treatment of misuse "defense" in products liability).
284. While product misuse is a common law doctrine, statutory reform provisions in many
states govern the effect of various forms of user misconduct including misuse. For a discussion
of such statutes, see supra Part I.
285. See Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 904 P.2d 861, 870 (Ariz. 1995); Mauch v.
Mfrs. Sales & Serv., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338, 348 (N.D. 1984); General Motors Corp. v.
Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977), overruled on othergrounds by Turner v. General
Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (rex. 1979), and by Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665
S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984). See generally Fischer, supra note 283; McNichols, supra note 121;
Twerski, The Many Facesof Misuse, supra note 283.
286. This Article addresses the role of product misuse as a user misconduct "defense."
Misuse by a third party (including product alteration and modification) raises issues of
intervening (and possibly superseding) causation and so is generally treated as part of the topic
of proximate causation. See generally 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note
8, at ch. 13; Frederick E. Felder, Annotation, Products Liability: Alteration of ProductAfter
It Leaves Handsof Manufactureror Seller as Affecting Liabilityfor Product-Caused Harm, 41
A.L.R.3d 1251 (1972).
287. See generallyRESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 2, cmt. p,
reporters' note (1998). While the Uniform Comparative Fault Act includes foreseeablemisuse
as a form of "fault" subject to comparison, this means that unforeseeable misuse remains outside
of the comparative system as a total bar to liability. See supra Part I.
288. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LiABILrry § 2, cmt. p,
reporters' note (1998).
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liability reform statutes inseveral states reduce damages 28 or bar liability" in
cases of a plaintiff's misuse.29'
The basic idea of the misuse doctrine is that products are necessarily
designed to do certain limited tasks, within certain limited environments of use,
and that no product can be made safe for every purpose, manner, or extent of
use. Considerations of cost and practicality limit every product's range of
effective and safe use, which is a fundamental fact of life that consumers
readily understand. Consumers know that products may be used safely only for
certain limited purposes, that they should be used properly and within the
manufacturer's warnings and instructions, and that the use of a product beyond
its capabilities may cause it to break, overheat, or otherwise fail in a possibly
dangerous way. If a user chooses to put a product to a type or manner of use
that the product cannot fairly be expected to withstand, and the user is injured
as a result,292 he or she cannot reasonably demand that the manufacturer (and
indirectly, other consumers) shoulder the economic consequences ofthe loss.23
"We cannot charge the manufacturer of a knife when 29it4 is used as a toothpick
and the user complains because the sharp edge cuts.

289. At least Idaho and Missouri have enacted such legislation, and this is the approach
of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act which reduces a plaintiff's damages, however, only on
account of foreseeable product misuse. See supranote 38.
290. At least Arizona, Indiana, Michigan, Montana, and Tennessee have such statutes. See
supra note 39. The Montana Supreme Court has interpreted that state's ambiguous statute to
mean that unforeseeable misuse bars liability. See Hart-Albin Co. v. McLees Inc., 870 P.2d 51,
53-54 (Mont. 1994).
291. The statutes use various labels to describe this form of plaintiff misconduct. See, e.g.,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719(5)(b) (1999) (citing unreasonable misuse as a defense to strict
liability).
292. See, e.g., Cavanagh v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 32 N.E.2d 256 (Mass. 1941)
(suggesting that the plaintiff was demanding more from a rubber bottle stopper than he could
fairly expect).
293. See, e.g., Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188, 192 (1st Cir. 1980)
(applying Massachusettes law). See generally Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., 509 P.2d 28,
31 (Or. 1973) ("Misuse, to bar recovery, must be a use or handling so unusual that the average
consumer could not reasonably expect the product to be designed and manufactured to withstand
it-a use which the seller, therefore, need not anticipate and provide for."); Alden D. Holford,
The Limits of Strict Liabilityfor Product Design and Manufacture, 52 TEx. L. REv. 81, 89
(1973). In his article, Holford explains:
If a consumer employs a product in some extraordinary manner, and
encounters a known danger in the course of his conduct, the doctrine of
product misuse will bar recovery from the manufacturer. The adventurous
consumer has voluntarily placed himself in a category distinct from the
normal consumer who forgoes the pleasure and convenience of using
products in novel but dangerous ways. The rationale of loss distribution
does not reach his case because it is unfair to force consumers who forgo
these additional benefits to subsidize those individuals who voluntarily take
the additional risks. . . .[The misuse defense] fall[s] into the general
category of assumption of risk.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See generally David G. Owen, The Moral Foundationsof Products
LiabilityLaw: TowardFirstPrinciples,68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 427, 476 (1993) (A consumer
who puts a "product to a uniquely adventuresome use that he should know may exceed the
product's capabilities ... has no fair claim to compensation from the maker, diminishing the
autonomy of the maker's owners and other consumers, because the accident was caused by the
victim's greed in demanding greater usefulness from the product than other consumers sought
and greater usefulness than was reflected in the price he paid.").
294. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 349 (Tex. 1977), overruled on
other groundsby Turnerv. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (rex. 1979), andby Duncan
v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (rex. 1984).

2000]

USER MISCONDUCT DEFENSES

The misuse doctrine is difficult to apply in a principled manner, as
discussed below, but the general doctrine is quite easy to state: manufacturers
and other sellers are subject to responsibility for harm from product uses which
are reasonably foreseeable but not for harm from unforeseeable product use.295
B. Development of the Doctrine andAvailability as a Bar to Various
Liability Claims
The misuse doctrine runs long and deep through products liability law,
having shielded manufacturers from liability for at least a century.296 For most
of the twentieth century, the role of a user's misuse of a product in a personal
injury action against the supplier was unclear. Many early courts simply treated
product misuse as an issue going to proximate cause.29" Other courts viewed
misuse as limiting the seller's liability to the product's "intended" uses. For
example, users in early cases were barred from recovery on claims that cleaning
298
fluid was intended to be applied to inanimate objects, not splashed in the eye;
that the entire edge of a grinding wheel was intended to be applied against the
object being ground, not just the edge of the edge;2' and that allegedly
uncrashworthy automobiles were intended to be driven on the highway, not for
crashing into trees." In the 1950s and 1960s, courts and commentators
increasingly framed the issue as whether the user had put the product to an
"abnormal" use,3"' although the "intended" use formulation of the misuse
principle continued to linger on in some jurisdictions.3 2 Through much of the
1960s and 1970s, and even into the 1980s, as the role of product misuse
295. See, e.g., Jurado v. Western Gear Works, 619 A.2d 1312, 1318 (N.J. 1993) ("[A]
manufacturer is not under a duty to protect against unforeseeable misuses" yet it "has a duty to
prevent an injury caused by the foreseeable misuse of its product."); cf.RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTs: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, cmt. p., reporters' note (1998) ("When a product is put
to an unforeseeable use and the plaintiff claims that the product should have been designed to
avoid injury when put to such a use, the courts agree that liability will not attach."); Armentrout
v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 188 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) ("[R]egardless of the defective
condition of a product, misuse by an injured party which cannot be reasonably anticipated by the
manufacturer is a defense where that conduct actually caused the injury.").
296. "It seems quite clearly established where the purchaser, actually knowing the
defective nature of the article, puts it to a use for which it is unfit and unsafe, any injury
received therefrom is due to his misuse and not to the act of him who created the defect."
Francis H. Bohlen, The Basis ofAffirmative Obligationsin the Law of Tort, 53 U. PA. L. REv.
337, 343 (1905).
297. See, e.g., Waterman v. Liederman, 60 P.2d 881, 883 (Cal. App. 1936) (finding that
wild driving on tire is a proximate cause issue). See generally William L. Prosser, The Fallof
the Citadel (StrictLiability to the Consuner), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 824 (1966).
298. Sawyer v. Pine Oil Sales Co., 155 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1946) (applying Louisiana
law). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 395 cmt. j. But see Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319
S.W.2d 859, 864 (Mo. 1958) (stating paint may foreseeably enter an eye and cause blindness).
299. Zesch v. Abrasive Co., 193 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Mo. 1946).
300. Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966) (applying Indiana
law), overruledby Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 109 (7th Cir. 1977); see also
General Motors Corp. v. Muncy, 367 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1966) (applying Texas law). Contra
Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). The crashworthiness doctrine
is addressed in 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 5, § 21:3.
301. See generally PROSSER&KEETONONTORTS, supra note 50, at 668; Noel, supra note
3, at 95.
302. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963);
Myers v. American Seating Co., 637 So. 2d 771, 775 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Allen v. Chance
Mfg. Co., 494 N.E.2d 1324, 1326 (Mass. 1986); Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628 (N.Y.
1973); Bazerman v. Gardall Safe Corp., 609 N.Y.S.2d 610, 611 (App. Div. 1994).
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evolved and began to come into focus, all three terms and concepts-intended
use, abnormal use, and misuse-shared an uncomfortable coexistence.0 3 By the
1980s and 1990s, however, the courts and commentators had worked out a
generally accepted definition ofthe "misuse" doctrine: liability is restricted to
the consequences of reasonably "foreseeable" use-a formulation that widely
prevails in products liability litigation today.
Although the precise formulation of the product misuse doctrine was still
in ferment in many jurisdictions late into the twentieth century, the correlative
ideas of restricting a seller's responsibility to normal or expectable product
uses, on the one hand, and making users responsible for their injuries caused
by particularly unusual product uses, on the other hand, have been central
pillars of products liability law for many years. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts has long provided that a manufacturer is subject to liability, in negligent
manufacturing cases, for harm caused by a chattel's "lawful use in a manner
and for a purpose for which it is supplied";3"' in negligent warnings cases, for
harm from "use of the chattel in the manner for which.., it is supplied";"' and
in negligent design cases, for harm from "probable use." 3" In warranty law,30 7
the Uniform Commercial Code built the misuse doctrine into the concept of a
product's "merchantability," defined most broadly in terms of a product's being
fit for its "ordinary" purposes.30 8
In strict liability in tort, an original premise of manufacturer liability was
that the injury arose out of the proper use of the product. As Judge Traynor
observed, in Greenman v. Yuba PowerProducts,Inc.:"
Implicit in the machine's presence on the market.., was a
representation that it would safely do thejobsfor which it was
built .... To establish the manufacturer's liability it was
sufficient that plaintiffproved that he was injured while using
the Shopsmith in a way it was intendedto be used as a result
of a defect in design and manufacture of which plaintiff was
that made the Shopsmith unsafe for its intended
not 31
aware
0
use.

In § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the scope of strict products
liability in tort is limited to injuries resulting from proper product uses:
products safe for "normal handling" are not defective, and product sellers are
shielded from strict liability for injuries resulting from "mishandling," "overconsumption," "excessive use," and a failure to read and heed an adequate

303. See generally Noel, supra note 3, at 96. Still today, misuse concepts and
nomenclature remain confused in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., Hart-Albin Co. v. McLees Inc.,
870 P.2d 51, 53-54 (Mont. 1994) (interpreting statutory "unreasonable misuse" phrase interms
of intended use, abnormal use, and unforeseeable use).
304. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 395 (1965).
305. Id. § 388.

306. Id. § 398 (special application of § 395).
307. See infra Part V.
308. See UCC §2-314(2)(c). See generally 1MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY
supra note 8, § 4:7.
309. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
310. Id. at 901 (emphasis added).
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warning.311 The Third Restatement succinctly limits responsibility in black-

letter definitions of both design and warnings defects to "the foreseeable risks
' and the Reporters make it clear that courts
of harm posed by the product,"312
for injuries that occur "[w]hen a product is put
bar recovery in design litigation
'3 13
to an unforeseeable use."
C. Misuse as a "Defense" andBurden ofPleadingand Proof

One reason the doctrine of misuse is difficult to apply is that there is no
agreement on just what kind of legal doctrine it really is. While many lawyers
speak loosely of a product misuse "defense," the common law principle of
product misuse is more accurately viewed as a liability-limiting principle
concerning the scope of a defendant's duty that involves the issues of
negligence, product defect, scope of warranty, and proximate causation. 314 As
part of the plaintiff's prima facie products liability case in most states, 315 the
311. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. g (stating that defectiveness not
established by harm from "mishandling"); id. cmt. h (stating that product not defective when
safe for 'normal handling"; no liability for injuries from "abnormal handling" or "abnormal
consumption"); id. cmt. i (stating that unreasonable danger not established by harm from
'over-consumption"); id. cmt. j (stating that no duty to warn of generally known risks of
excessive use; seller may assume warnings will be read and heeded, and product with adequate
warning is neither defective nor unreasonably dangerous).
312. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCrS LIABILITY §§ 2(b) & (c). Quite
obviously, for a risk to be foreseeable, it must ordinarily result from a foreseeable product use.
Comment m states:
m. Reasonably foreseeable uses and risks in design and warning
claims. Subsections (b) and (c) impose liability only when the product is
put to uses that it is reasonable to expect a seller or distributor to foresee.
Product sellers and distributors are not required to foresee and take
precautions against every conceivable mode of use and abuse to which their
products might be put.
Id. cmt. m; see also id. cmt. p.
313. RESTATEMENT (THMIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, cmt. p, reporters' note,
at 109 (1998).
314. See, e.g., Marshall v. Clark Equip. Co., 680 N.E.2d 1102, 1108 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997) (discussing proximate and intervening causation, involving "foreseeability of an
intervening misuse"); Jurado v. Western Gear Works, 619 A.2d 1312, 1319 (N.J. 1993)
(discussing duty, product defect, and proximate cause); Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Gamble, 501 S.E.2d
393, 396 (Va. 1998) (discussing duty). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILrIy § 2, cmts. m, p. Regarding commentp, the reporters' note states:
When a product is put to an unforeseeable use and the plaintiff claims that
the product should have been designed to avoid injury when put to such a
use, the courts agree that liability will not attach. There is widespread
understanding that misuse in this context goes to the basic duty issue.
Id. § 2, cmt. p, reporters' note, at 109 (1998). See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS
(2000); Prosser, supranote 297, at 824 (discussing product defect and proximate
§ 370, at M026
cause); John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44 MISs. L.J. 825,
846 (1973) (product defect, proximate cause, and scope of risk).
Courts and commentators have had real difficulty in ascertaining and explaining how
different forms of misuse figure into the rubrics of duty, defectiveness, proximate cause, and
affirmative defenses. The complexity of the issues, particularly in the context of comparative
fault, is evident by the confusion in many of the decisions. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 904 P.2d 861, 864-70 (Ariz. 1995) (necessitating three separate opinions); Jurado,619
A.2d at 1318-19.
315. See, e.g., Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348, 356-57 (Md. 1985);
Newman v. Utility Trailer and Equip. Co., 564 P.2d 674, 676-77 (Or. 1977) (in banc). The
court in Newman stated:
Before a manufacturer or other seller is strictly liable for injury
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plaintiff must at least theoretically plead and prove that the accident arose out
of a reasonably foreseeable product use which suggests that the plaintiff's
unforeseeable misuse cannot be an affirmative defense. Yet, all but one of the
several states that have enacted
3 6 statutory reform provisions on misuse define
it as an affirmative defense. 1
Courts and commentators have labored diligently in attempting to work out
a clear and sound doctrine of misuse, often without success. The struggle with
the meaning of the doctrine is illustrated in many judicial opinions. In one, for
example, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that "the defense of
misuse.., is a particularized defense requiring that the plaintiff's use of the
31 7
product be unforeseeable and unintended as well as the cause of the injuries"
and further observed that "[m]isuse... is a question of causation. Regardless
of the defective condition, if any, of a manufacturer's product, a manufacturer
will not be liable if an unforeseeable misuse of the product caused the
injuries."3 ' The dissent characterized misuse as an "affirmative defense., 319By
contrast, in another case, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that "[tihe
absence of misuse is part of the plaintiff's case," that "[m]isuse is not an
affirmative defense," and that "the plaintiff has the burden of showing that
there was no misuse or that the misuse was objectively foreseeable.""32 Other
courts have similarly disagreed as to the true role ofplaintiffmisuse in products
liability litigation, and the perplexities are magnified in jurisdictions that
attempt to blend misuse into a system of comparative fault. 3 '
When all is said and done, there probably is no logical way to avoid
treating the absence of misuse as a matter of scope of the defendant's
responsibility and, hence, as part ofthe plaintiff's case." Nor does there seem
to be any sound reason for a court to try to work around the logic in order to
convert the doctrine into an affirmative defense. While one might think at first
that plaintiffs would be advantaged if misuse were treated as an affirmative
defense (giving the defendant the burden of pleading and proof) rather than as
part of the plaintiff's case, the issue ordinarily is of little or no practical
consequence in products liability litigation. Defendants typically treat product

inflicted by a product, the product must have been put to a foreseeable use.
As an example: if a shovel is used to prop open a heavy door, but, because
of the way the shovel was designed, it is inadequate to the task and the
door swings shut and crushes the user's hand, no responsibility for the
injury results by reason of the shovel's not being designed to prop open
doors since it was not reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer or seller
that it would be so used.
Id. at 676-77; cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, cmt. m (1998).
But cf. id., cmt. p, at 38. See generally Noel, supra note 3.

316. See supra Part I; cf. Peter Zablotsky, The Appropriate Role of PlaintiffMisuse in

ProductsLiabilityCauses ofAction, 10 ToURo L. REv. 183,201-04 (1993) (collecting the cases
and stating that most courts properly hold misuse to be an affirmative defense).
317. Uptain v. Huntington Lab, Inc., 723 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Colo. 1986).
318. Id.
319. Id. at 1332.
320. Jurado v. Western Gear Works, 619 A.2d 1312, 1317 (N.J. 1993).
321. For one court's valiant efforts to unravel the mysteries ofhow the doctrine of product
misuse fits into the comparative fault system, compare the different judges' opinions in Jimenez
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 904 P.2d 861, 862, 870-71 (Ariz. 1995).
322. See Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Iowa 1980) (abandoning
view that misuse is an affirmative defense for view that it is part of plaintiff's burden to prove
product defect and causation); see also Henkel v. R & S Bottling Co., 323 N.W.2d 185 (Iowa
1982).
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misuse like any other misconduct defense, offering evidence and argument
upon the issue whether or not the plaintiff has pleaded the absence of misuse
in the complaint. In a jurisdiction that requires a plaintiff to plead the absence
ofmisuse, it is difficult to imagine a court refusing to allow a plaintiffto amend
the complaint to include this aspect of the claim. More importantly, because
plaintiffs rarely fail to plead proximate causation-that the defendant's
negligence, breach of warranty, or a product defect proximately caused the
plaintiff s harm-virtually every complaint includes at least an implicit
allegation of the absence of misuse. This is because the absence of misuse is
built into the concepts of negligence, breach of warranty, product defectiveness,
and, especially, proximate causation. Finally, the burden of proof only
infrequently provides a significant tactical advantage, and it would seem that
defendants typically would prefer to have a clear-cut misuse "defense,"
especially one created by the legislature, to argue to the court or jury.
D. The ForeseeabilityLimitation

'"The ways in which a product might be misused are, like the stars, an
endless number." 3 In order to protect product sellers from liability for
accidents caused by adventurous product uses, courts in recent years have
almost universally limited responsibility to "foreseeable" product uses.324 Yet,
defining a principle that supposedly is one of limitation in such an amorphous
manner creates enormous problems ofapplication, which is a major reason why
the misuse defense is so much easier to state than to apply. Indeed, the innate
vagueness of "foreseeability" as the one definitional standard for the
doctrine--its only limiting basis-renders the definition of misuse virtually
meaningless as a device for determining the scope of liability in actual cases.
That is, since the doctrine of product misuse is defined in terms of
foreseeability, which is an illusory and confusing notion,325 the doctrine
effectively has no real definition. At the end of the day, however, as in

323. Goodman v. Stalfort, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 889, 894-95 (D.N.J. 1976) (Biunno, J.)
(discussing misuse where plaintiff was burned by flashback when he poured charcoal fluid on
grill after enlarging the can's opening with tine of garden tool to increase its flow).
324. The foreseeability limitation has long been recognized. See generally Fleming James,
Jr., Products Liability, 34 TEx. L. REV. 44, 54-55 (1956) (citing cases from 1852). Recent
statements and applications of the principle include Hicks v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 652
So. 2d 211 (Ala. 1994); Romito v. Red PlasticCo., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834 (Ct. App. 1995); Lutz
v. Nat'l Crane Corp., 884 P.2d 455 (Mont. 1994); Jurado,619 A.2d 1312; and Slone v. Gen.
Motors Coip., 457 S.E.2d 51 (Va. 1995).
325. See, e.g., Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188, 191 (1st Cir. 1980)
(applying Massachusetts law); Moranv. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11, 26 (Md. 1975) (O'Donnell,
J., dissenting). Judge O'Donnell observed:
It seems to me that the majority has fallen into the pitfall, recognized by
Professor Prosser, who, in undertaking to analyze the treatment by the
various courts of the illusory concept of "foreseeability" and noting the
confusion resulting therefrom, states:
"Some 'margin of leeway' has to be left for the unusual and the
unexpected. But this has opened a very wide door; and the courts have
taken so much advantage of the leeway that it can scarcely be doubted that
a great deal of what the ordinary man would regard as freakish, bizarre,
and unpredictable has crept within the bounds of liability by the simple
device of permitting the jury to foresee at least its very broad, and vague,
general outlines."
Id. at 26 (quoting W. Prosser, Torts, § 43, at 269 (4th ed. 1971)).
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"defining" proximate causation in terms of foreseeable risk,326 there is at least
a little comfort in the flexibility provided to the factfinder by framing the scope
of responsibility for product use in terms of foreseeability.327
The best that the courts have been able to do in placing at least the
appearance of some halter on this concept is to modify it with the word
"reasonable," limiting a manufacturer's responsibility for accidents resulting
from uses that are "reasonably foreseeable.""32 Surely such a definition of the
standard may be faulted for providing no further touchstone for deciding cases,
but a reasonableness modification offoreseeability is plainly better than leaving
it stark naked. So modifying foreseeability usefully reminds courts and juries
that there are indeed reasonable limits to the kind of uses a manufacturer fairly
must consider when making design and warnings decisions.
The intrinsic vagueness ofthe foreseeability concept in the misuse context,
which diminishes its usefulness for either ascribing or predicting liability, has
been lamented by the courts.329 While some uses, especially common ones,330
are clearly foreseeable, and others, particularly those that are especially bizarre,
are clearly unforeseeable, the great majority of uses fall in the "vast middle
ground of product uses about which reasonable minds could disagree as to
whether they are or should be foreseeable to the manufacturer."33' The
decisions go all over the board on the foreseeability of misuse issue, and the
best that can be said is that a prudent judge will almost always recognize
product misuse as a question of fact for ajury to decide.332
Accordingly, whether advising a seller trying to comply with the law at the
time of designing and marketing its products or a plaintiff contemplating a
lawsuit, a lawyer can only guess how the foreseeability issue will be resolved
at trial. A prudent lawyer would hesitate to predict whether a judge or jury

326.

See 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 8, ch. 13.
327. See generally Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse, supra note 283, at 426.
328. See Henkel v. R & S Bottling Co., 323 N.W.2d 185, 191-92 (Iowa 1982); Ellsworth
v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348, 354 (Md. 1985); Newman v. Utility Trailer & Equip.
Co., 564 P.2d 674, 676-77 (Or. 1977) (en bane); Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Gamble, 501 S.E.2d 393,
397 (Va. 1998) (finding that use not "reasonablyforeseeable" as a matter of law); cf. Jurado v.
Western Gear Works, 619 A.2d 1312, 1319 (N.J. 1993) (articulating "objectively" foreseeable
standard).
329. See, e.g., Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1980) (applying
Massachusetts law):
Plaintiff ... attempts to expand the scope of the "intended" use concept by
resort to the familiar, and sometimes misleading, rubric of "foreseeability." But
reliance on such generality is of limited assistance, for "In a sense, in retrospect
almost nothing is unforeseeable." One with the time and imagination and aided by
hindsight no doubt can conjure up all sorts of arguably "foreseeable" misuses of a
variety of otherwise reasonable safe products.
Id. at 191 (citations omtted). See also Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11, 26 (Md. 1975)
(O'Donnell, J., dissenting).
330. If persons regularly use a product in a dangerous, unintended manner, the use was
probably a foreseeable one. See, e.g., Gootee v. Colt Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d 1057, 1065 (6th
Cir. 1983) (noting that use of revolver half-cock as a safety is a virtually universal practice);
Lamer v. McKee Industries, Inc., 721 P.2d 611, 615 (Alaska 1986) ("[A] manufacturer should
not be relieved of responsibility simply because it closes its eyes to the way its products are
actually used by consumers.").
331. Moran, 332 A.2d at 16.
332. See, e.g., id. at21; Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 97 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (10th Cir. 1996)
(applying Utah law); Haag v. Bongers, 589 N.W.2d 318, 329 (Neb. 1999); Price v. BIC Corp.,
702 A.2d 330, 333 (N.H. 1997); Materials Trans. Co. v. Newman, 656 So. 2d 1199, 1202
(Miss. 1995).
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would find that a manufacturer reasonably should foresee that a young boy will
hurl a beer bottle against a telephone pole;333 a teenage girl will scent a candle
by pouring cologne upon it below the flame;... a woman wearing a cotton
flannelette nightgown inside out, with its pockets protruding, will lean over the
burner of a stove causing a pocket to come in contact with a flame;335 a person
will insist on buying shoes that are too small for her feet,336 on buying
automobile tires too large for his rims,337 on sitting in a chair3. or an exercise
bicycle339 too frail for one's weight (300 and 500 pounds, respectively), or on
standing on an ordinary chair;3" a car will be driven at 115 mph, go out of
" ' a tire, designed for speeds to 85 mph,
control, and injure a third party;34
equipped on a car designed for speeds over 100 mph, will blow out at 100
mph;2 a car's emergency brake will be left on undetected at highway speeds
long enough to vaporize the hydraulic brake fluid, causing the brakes to fail;343
a person will attempt suicide by closing herself in a car trunkwithout an inside
release latch, change her mind, and be trapped inside for nine days thereafter;3"
an empty Clorox container will be used to store gasoline, will tip over, and the
gasoline will be ignited by a spark from the motor of an electric appliance in
another room;345 a patient will walk, against doctor's orders, on his broken leg
held together with a defective surgical pin designed only to stabilize the
fracture, not to support the weight of a man;346 a machine will not be properly
maintained;347 a person will pour hot Wesson Oil from the skillet back into the
bottle and then recap the bottle, causing it to explode;34 "burning alcohol," sold
only for professional dental use, will be drunk by penal farm inmate dental
assistants who then go blind;349 a screen on a second story window will not
333. Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188, 189 (1st Cir. 1980) (unforeseeable
as a matter of law).
334. Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11, 21 (Md. 1975) (jury could find foreseeable).
335. Ellsworth v. Sheme Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348, 357 (Md. 1985) (foreseeableas
a matter of law).
336. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 395, cmt. j (unforeseeable);Dubbs v. ZakBros.
Co., 175 N.E. 626, 627 (Ohio Ct. App. 1931) (unforeseeable).
337. McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co. of Tex., 391 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1968)
(unforeseeable-by implication).
338. Home v. Liberty Furniture Co., 452 So. 2d 204 (La. Ct. App. 1984)
(foreseeable-by implication).
339. Dunne v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 679 So. 2d 1034, 1037 (La. Ct. App. 1996)
(foreseeable).
340. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395, cmt. k, at 331 (1965) (foreseeable).
341. Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1967) (no duty to
foresee such grossly careless misuse), overruled on other grounds by Huff v. White Motor
Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 106 n.1, 109-10 (7th Cir. 1977).
342. See LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 451 F. Supp. 253, 257-58 (W.D. La.
1978) (foreseeable).
343. Knapp v. Hertz Corp., 375 N.E.2d 1349, 1355 (I!!. App. Ct. 1978) (foreseeable).
344. Daniell v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 581 F. Supp. 728, 731 (D.N.M. 1984)
(unforeseeable as a matter of law).
345. Taylor v. Gen. Elec. Co., 505 A.2d 190, 194 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986)
(foreseeable as a matter of law).
346. Stewart v. Von Solbrig Hosp., Inc., 321 N.E.2d 428, 432 (11. App. Ct. 1974)
(misuse as a matter of law).
347. Wilson v. Crouse-Hinds Co., 556 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1977) (jury could find
foreseeable).
348. Chandler v. Hunt Food & Indus., Inc., Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 5969 (Tenn. 1968)
(unforeseeable-byimplication).
349. Barnes v. Litton Indus. Prod., Inc., 555 F.2d 1184, 1187-88 (4th Cir. 1977) (a jury
could properly find foreseeable).
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withstand the pressure of a baby boy waving good-bye to his mother;"' a
doctor will transplant synthetic fibers, normally used for wigs and hairpieces,
into a patient's scalp as a treatment for baldness, causing irritation and
infection;35' a grocery shopper who trips will hope that a shopging cart does not
scoot away when he grabs for it to save himself from falling; 12 the owner of a
riding lawn mower will attach a wooden "dog box" to the mower and place a
two-year-old child in the box who will fall out and be run over by the mower; 3
a youth will tilt or rock a soft-drink vending machine, to dispense a can without
payment, causing the machine to fall upon and kill him;3"4-a teenage boy will
hang himself with a rope on a swing set as a joke to impress the girls; 5 a
youth, thinking the safety is on, will point a BB gun at his friend's head and
pull the trigger; 356 a small child will eat a "spit devil" firework wrapped in plain
red paper that looks like candy;35 7 a baby will drink a bright red furniture polish
that looks like a soft drink;358 a child will open and stand on an oven door to see
what is cooking on the stove, causing the stove and a pot of boiling water to
topple over;3 9 a boy, while riding a canister vacuum cleaner like a toy car will
fan;360 or
be injured when his penis slips through an opening into the cleaner's
36
that children will play with a gas can without a child-proof top. '

350. Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Gamble, 501 S.E.2d 393, 397 (Va. 1998) (unforeseeable as a
matter of law).
351. Berg v. Underwood's Hair Adaption Process, Inc., 751 F.2d 136, 137 (2d Cir. 1984)
(unforeseeable-no duty as a matter of law).
352. Smith v. Technibilt, Inc., 791 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Tex. App. 1990) (unforeseeable as
a matter of law).
353. Erkson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 841 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)
(unforeseeable as a matter of law).
354. Compare Oden v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 621 So. 2d 953, 955 (Ala. 1993)
(unforeseeable because person may not impose liability on another for consequences of person's
own act of moral turpitude), with Morgan v. Cavalier Acquisition Corp., 432 S.E.2d 915, 921
(N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (jury could find foreseeable)and Ridenour v. Bat Em Out, 707 A.2d
1093, 1096 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (jury could find foreseeable in "change machine"
case).
355. Smith v. Holmes, 606 N.E.2d 627, 637 (I11. App. Ct. 1992) (unforeseeable as a
matter of law).
356. Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon, 450 A.2d 615, 618 (Pa. 1982) (foreseeable, but danger was
obvious and warned against).
357. Victory Sparkler & Specialty Co. v. Latimer, 53 F.2d 3, 4 (8th Cir. 1931) (jury
could properly find foreseeable).
358. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 83-84 (4th Cir.1962) (jury could
properly find foreseeable).
359. Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 283 A.2d 255, 260 (R.I. 1971) (jury could properly
find foreseeable).
360. Larue v. National Union Elec. Corp., 571 F.2d 51 (1st Cir.1978) (unforeseeableas
a matter of law).
361. CompareSimpson v. Standard Container Co., 527 A.2d 1337, 1341 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1987) (unforeseeableas a matter of law, where label on the can warned against storing in
a living area), with Keller v. Welles Dep't. Store of Racine, 276 N.W.2d 319, 324 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1979) (foreseeable). In Keller, the court remarked:
A gasoline
Children are incurably curious about their environment ....
can.., is commonly stored either on the floor or on a low shelf. These
are areas readily accessible to children in their "explorations." It is not
unforeseeable that a child might attempt to taste the liquid in the can [or,]
in the course of playing "mow the lawn" or "gas station," a child might
pour the gasoline from the can.
Id. at 324.
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If there is a common thread in the decisions on the meaning of the
"foreseeability" limitation to product uses, it is one of limiting a seller's
responsibility to uses that are fair. While the fairness of a product's use
provides little more direct guidance than the notion of foreseeability, it at least
provides a depth and richness for embracing all the equities of a particular
case--quite similar to the reasonablenessofforeseeability of use. An important
aspect in evaluating the fairness or foreseeability of particular uses is whether
a reasonable consumer might fairly expect the product to be able to withstand
that use. 62 As one court explained, misuse may be viewed as a "use or handling
so unusual that the average consumer could not reasonably expect the product
to be designed and manufactured to withstand it-a use which the seller,
therefore, need not anticipate and provide for."363 Applying this principle to
deny recovery to a boy whose eye was injured when he threw a discarded beer
bottle against a telephone pole, shattering the glass bottle, another court
concluded that a reasonable consumer could expect nothing else.3
While the consumer expectations test has withered considerably as a
principal test of product defectiveness,365 a consumer expectations standard in
some cases provides a sound foundation for defining the limits of use for which
a manufacturer fairly may be held accountable. Yet, the usefulness of a
consumer expectation standard in the misuse context, as more generally in
ascertaining a product's defectiveness, depends upon the type of product and
risk at issue. Consumers have quite well-defined and reasonable expectations
about the performance limits of some products, especially more simple ones,
but they often have no idea of the limitations of complex products operating in
complex environments, such as the extent to which an automobile is or should
be able to withstand a particular type of serious crash.3" Thus, in a case where
the hazards from a particular type of misuse are clear, a court might fairly
conclude that the use was not reasonably foreseeable if it was one that a
reasonable consumer would not expect the product safely to withstand.
Whether one views the misuse issue in terms of the foreseeability of the
plaintiff's use, the presence or absence of a defect, or the presence or absence
of proximate cause, the result in each case depends ultimately upon the
reasonable foreseeability, or fairness, of the plaintiffs particular use. If the
manufacturer or other product seller reasonably should have contemplated and
guarded against the risk, the defendant is subject to liability for the harm; if the
plaintiff put the product to an unforeseeable, unfair use, the defendant simply
is not liable.

362. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
363. Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., 509 P.2d 28, 31 (Or. 1973).
364. Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1980) (applying
Massachusetts law). The court found that "[n]o reasonable consumer would expect anything but
that a glass beer bottle.., would fail to safely withstand the type of purposeful abuse involved
here." Id. at 190-91.
365. See I MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTs LIABILrrY, supranote 8, § 5:6, at 299.
366. See, e.g., Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308-10 (Cal. 1994). See
generally I MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODucTs LIABILrrY, supra note 8, § 8:6, at 475.
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E. Failureto Follow Warnings andInstructions
A user's failure to follow a manufacturer's warnings of danger or
instructions on safe use provides a special form of misuse which ordinarily
should bar recovery whenever the danger from noncompliance is evident, the
noncompliance is a substantial cause of the plaintiffs harm, and there is no
simple way or apparent reason for the manufacturer to design the danger out of
the product. Despite common knowledge (and hence foreseeability) that users
often ignore warnings and instructions, many courts, and a few legislatures,367
have long had little sympathy with plaintiffs who are injured because they
ignore warnings and instructions.36 Commentj to the Restatement (Second)of
Torts § 402A states the rule quite clearly: "Where warning is given, the seller
may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing
is followed, is not in defective
such a warning, which is safe for use if it 369
condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous." Accordingly, if there was no
practical way or reason for the manufacturer to design the danger away, courts
have widely ruled that a user's failure to read or heed adequate instructions for
safe use, sometimes characterized as "misuse," bars recovery.37 ° It generally is
both logical and fair to preclude recovery to a user who knowingly ignores the
admonitions ofa manufacturer's full and fair warnings and instructions, for the
user by so doing knowingly pushes the product unfairly beyond its stated safety
367. Statutes in at least Arizona, New Jersey, and North Carolina provide blanket
protection to a defendant for injuries resulting from the plaintiff's violation of a warning or
instruction. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-683(3) (West 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:58C-4
(West 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. 99B-4(1) (1999). New Jersey's provision limits this defense to
cases involving "adequate" warnings and instructions; Arizona's statute and North Carolina's
statute do not, although North Carolina's statute is limited to warnings and instructions of which
the user reasonably should have been aware. A Michigan statute's definition of misuse includes
uses contrary to warnings and instructions, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2945(e) (West
2000), but it provides an immunity only for unforeseeable misuse. Id. § 600.2947(2) (West
2000).
368. An early example is Fredendallv. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 18 N.E.2d 11 (N.Y.
1938).
369. REs'ATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. j, at 353.
370. See PROSSER, supra note 51, § 102, at 669 ("The seller is entitled to have his
warnings and instructions followed; and when they are disregarded, and injury results, he is not
liable."); see, e.g., Kampen v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 157 F.3d 306, 309 (5th Cir. 1998)
(en bane) (applying Louisiana law and barring plaintiff's claim when he failed to read
instructions in manual and spare tire compartment not to "get beneath the car" and was crushed
because jack supporting car collapsed); Watson v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1514, 1515
(11th Cir. 1985) (finding that failure to follow instructions is not use in "normal" manner for
purposes of implied warranty claim but jury issue on negligence and strict liability warnings
adequacy claims); Bell v. Montgomery Ward, 792 F. Supp. 500, 505-06 (W.D. La. 1992)
(finding against person mowing lawn, who lost two toes in mower when he slipped on wet grass
and had ignored warnings to keep guards in place and feet away from blade and not to wear
tennis shoes or to mow on wet grass or on slopes steeper than 15 degrees); Uptain v. Huntington
Lab, Inc., 723 P.2d 1322, 1326 (Colo. 1986) (discussing housekeeper who used bare hands to
wring out mop used to apply bathroom cleaning solution containing 23 %hydrochloric acid; label
warned against skin contact to avoid chemical bums and to wash skin area well if contact
occurred); Peterson v. Parke Davis & Co., 705 P.2d 1001, 1003-04 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985)
(discussing implications of doctor's failure to read or heed warnings and instructions in package
insert, leaving patient on toxic drug despite contra-indications); Hughes v. Massey-Ferguson,
Inc., 490 N.W.2d 75, 78 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (barring recovery of farmer who walked on 3
inch rim over auger without first shutting off corn head as warnings instructed); Sturm, Ruger
& Co. v. Bloyd, 586 S.W.2d 19, 22 (Ky. 1979) (barring recovery of six-shooter revolver owner,
who left hammer resting on firing pin in line with loaded cartridge, contrary to explicit
instructions and warnings; gun discharged when dropped on floor).
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capabilities. But if the disregarded warning or instruction is itself inadequate,
so that the user is not fairly informed about the danger, then the failure to
follow warnings or instructions is foreseeable and, generally, excusable as
well. In such a case, "if the injury resulting from foreseeable misuse of a
product is one which an adequate warning concerning the use of the product
would likely prevent, such misuse is no defense."' Moreover, because of
the foreseeability that warnings may be disregarded, modem courts generally
hold that manufacturers have an independent duty to design away dangers if
there is a reasonable way to do so."
F. ComparativeFault
Whether and to what extent "product misuse" should be merged into a
jurisdiction's system of comparative fault, and so treated as a
damage-reducing factor rather than as a total bar, is a vexing problem which
has yet to be deliberatively addressed by most courts and legislatures.
Viewing misuse merely as another plaintiff misconduct "defense," some
courts and legislatures have simply merged it into their comparative fault
schemes. In those states, misuse will reduce but not bar a plaintiff's recovery,
unless, in modified comparative fault states, the plaintiff's fault is found to
exceed that of the defendant.373 Such a merger requires confronting the issue
of what types of misuse will be treated on a comparative fault basis, and
whether unforeseeable misuse will still serve as a total bar. At least a couple
of courts have ruled mysteriously that a plaintiff's unforeseeable misuse is
somehow subject to comparison with the defendant's conduct or a product
defect, "that where an unreasonably dangerous defect of a product and the
plaintiff's assumption of risk or unforeseeable misuse of the product are

371. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 548 S.W.2d 416, 422-23 (Tex. App. 1976), rev'd
on other grounds 561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978); see also Harless v. Boyle-Midway Div., Am.
Home Prod., 594 F.2d 1051, 1055 (5th Cir. 1979) ("It seems both confusing and internally
inconsistent to ask ajury who has previously concluded that the label was inadequateto consider
the defense of failure to read an adequate label."); Huynh v. Ingersoll-Rand, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d
296, 300-01 (Ct. App. 1993); Johnson v. Johnson Chem. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 607, 610 (App.
Div. 1992) (discussing situation where plaintiff failed to read roach bomb instruction to
extinguish pilot lights or open flames).
372. See, e.g., Lewis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 682 A.2d 724, 732 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1996):
If there is an objectively foreseeable likelihood that a product will be
subject to misuse and that that misuse will endanger users despite
appropriate warnings, then warnings alone will not satisfy the
manufacturer's duty. In addition to providing warnings, the manufacturer
must also take all other feasible measures required by a risk-utility analysis
to make even anticipated misusers of the product reasonably safe.
Id. at 732; accord, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 2, cmt. 1.
373. See, e.g., Elliot v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 642 A.2d 709 (Conn. 1994) (asserting that
misuse in a strict liability setting as incorporated into considerations of comparative fault);
Standard Havens Prod., Inc., v. Benitez, 648 So. 2d 1192, 1197 (Fla. 1994) (finding misuse not
a bar in negligence action, following similar holding on strict liability). At least two states have
enacted legislation accomplishing this result. See IDAHO CODE § 6-1405(3) (Michie 1998)
(requiring reduction of claimant's damages according to comparative responsibility for misuse;
.misuse" defined as "when the product user does not act in a manner that would be expected
of an ordinary reasonably prudent person who is likely to use the product in the same or similar
circumstances"); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 537.765.3 (West 2000) (declaring that for comparative fault
apportionment, plaintiff's "fault" includes product uses (1) not reasonably anticipated by the
manufacturer, and (2) for purposes not intended by the manufacturer).
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concurring proximate causes of the injury suffered, the trier of fact must
compare those concurring causes to determine the respective percentages" for
the apportionment of damages.374
However, it seems more logical to view unforeseeable misuse as lying
entirely outside the scope of responsibility of manufacturers and other sellers
and, hence, outside the ambit of comparative fault. Because a seller has no
duty to guard against unforeseeable product risks, there ordinarily is no seller
fault or product defect in such cases to compare.375
To achieve a fair and sensible result in most cases, and to avoid an
utterly confusing mixture of doctrines, the best approach (if not prohibited by
statute) is to consider a user's foreseeable misuse as any other kind of
comparative fault for allocation to the plaintiff. On the other hand, if a
substantial cause of the plaintiff's injury was his or her unforeseeable misuse
of a product, then the plaintiff's conduct generally should be considered the
sole proximate cause of the harm and so bar any recovery whatsoever.376
Such a bright line rule for unforeseeable misuse in comparative fault
jurisdictions might seem crude, and juries allowed to allocate responsibility
between a product defect and a plaintiff's unforeseeable misuse might
conceivably be able to do better justice in some small set of cases. But the
number of cases in which the plaintiffs injury is substantially traceable to
both a product defect and the plaintiff's unforeseeable misuse (which is not
the sole proximate cause of an accident) is surely very small. Like counting
angels on a pinhead, the very concept of such combined causation is difficult
to grasp and even more difficult to put to use. 3" In a real world where the
law can only hope to do substantial justice most of the time, rather than
perfect justice all of the time, a simple rule that bars liability altogether if a
plaintiffs unforeseeable product misuse was a substantial cause of the harm
appears to be the fairest way, both within and outside of comparative fault,
to resolve most cases in a common sense and practical way.

374. Mauch v. Mfrs. Sales & Serv., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338, 348 (N.D. 1984) (emphasis
added) (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977) (making heroic
attempt to explicate and justify this nonsense), overruled on other grounds by Turner v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (fex.1979), and by Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665
S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984)).
375. See, e.g., States v. R.D. Werner Co., 799 P.2d 427, 430 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990)
(finding that unlike comparative negligence, which diminishes recovery, unforeseeable misuse
of ladder from which plaintiff fell goes to causation and completely bars recovery, regardless
of defective condition).
376. This is the approach taken by most courts, and it is adopted by the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act. See supra note 287.
377. The confusion from combining doctrines (comparative fault and misuse) and sources
of law (courts and legislatures) is illustrated by Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 904 P.2d 861
(Ariz. 1995), although Judge Martone's concurring opinion makes good sense: "Mrue misuse
(unforeseeable, sole cause) continues to be an all or nothing defense .... Foreseeable misuse
(concurring cause) is really contributory negligence, and is now a comparative defense to a
products case." Id. at 873.
378. When a product is defective and the user puts it to an unforeseeable use, "then the
accident was not proximately caused by the product defect." PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS,
supranote 50, § 102, at 711.
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V. DEFENSES TO WARRANTY CLAIMS

A. In General
How a plaintiff's misconduct affects liability in warranty is one of the
most confused issues in all of products liability law.379 To a large extent, the
confusion springs from the long, uneasy relationship between warranty law
and tort. The law of warranty, one must not forget, is "a freak hybrid born
of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract.
But that origin lies in the
distant past, and most courts now view warranty law as a part of the law of
contracts.381 In the contractual warranty context, where breach of warranty
is predicated upon the falsity of a seller's representation or the failure of its
goods to meet a commercial norm, rather than upon the seller's fault, a
defense based upon a user's contributory negligence or dangerously venturous
misbehavior seems oddly out of place. Yet, particularly in cases involving
personal injuries resulting from a user's unforeseeably hazardous or
knowingly dangerous and unreasonable product use, the courts have shown
a manifest reluctance to accept the proposition that such misconduct is out of
bounds simply because a warranty claim sounds in contract.
A variety of conflicting overlaps in legal categories add to the confusion.
While the doctrine of strict products liability in tort (which itself developed
from warranty law) 3" is largely a creature of the common law, the law of
warranty is now principally enshrined, via Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, in statute.383 In addition, there are conflicts between
differing definitions of the tort-based misconduct defenses of the common
law, on the one hand, and the misconduct defenses enacted in recent products
liability reform statutes, on the other. Further, user misconduct is handled in
a variety of ways under various systems of comparative fault, most created
by legislation but some by common law. In the warranty setting, many courts
compound the confusion by altering in the warranty setting traditional tort law

379.

See generally BARKLEY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT

WARRAmTES

12.03[8] [b], at 12-17 (1984); ROBERT J. NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES §§ 81-84

(1970); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-8 (5th ed.

2000) [hereinafter WHITE &SUMMERS]; Joel R. Levine, Buyer's ConductasAffecting the Extent
of Manufacturer'sLiability in Warranty, 52 MINN. L. REv. 627 (1968); Sonja A. Soehnel,
Annotation, ProductsLiability: ContributoryNegligence or Assumption of Risk as Defense in
Action for Strict Liabilityor Breach of WarrantyBased on Failureto Provide Safety Devicefor
Product Causing Injury, 75 A.L.R.4th 538 §§ 16-20 (1990) (discussing warranty misconduct
defenses to claims of failure to provide safety devices); E.L. Kellett, Annotation, Contributory
Negligence orAssumption of Risk as Defense to Action for PersonalInjury, Death, or Property
Damage Resulting From Alleged Breach of Implied Warranty, 4 A.L.R.3d 501 (1965)
(discussing warranty misconduct defenses in general).
380. Prosser, supra note 297, at 800; see also Note, Defense of Change of Position In
Cases of Payment UnderMistake on a Negotiable Instrument,42 HARv. L. REv. 411, 414-15
(1929). See generally 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 8, § 5:2.
381. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965)
(applying Pennsylvania law); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 156 A.2d 568, 572 (Pa. Super. Ct.

1959).

382. This development occurred in America during the 1950s and early 1960s. See 1

MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 8, §§ 5:2 to :3.

383. See id. ch. 4, at 120.
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definitions and effects of various forms of plaintiff misbehavior." 4 In an
attempt to avoid this quagmire, some courts have simply abandoned all use
of the traditional tort law terms used to describe plaintiff misconduct."'
The issue examined here is what the effect should be on a claim for
breach of express or implied warranty against a product seller if a plaintiff
carelessly uses a product, ignores warnings and instructions, deliberately and
unreasonably engages a product danger, or puts a product to an unforeseeably
dangerous use. Stated otherwise, do the tort law misconduct defenses of
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and product misuse apply to
warranty claims; are there any misconduct defenses unique to warranty
claims; and what is the effect of comparative fault doctrine on warranty
misconduct defenses? While the developing warranty law on these questions
in some states roughly parallels the law applied in strict products liability in
tort,386 and while eventual convergence is not unfathomable, 3' the law on
warranty misconduct defenses is teetering at the edge of chaos. The best that
can be done here is to describe the principal approaches the courts have taken
and to indicate which appear most fair and logical.
B. ContributoryNegligence andAssumption of Risk
In 1966, Dean Prosser wrote that "[sluperficially the warranty
cases . . . are in a state of complete contradiction and confusion as to the
defense of contributory negligence." 388 Some early cases held that
contributory negligence should simply bar recovery in warranty, reasoning,
for example, that "[w]arranty is not insurance, and there is nothing in this
contract to indicate that eitherparty supposed the defendant was to answer for
the plaintiff's carelessness.
Occasional decisions still hold that a plaintiff's

384. "Some courts maintain that contributory negligence is no defense but hold that the
defendant may parade the same misconduct of the plaintiff before the jury to show a lack of
proximate cause." WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 379, § 11-8, at 408, (citing Ford Motor Co.
v. Lee, 224 S.E.2d 168, 170 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976) ("In an action predicated on a breach of
warranty, there is no defense per se of contributory negligence, but such defense presents ajury
question as to whether the injuries resulted from the breach."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 229
S.E.2d 379 (Ga. 1976)); see also Imperial Die Casting Co. v. Covil Insulation Co., 216 S.E.2d
532, 534 (S.C. 1975).
385. See Huebert v. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co., 494 P.2d 1210, 1216 (Kan. 1972) (noting that
several courts have abandoned use of "contributory negligence" and "assumption of risk" terms
to avoid semantic problems in implied warranty cases, and holding that such concepts "in their
normal meaning are not defenses" to actions for breach of express warranty).
386. See, e.g., Duff v. Bonner Bldg. Supply, Inc., 666 P.2d 650, 653 (Idaho 1983)
(finding that assumption of risk and misuse are defenses to breach of warranty actions, but
contributory negligence is not); Gregory v. White Truck & Equip. Co., 323 N.E.2d 280 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1975).
387. See WooDs & DEERE, supra note 5, § 14:17, at 339.
388. Prosser, supranote 297, at 838. On whether contributory negligence is a defense to
an implied warranty action, "the authorities are hopelessly divided." Gardner v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 127 N.W.2d 557, 562 (Minn. 1964); see also Levine, supra note 379, 647-52.
389. Razey v. J.B. Colt Co., 94 N.Y.S. 59, 61 (App. Div. 1905) (finding that plaintiff's
contributory negligence barred recovery when plaintiff used gas generator in room with lighted
gas jet); see also Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343, 346 (10th Cir. 1962)
(applying Colorado law and barring plaintiff's claim when the sole proximate cause of harm to
plaintiff, who was burned when match ignited her nightgown, was her contributory negligence
in smoking and using matches in bed while in semiconscious state induced by potent sleeping
pill); Posey v. Pensacola Tractor & Equip. Co., 138 So. 2d 777, 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962);
Finks v. Viking Refrigerators, Inc., 147 S.W.2d 124, 130 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940); Eisenbach v.
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contributory negligence should bar recovery.3' 9 But many courts long have
held to the contrary-that a consumer's contributory negligence should 3be
irrelevant to a warranty claim which lies in contract or assumpsit, 91
particularly in cases involving defective food. 3" Many of the more recent
3
cases take the same approach, holding that simple contributory
3 9 negligence '
warranty.
of
breach
for
claim
has no effect on a plaintiffs
Prosser's study of the cases revealed that courts would not bar recovery
on grounds of contributory negligence if a plaintiffs only fault lay in failing
to inspect or discover a danger in a product, but "if he discovers the defect,
or knows the danger arising from it, and proceeds nevertheless deliberately
to encounter it by making use of the product, his conduct is the kind of
contributory negligence which "3overlaps assumption of risk; and on either
This is precisely the position taken in
theory his recovery is barred.

Gimbel Bros., Inc., 24 N.E.2d 131, 133 (N.Y. 1939); Natale v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 182 N.Y.S.2d
404, 407 (App. Div. 1959).
390. See, e.g., Nicholson v. American Safety Util. Corp., 488 S.E.2d 240, 244 (N.C.
1997) (applying products liability statute); Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725 (Wyo. 1979).
391. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479, 485 (3d Cir.
1965) (applying Pennsylvania law); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 156 A.2d 568, 573 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1959).
392. See, e.g., Kassouf v. Lee Bros., 26 Cal. Rptr. 276, 278 (Ct. App. 1962) (citing 2
HAmeER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTs § 22.4, at 1210 (1956)) ("Contributory negligence, in
general, is a defense only to actions grounded on negligence."). In Kassouf, after purchasing
groceries including a Hershey "Mr. Goodbar" at defendant's food store, plaintiff sat down in
a chair to read the newspaper beside a table on which she placed the candy bar. The court
recounted:
While reading, she reached with one hand and took the candy bar
from the table. Without looking, and with one hand, she opened one end
of the wrapper and slid the bar partially out from it. Using this one-handed
method, she broke off pieces, one after another, and put them into her
mouth.
From the outset she noticed that the bar "didn't taste just right," but
she assumed this was because she hadn't eaten all day. She had consumed
about one third of the candy bar by the time she bit into a mushy worm.
When she looked at the bar, she saw that it was covered with worms and
webbing; worms were crawling out of the chocolate and the webbing had
little eggs "hanging onto it."
Id. at 277. Sickened from ingesting the contaminated candy, plaintiff sued the grocery store for
breach of warranty of merchantability, and the jury found for plaintiff. Id. Defendant appealed
the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that plaintiff had a duty "to take reasonable
precautions for her own safety in the handling, inspection, and consumption" of the candy bar.
Id. Affirming the trial court, the court held there is no duty to look at and feel a candy bar prior
to biting into it. Id. at 278; cf. Coulter v. Am. Bakeries Co., 530 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. Ct. App.
1988) (inding comparative fault generally applicable to implied warranty claims, but, in case
where metal wire in doughnut, sucking on doughnut while sipping milk, rather than chewing the
doughnut properly, was not faulty conduct that could reduce recovery).
393. On the contributory negligence defense to products liability claims in tort, see supra
Part II. "Simple" contributory negligence, negligently failing to discover or guard against the
possibility of a defect, is to be distinguished from a plaintiff's assumption of risk in voluntarily,
and perhaps unreasonably, encountering a known and appreciated danger. On the assumption of
risk defense to products liability claims in tort, see supra Part III.
394. See Keaton v. A.B.C. Drug Co., 467 S.E.2d 558,561 (Ga. 1996); Colter v. BarberGreene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1312 (Mass. 1988); Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
446 N.E.2d 1033, 1039 (Mass. 1983) (discussing comparative fault); Goulet v. Whitin Mach.
Works, Inc., 568 N.E.2d 1158, 1160-61 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991); Wallace v. Owens-Illinois,
Inc., 300 S.C. 518, 389 S.E.2d 155, 157 (Ct. App. 1989) (illuminating analysis by Bell, J.);
Wood v. Bass Pro Shops, Inc., 462 S.E.2d 101, 103 (Va. 1995).
395. Presser, supra note 297, at 839.
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Restatement (Second)of Torts § 402A comment n for strict liability in tort.396
While there is some thin authority to the contrary, 3" the courts quite widely
agree that a plaintiffs negligent assumption of risk-his or her unreasonable
decision to encounter a known and appreciated product danger-properly bars
recovery in warranty as well.398
C. Misuse
Many courts have applied a misuse defense to warranty claims quite
similar to how it is applied to products liability claims based in tort.3" Thus,
early warranty cases denied recovery if the injury arose out of a product use
not intended by the manufacturer.4 More recently, courts have limited the
warranty of merchantability, which requires that products be "fit" for their
"ordinary purposes,""' to uses that are reasonably foreseeable.4" In other
words, a seller's implied warranties do not extend to abnormal use, or
unforeseeable misuse, whether by the user or another. °3

396. See supra Part II.
397. See, e.g., Wood v. Bass Pro Shops, Inc., 462 S.E.2d 101, 103 (Va. 1995) (noting
that implied warranty actions are ex contractu, and holding that "the tort or ex delicto defense
of assumption of the risk is not applicable in an action for breach of an implied warranty";
however, liability is barred if defect was "known, visible or obvious" to plaintiff).
398. Massachusetts has the most extensive jurisprudence on this point. See Allen v.
Chance Mfg. Co., 494 N.E.2d 1324, 1326-27 (Mass. 1986); Correia v. FirestoneTire & Rubber
Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1039 (Mass. 1983); Velleca v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 630 N.E.2d 297, 298
(Mass. App. Ct. 1994); Barry v. Stop & Shop Cos., 507 N.E.2d 1062, 1065-66 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1987) (finding that plaintiff's hand cut by rotating blade of lawn mower when she attempted
to push misplaced baffle back into place). See Murphy v. Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc., 444 F.2d
317 (6th Cir. 1971) (applying Michigan law); Hiigel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 525 P.2d 1198,
1200 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975); Brackett v.
Johnson, 273 A.2d 499 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1970) (finding that plaintiff placed hand in chute of
snowblower he knew to be defective); Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 261 N.E.2d 305 (IUI.1970);
cf. Freeman v. Case Corp., 118 F.3d 1011, 1014 (4th Cir. 1997) (applying Virginia law and
noting that liability barred if defect was "known, visible or obvious" to plaintiff, but ruling that
obviousness was jury issue); Epstein v. Eastman Kodak Co., 638 N.Y.S.2d 490, 491 (App. Div.
1996); Gillespie v. Am. Motors Corp., 317 S.E.2d 32 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that where
buyers of vehicle complained of noxious fumes in passenger compartment immediately upon
purchase, their contributory negligence in driving vehicle for three years thereafter, despite their
doctor's advice not to ride therein, barred recovery in warranty for resulting injuries). See
generally CLARK & SMrrH, supra note 379,
12.0318][b], at 12-17 to 12-18; WHITE &
SUMMERS, supranote 379, § 11.8, at 408-09 (stating that "courts agree that the more specific
form of contributory misconduct called 'assumption of the risk' bars a plaintiffs recovery in
either strict tort or warranty," consistent with Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. n).
399. On the misuse defense to products liability claims in tort, see supra Part IV.
400. See Preston v. Up-Right, Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 679, 682-83 (Ct. App. 1966); Silverman
v. Swift & Co., 107 A.2d 277, 281 (Conn. 1954); Ross v. Diamond Match Co., 102 A.2d 858,
859-60 (Me. 1953); Cheli v. Cudahy Bros. Co., 255 N.W. 414, 416 (Mich. 1934), overruled
on other grounds,Hill v. Husky Briquetting, Inc., 223 N.W.2d 290 (Mich. 1974). See generally
Levine, supra note 379, at 643.
401. See U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1972); see infra V.D.
402. See Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188, 191 (1st Cir. 1980) (applying
Massachusetts law).
403. See, e.g., Watson v. Uniden Corp. ofAm., 775 F.2d 1514 (1lth Cir. 1985) (applying
Georgia law and finding that plaintiff's use of product contrary to instructions is not use in a
normal manner, when he forgot to switch from standby to talk, as manual instructed, before
placing on ear); Fournier Furniture, Inc. v. Waltz-Hoist Blow Pipe Co., 980 F. Supp. 187, 190
(W.D. Va. 1997) (finding that misuse of product, defined as using it in manner which seller
could not reasonably have foreseen, bars breach of warranty claims if misuse is sole proximate
cause of harm); Global Truck & Equip. Co. v. Palmer Mach. Works, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 641,
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For example, in Venezia v. Miller Brewing Company,' a young boy's
eye was injured when he threw a discarded Miller Beer bottle against a
telephone pole, shattering the bottle. In his warranty claim against Miller and
the bottle manufacturers for failing to make their bottles strong enough to
withstand this type of use, the federal appeals court noted that the
Massachusetts high court had previously found no breach of a warranty of
merchantability where a plaintiff was injured by breaking glass while trying
to pry the cover off a glass baby food jar with a beer can type of opener. 44
While noting that "[t]he linchpin of the warranty claim... is thus the proper
scope of the term ordinary purpose," and that "at first blush it might appear
beyond dispute that throwing a glass container into a telephone pole is by no
means an 'ordinary' use of that product," 406 the court observed that the
standard as
Massachusetts high court had already rejected the "ordinary use"
being devoid of content for deciding misuse cases. ' Instead, the
"manufacturer's warranty of product fitness for ordinary use includes a
guarantee that such product will withstand, in a reasonably safe manner,
foreseeable 'misuse' incident to or arising out of the product's intended
use."' Applying this standard, the court concluded that "it would be
stretching too far to believe that the Massachusetts courts are presently
prepared to expand their definition of 'ordinary purposes' to include the
deliberate misuse of an otherwise reasonably safe container in a manner
totally unrelated to any normal or intended use of that item .... Afortiori,
we can see no possible implied fitness warranty that an empty glass bottle
discarded by unknown persons would.., safely withstand being intentionally
smashed against a solid stationary object. 9
D. U. C.C. Article 2
Since warranty law is now governed in every state by Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 4 0 a search for the proper role of user misconduct
in warranty law should begin there. But the U.C.C.'s black-letter ("Official

650-51 (N.D. Miss. 1986) (holding that improper use negates both implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness); Daniell v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F. Supp. 728, 731-32 (D.N.M.
1984) (applying improper use rule to case where plaintiff, after locking herself in trunk in
attempt to commit suicide, could not get out for nine days because of absence of internal release
mechanism; use was highly extraordinary rather than "ordinary," and buyer did not think about,
much less rely upon, seller's skill or judgment to select automobile suitable for her
"unfortunate" purpose); Wheeler v. Sunbelt Tool Co., 537 N.E.2d 1332, 1342 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989) (ciing UCC § 2-715, and observing that "[m]isuse arises as an issue which may defeat
the action in whole or in part by contesting proximate cause"); Carbone v. Alagna, 658
N.Y.S.2d 48, 51 (App. Div. 1997) (finding that boy struck by projectile fired from friend's
slingshot could not maintain implied warranty action against suppliers of slingshot); Featherall
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 252 S.E.2d 358, 367 (Va. 1979) (finding no recovery for
breach of implied warranty if use was unforeseeable).
404. 626 F.2d 188, 189 (1st Cir. 1980) (applying Massachusetts law).
405. Id. at 190 (citing Vincent v. Nicholas E. Tsiknas Co., 151 N.E.2d 263 (Mass.
1958)).
406. Id. at 189.
407. See Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 968 (Mass. 1978).
408. Venezia, 626 F.2d at 190 (emphasis added).
409. Id. The court concluded that "the impact of endorsing a contrary conclusion would
be overwhelming, with every discarded glass object holding the potential for generating a future
lawsuit." Id. at 192.
410. See 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUcTS LIABILITY, supra note 8, ch. 4, at 120.
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Text") references to consumer misconduct are at best oblique-the scope 411
of
warranty liability is defined by whether a product is fit for "normal" use,
by whether the buyer is probably aware of the product's dangerous
condition, 412 and by whether a breach of warranty "proximately" results in
the plaintiff's injuries.413

The warranty most frequently litigated in products liability cases, the
implied warranty of merchantability, is principally defined in § 2-314(2)(c)'s
provision that a merchantable product is "fit for the ordinary purposes for
which such goods are used." 4 " This provision quite obviously suggests that
an implied warranty of merchantability will not arise under this subsection4 15
if a product's performance capabilities are exceeded by a use which is not
"ordinary," however that word may be interpreted. Under § 2-316(3)(b), no
warranties arise with respect to defects a buyer does or should discover
during a pre-sale examination of a product.4 16 Finally, the remedies provision
of Article 2 includes, in defining the "consequential damages" available for
breach of warranty in § 2-715(2)(b), "injury to person or property
proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.
w41-While
each of these
provisions in Article 2 may be interpreted to implicate the role of a buyer's
misconduct in warranty litigation, none of them do so in a manner that is
clear and to the point.
In contrast to the obscure manner in which buyer misconduct is treated
in the U.C.C.'s Official Text, the Official Comments specifically address the
effect of both a buyer's carelessness and behavior which imply risk
acceptance, framing the issue in terms of whether a buyer's loss is
"proximately caused" by a product defect or, alternatively, by the buyer's
choice or conduct. Comment 13 to § 2-314 provides in part:
In an action based on breach of warranty, it is of course
necessary to show not only the existence of the warranty but
the fact that the warranty was broken and that the breach of
the warranty was the proximate cause of the loss sustained.
In such an action an affirmative showing by the seller that
the loss resulted from some action or event following his
own delivery of the goods can operate as a
defense . . . . Action by the buyer following an
examination of the goods which ought to have indicated the

411. See U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1972).
412. Id. § 2-316(3)(b).
413. Id. § 2-715(2)(b).
414. Id. § 2-314(2)(c); see 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCrS LIABILITY, supra note 8,

§ 4:7.

415. Note that U.C.C. §2-314(2) contains a total of six subsections, labeled (a)-(f), so that
even ifa product is merchantable under one or more subsections it may be found unmerchantable
under one or more of the other provisions. So, if opening a Pepsi bottle on a metal fence causing
it to explode is not an "ordinary purpose" under subsection (c), the bottle might still be
unmerchantable for not being "adequately contained" under subsection (e). For such facts, see
Natale v. Pepsi-ColaCo., 182 N.Y.S.2d 404, 406 (App. Div. 1959).
416. See, e.g., Light v. Weldarc Co., 569 So. 2d 1302, 1305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

(finding no implied warranty that safety glasses would not slip down user's nose, and so fail to
protect eye from metal sliver thrown from punch press, when user inspected glasses, knew their
propensity to slip, and made "conscious decision" to buy them). See also 1 MADDEN & OWEN
ON PRODucTs LIABILITY, supra note 8, § 4:17, at 206.
417. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (1972).
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defect complained of can be shown as matter bearing on
whether the breach itself was the cause of the injury.
Comment 8 to § 2-316 provides that "if the buyer discovers the defect and
uses the goods anyway, or if he unreasonably fails to examine the goods
before he uses them, resulting injuries may be found to result from his own
action rather than proximately from a breach of warranty."419 Comment 5 to
§ 2-715 provides more fully:
Subsection (2) (b) states the usual rule as to breach of
warranty, allowing recovery for injuries "proximately"
resulting from the breach. Where the injury involved

follows the use of goods without discovery of the defect
causing the damage, the question of "proximate" cause
turns on whether it was reasonable for the buyer to use the
goods without such inspection as would have revealed the
defects. If it was not reasonable for him to do so, or if he
did in fact discover the defect prior to his use, the injuI
would not proximately result from the breach of warranty.41
This last comment imposes the greatest burden on buyers, for it states that
there is no proximate cause, and hence no damages for breach of warranty,
if a buyer either (1) unreasonably fails to inspect a product for defects or (2)
uses a product after discovery of a defect, whether such use was unreasonable
or not.
Erdman v. Johnson Brothers Radio & Television Company421 illustrates
one court's attempt to harmonize the awkward fit between a plaintiff's
contributory negligence and the law of warranty. From the start, the
plaintiffs' television-radio-stereo console purchased from the defendant
emitted crackling sounds, often accompanied by a tear in the picture, and it
sometimes emitted "sparks and heavy smoke shooting out of the back of the
set and the smell of burning rubber, wire, or some other substance." 4' The
defendmats purported to repair the problem, but sparks and smoke still
emanated from the rear of the television. 4' After one of these recurring
episodes, the plaintiffs turned off (but did not unplug) the television, went to
bed, and were later awakened by a fire from the set that destroyed their
house.' In plaintiffs' warranty and negligence action against the dealers, the
trial court ruled for the defendants, finding that the plaintiffs had been
contributorily negligent in continuing to use a television that was arcing,
smoking, and emitting sparks and a burning odor for two hours on the night
of the fire. 4' The court concluded that the implied warranty of

418. U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 13.

419. U.C.C. § 2-316 cmt. 8, at 89.
420. Id. § 2-715 cmt. 5.

421. 271 A.2d 744 (Md. 1970).
422. Id. at 745.

423. Id.

424. Id. at 746.
425. Id. at 747.
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merchantability did not cover the continued use of a television under these
conditions since such was not a "normal" use.426
On appeal, the Maryland high court affirmed. Pondering whether
contributory negligence is a bar to an implied warranty claim under the
Uniform Commercial Code, on the one hand, or falls outside the scope of the
seller's implied warranty, on the other, the Erdmancourt observed that "[t]he
important factor under either theory or an amalgam of them is that, although
there may have been a breach of the warranty, that the breach is no longer
considered 'the proximate cause of the loss.'"27 Thus, "the defect in the set,
of which the plaintiffs had knowledge, could no longer be relied upon by
them as a basis for an action of breach of warranty."" The court concluded
that "the breach of warranty, if any there was, was not the proximate cause
of the fire because of the appellants' continued use of the set after the
discovery of the obvious defects, "429 remarking "that such a holding is
consistent with the trial judge's characterization of the plaintiffs' conduct as
contributory negligence and with "the
430 U.C.C.'s Official Comment 13 to § 2314, and Comment 5 to § 2-715.
Despite the specificity of the U.C.C.'s Official Comments on how buyer
misconduct affects a warranty claim, Erdman is one of the few decisions that
analyzes these useful comments together with the vague black-letter
provisions to resolve the user misconduct issue in a warranty case. Why most
courts have failed to use Article 2's misconduct comments in a similarly
forthright manner might be because the courts have sensed the rough manner
in which the contract law scholars who drafted Article 2 incorporated the tort
law concepts of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, misuse, and
proximate cause into the warranty law context. Or perhaps the courts, feeling
bound only by the U.C.C.'s Official Text, have largely ignored the comments
to provide more flexibility in their effort to standardize the misconduct
defenses applicable to all products liability claims, in tort and warranty alike.
Finally, beginning in the late 1960s, courts increasingly may have perceived
that the all-or-nothing approach to buyer misconduct exhibited by the
comments is inconsistent with the modem comparative fault approach to
damages apportionment that swept the nation in the late twentieth century. 43 '
The infrequency with which the courts have used the U.C.C.'s blackletter provisions to decide consumer misconduct cases is more problematic.
Certainly the paucity of this type of analysis is partially explained by the
vague and indirect manner in which these provisions refer to buyer
misconduct in terms of ordinary use, discovery of defects, and proximate
426. The trial judge remarked in part:
"You have a man of high intelligence, who purchased this television set,
who continued to use it, even though he knew and had complained that it
was arcing, smoking, with actual sparks and a burning odor. Now using a
set which is in that condition is certainly not, in my opinion, a use in a

normal manner .... I so hold that, even assuming the tire came about as
a result of a defect in the set, that the warranty did not extend to the point,
under the circumstances of this case, of covering the Plaintiff's damages
resulting from the fire."
Id. at 747 (quoting trial judge's opinion).
427. Id. at 749 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 13).
428. Id.
429. Id. at 750.
430. Id. at 750-51.
431. See 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODucTs LIABILITY, supra note 5, ch. 15.
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causation. Moreover, because this Official Text did not explicitly address the
subject of buyer misconduct, the enactment of the U.C.C. did not displace
prior law, nor did it interfere with the ongoing development of supplementary
law, on how a buyer's misconduct should affect a warranty claim. 432 Thus,
courts may have felt authorized by the U.C.C. itself to substitute developing
principles of consumer misconduct from the tort law context for the rough,
vague, and increasingly anachronistic provisions of Article 2.
Since warranty law claims in most products liability actions are secondary
to overlapping claims of strict liability in tort and negligence, many courts
and lawyers may simply view these liability claims collectively as lying
essentially in tort and so may view the defenses from the same perspective.
While the temptation to view tort and warranty claims as falling under a
single "products liability action" umbrella for purposes of evaluating
available defenses is understandable, it improperly denigrates the legislative
prerogative. Until the legislatures themselves choose to unify tort and
warranty claims in products liability litigation, as a couple now have done,433
the courts should clarify how differing forms of consumer misconduct affect
claims and damages for breach of warranty under Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code.
E. Express Warranty
Much of the analysis above applies to express as well as implied warranty
claims. But express warranties arise from explicit contractual representations,
and so the issue of whether a representation was part of the basis of the
particular bargain (or whether a plaintiff justifiably relied thereon) is an issue
that cannot be ignored.434
One special doctrine that has developed in some of the express warranty
cases is that contributory negligence is irrelevant if the plaintiff's
"misconduct" consists merely in relying on the truthfulness of the defendant's
representation. Hensley v. Sherman CarWash Equipment Co. 435 was an action
by a car wash employee against the manufacturer of the automobile conveyor
unit. On the day of the accident, the pivoting safety hood which ordinarily
covered the open pit at the end of the conveyor was not operating, and the
plaintiff stepped into the pit. The plaintiff's express warranty claim was based
on the assertion in the defendant's information sheet that "[c]ar wash
personnel are assured safe working conditions on all areas of the vehicle by
the pivoted safety hood . . . [which] eliminates all possibility of persons

stepping into an open pit." 4 Holding that the plaintiff's contributory
negligence was not a bar to her express warranty claim, the court reasoned
that the plaintiff's faulty behavior in failing to observe where she was going
was "within the scope of the risk warranted against by defendant," since the
stated "purpose of the safety hood was to prevent a person from stepping into

432. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1972).
433. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572n(a) (1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.2945 (West 2000). Note, however, that some states treat express warranty claims as
generating special responsibilities and so exclude them from the general definition of a "product
liability action." See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:58C-1(b)(3) (1987).
434. See 1MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUcTs LIABILITY, supra note 8, §§ 4:2-:4, at 122.
435. 520 P.2d 146 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974).
436. Id. at 147.
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the opening at the end of the conveyor unit."437 Accordingly, "tihe very risk
which defendant warranted not to exist was encountered by plaintiff, and her
negligence or lack of due care is irrelevant." 438 Indeed, a person's "fault" in
believing a manufacturer's express promise should only rarely be allowed to
undercut the manufacturer's fundamental obligation to speak the truth. 43
Other courts have agreed with Hensley that a plaintiff's contributory
negligence will not bar a breach of express warranty claim if the misconduct
merely "puts the warranty to the test."" 0
F. Comparative Fault
Only in recent decades have courts and legislatures realized that a
plaintiff's misconduct and damages need not be treated in an all-or-nothing
manner. 41 Today, whether consumer misconduct should be considered a
matter of comparative fault for damages apportionment on a warranty claim
depends upon the scope of each particular jurisdiction's comparative fault
system. 442 While the development of the comparative fault doctrine is
generally beneficial, it has magnified the profound confusion that already
existed in fashioning a proper role for user misconduct in warranty litigation.
In states which have enacted "comparative negligence" legislation, courts
have been properly hesitant to compare a user's misconduct with a
defendant's breach of warranty. 443 But in states with legislation which has
defined the apportionment system more broadly in terms of comparative
"fault" 4 or "culpability,"445 especially if "fault" is defined to include breach

437. Id. at 148.
438. Id.
439. See generally Owen, supra note 293, at 463-65.
440. Hensley, 520 P.2d at 148. See Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149, 153 (9th Cir.
1962) (applying Hawaii law); Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254, 258 (6th
Cir. 1960) ("'If the manufacturer chooses to extend the scope of his liability by certifying certain
qualities as existent, the negligent acts of the buyer, bringing about the revelation that the
qualities do not exist, would not defeat recovery.'" (quoting Hanson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 276 F.2d 254, 258 (1960))); Imperial Die Casting Co. v. Covil Insulation Co., 264 S.C.
604, 609, 216 S.E.2d 532, 534 (S.C. 1975).
441. Perhaps the earliest products liability case in which the court allowed the jury to
reduce the plaintiff's recovery for breach of implied warranty on account of contributory
negligence, rather than to bar recovery altogether, was Chapman V.Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78,
86 (D. Haw. 1961), 4f'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962). A helpful, early discussion favoring
comparative fault apportionment in warranty cases is Levine, supra note 379.
442. See generally WOODS & DEERE, supra note 5, §§ 14:16-:17, at 336-39.
443. See, e.g., Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834, 837 (Wyo. 1991)
("Mhe statute applies only to causes of action arising out of appellee's negligence .... ."). But
see Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 837 P.2d 1273, 1289 (Haw. 1992) ("merging" breach of
implied warranty into pure apportionment products liability scheme). In some jurisdictions,
warranty claims may plausibly be included under the "comparative negligence" umbrella:
It can be argued that most comparative negligence statutes by using only
the term 'negligence' intend to exclude warranty actions. This argument is
very tenuous in a jurisdiction recognizing contributory negligence as a
defense. It may have some force in a state which has never recognized
contributory negligence as a defense to warranty ....
WOODS & DEERE, supra note 5, § 14:16, at 336.
444. As in Colorado. See Montag v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 75 F.3d 1414, 1419 (10th
Cir. 1996) (interpreting products liability apportionment statute, COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. § 1321-406 (2000), to permit comparison of driver's fault with automotive manufacturer's fault in
designing defective seatbelt).
445. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. art. 14-A § 1411 (McKinney 1999).
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of warranty" 6 or something similar,4 or when the statute provides for
apportionment in all cases involving personal injury, death, or damage to
property," 8 then courts may or must include breach of warranty as an item
to be apportioned." 9 In the two states that have adopted the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act,' ° breach of warranty is explicitly included as a type
of "fault" to be apportioned.45' Some state legislatures have enacted special
products liability reform statutes that explicitly provide for the comparative
fault apportionment of damages in products liability actions generally,
regardless of the basis of the claim.452 Finally, in a number of the ten or so
jurisdictions where comparative fault apportionment is a creature of the
common law, the courts havegenerally
chosen to include breach of warranty
3
in the apportionment system.
A variety of secondary comparative fault issues arise in connection with
warranty claims involving user misconduct. In the majority of comparative
fault states that have adopted a "modified" rather than "pure" system of
comparative fault, a plaintiff's contributory fault continues to bar recovery
altogether, in warranty as in tort, when the plaintiff's fault exceeds the
defendant's fault. 4 When comparative fault statutes specify apportionment
for claims of personal injury and property damage, such statutes may not be
applied to breach of warranty actions seeking recovery of purely economic
loss. 4'
For the many reasons why damages apportionment
principles are widely
416
applied to products liability claims intort, a division of damages based on
responsibility in warranty is also sound in principle. Because treating plaintiff
misconduct as a basis for apportioning damages was largely nonexistent when
the Uniform Commercial Code was drafted in the 1950s, Article 2 fails to

446. See ARK.CODE ANN. § 16-64-122(c) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1999).
447. In Maine "fault" includes a "breach of statutory duty." See ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 156 (West 1964).
448. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972 & Supp. 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4
(1997); Fiske v. MacGregor, 464 A.2d 719, 726-729 (R.I. 1983) (providing thorough analysis
of case law).

449. See generally WooDs & DEERE, supra note 5, § 14:16.
450. UNIFoRM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 123 (1996). Iowa and Washington
are the only two states that have adopted the Act.
451. Under § 1(b) of the Act, "fault" is defined to include "breach of warranty." See id.
at 127.
452. See Karl v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 705 F.2d 164, 165-66 (6th Cir. 1983)
(applying Michigan law); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.001 (1985).
453. See, e.g., Sebring v. Colver, 649 P.2d 932, 935 (Alaska 1982); Coulter v. American
Bakeries Co., 530 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Wheeler v. Sunbelt Tool Co., Inc.,
537 N.E.2d 1332, 1341 (I11. App. Ct. 1989); In re Certified Questions from the United States
Court of Appeals for Sixth Circuit, 331 N.W.2d 456, 459 (Mich. 1982); Owens v. Truckstops
of Am., 915 S.W.2d 420, 434 (Tenn. 1996).
454. See, e.g., Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 886 P.2d 92, 100 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
455. See Ethyl Corp. v. BP Performance Polymers, Inc., 33 F.3d 23, 25 (8th Cir. 1994)
(applying Iowa law); Little Rock Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Okonite Co., 744 S.W.2d 381, 382
(Ark. 1988) (holding no apportionment where statute applied to "actions for damages for
personal injuries or wrongful death or injury to property in which recovery is predicated upon
fault," not because implied warranty was not a form of "fault," but because of type of loss
sustained); see also Eastern Mountain Platform Tennis, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 40 F.3d
492, 501 (1st Cir. 1994) (applying New Hampshire law and holding that comparative fault not
applicable as defense to warranty liability "except in personal injury cases based on dual theories
of strict liability in tort and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability").
456. See 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 5, ch. 15.
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address the topic. But Article 2's formulation of buyer misconduct issues in
proximate causation terms is compatible with the concept of damages
apportionment which assigns responsibility for damages to each party in
proportion to the extent to which the party's breach of duty proximately
caused the harm.457
The widening application of comparative fault principles to warranty
actions has occurred mostly in the context of implied warranty claims, and
there has been a greater reluctance to apply damages apportionment principals
to claims for express warranty. 48 But the several comparative fault statutes
that apply to injury claims generally, together with the products liability
statutes that apply comparative fault provisions to all products liability claims,
would seem quite clearly to embrace express warranty claims within the
ambit of comparative responsibility. However, jurisdictions without these
statutes generally should not reduce a plaintiff's damages on account of
simple contributory fault, for such behavior usually consists in merely putting
the warranty to the test. More egregious misconduct, however, particularly
if it involves plaintiff conduct which is knowingly dangerous and
unreasonable, or puts a product to an unforeseeable use, unfairly tests the
product outside the warranty and so should continue to bar express warranty
recovery altogether.
While damages apportionment for consumer misconduct in implied
warranty cases is sound as a principle of general application, it needs
exceptions. No doubt some forms of consumer misconduct, such as
knowingly dangerous and unreasonable behavior and putting products to
unforeseeably dangerous use, should be left entirely outside the area of
damages apportionment for all warranty claims. Regardless of how user
misconduct is characterized, the issue of damages apportionment needs to be
addressed only if the product use was within the scope of warranty. And for
most products liability claims involving user misconduct, in warranty no less
than tort, courts should leave room for a robust doctrine of "sole proximate
cause""5 9 which is often better treated as an issue of "scope of warranty. "4°
Both doctrines embrace the same notion that there must be a fair limit to a
seller's responsibility, such that both express and implied promises are
reasonably construed to exclude responsibility for injuries resulting from the
use of a product outside the scope of a warranty.

457. See, e.g., Frazer v. A.F. Munsterman, Inc., 527 N.E.2d 1248, 1256 (Ill. 1988). See
generally Levine, supra note 379, at 663 (arguing that comparative fault approach "while not
a panacea, can serve to substantially ameliorate the harshness of the contributory negligence
doctrine while balancing the manufacturer's responsibility to society with the buyer's action in
contributing to his injury").
458. "Contributory negligence has never been an available defense in cases involving
express warranties." Ferdig v. Melitta, Inc., 320 N.W.2d 369, 374 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
459. See, e.g., Fournier Furniture, Inc. v. Waltz-Hoist Blow Pipe Co., 980 F. Supp. 187,
190 (W.D. Va. 1997) (holding that misuse of product, defined as "using it in manner which the
seller could not reasonably have foreseen," bars breach of warranty claims if misuse is sole
proximate cause of harm).
460. See, e.g., Erdman v. Johnson Bros. Radio & Television Co., 271 A.2d 744, 749
(Md. 1971). See NORDSTROM, supra note 379, § 84. Professor Nordstrom viewed the user
misconduct issue as a question of the nature of the agreement between the parties, addressed in
Article 2 in terms of whether the goods "conformed" to the warranty. See U.C.C. § 2-106(2)
(1972). In view of Nordstrom's focus on the intent of the parties and the nature of their
agreement, he preferred among tort law terms the concept of assumption of risk to the vaguer
concept of proximate cause. See NORDSTROM, supra note 379, § 84.
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As an example, assume that a new sport utility vehicle has a high center
of gravity, a narrow track width, and a large bubble visible on the sidewall
of one tire, and further assume that the buyer is aware of these obvious
characteristics of the vehicle. If the buyer chooses to turn the steering wheel
sharply at high speed in an effort to spin the vehicle sideways like a movie
stuntman, the tire might blow out and the vehicle might roll over, injuring the
driver. In such a case, although the tire is clearly defective, and while the
safety of the vehicle's stability may fairly be subject to inquiry, the sole
proximate cause of the driver's injuries should probably be viewed as the
driver's harsh driving rather than any lack of merchantability in the tire or the
vehicle. Stated otherwise, the scope of the implied warranty of quality in such
a case does not include safe performance when the product is put to such
abusive use. The issue of comparative fault should never be reached at all in
such a case, because there was no proximate connection between breach of
warranty and the plaintiff's harm.
VI. DEFENSES TO MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS

A. In General
The basic misconduct "defense" asserted in tortious misrepresentation
actions is that the plaintiff's reliance, if any, was not "justifiable." 461Indeed,
the justifiability of reliance, sometimes referred to as "reasonable reliance"
or the "right to rely, "42 has long been a central element of all three forms of
tortious misrepresentation, including fraud,4 63 negligent misrepresentation, 6
and strict products liability in tort for misrepresentation under the Restatement

461. See generally 2 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 7.8 (2d ed. 1986);
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 50, § 109; James B. Sales, The Innocent
MisrepresentationDoctrine: Strict Tort Liability Under Section 402B, 16 HOus. L. REv. 239
(1979); Gary Massey, Jr., Comment, Interpretingthe Restatement of Torts Section 402B After
the Changes to Section 402A, 28 CUMB. L. REv. 177 (1997-98).
462. The dominant term is "justifiable." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 402B,
537(b), 538(1), 552. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability does not really
address the issue. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 9 cmt. b (1998) (adopting the
principles of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B); id. § 9 cmt. c (1998) (referring only
to the issue of "contributory fault"); id. § 9, reporters' notes 1 & 2 (referring to § 402B's
requirement of "justifiable reliance"). But other terms are used as well, sometimes
interchangeably. See, e.g., G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 808 P.2d 851, 855 (Idaho
1991) (stating eighth element of fraud claim as plaintiff's "right to rely thereon"); IFD Constr.
Corp. v. Corddry Carpenter Dietz & Zack, 685 N.Y.S.2d 670, 673 (App. Div. 1999) (stating
that reliance was "neither reasonable nor justified"); Rowan County Bd. of Educ. v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 407 S.E.2d 860, 863 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (discussing "justifiable reliance" and
"reasonable reliance"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 cmt. b (1965) (relying on an
opinion may make the person's reliance "less reasonable, and so less justified."); 37 AM. JUR.
2D Fraud& Deceit § 236 (1968) (classifying issue as plaintiffs "right to rely" and examining
basis for ascertaining whether reliance is "justifiable or excusable"). Except perhaps on the issue
of whether a victim's conduct should be measured objectively or subjectively, discussed below,
it matters little which term a court selects to characterize the form of misconduct which will
defeat a claim for tortious misrepresentation.
463. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537(b) (1977). Although § 537 by its terms
applies only to recovery for pecuniary loss, § 557A applies the principles of liability in deceit
for pecuniary loss to cases in which the deceit causes physical harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 557A cmt. a (1977).
464. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977).
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(Second) of Torts4 and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability.4
Probably because thejustifiability of a plaintiff's reliance overlaps several
other elements of fraud (fact, materiality, plaintiff's ignorance of falsity, and
reliance), as discussed below, it is sometimes omitted in recitations of the
elements of fraudulent467 and negligent misrepresentation. 46' This omission
might be viewed as suggesting that there exists some uncertainty as to
whether the justifiability of a plaintiff's reliance is truly an element of a
tortious misrepresentation claim or whether instead a plaintiff's unjustified
reliance should be considered an affirmative defense. But the omission is to
be explained by its embedded nature in the other elements, and there is
essentially no debate that the justifiability of a plaintiff's reliance is an
essential component of a common-law4 69 claim for tortious
misrepresentation.4 7
As a component of all three causes of action for tortious
misrepresentation, the justifiability of reliance cannot be characterized as an
affirmative defense because the plaintiff in all such cases has the burden, as
with each element of such claims, to plead and prove the justifiability of the
reliance upon the defendant's misrepresentation. 7 If a plaintiff is unable to
prove that the reliance was justifiable, the tortious misrepresentation claim
will fail.472 Similar to the other misconduct defenses examined in this Article,
465. Id. § 402B. See id. cmt. j.
466. Section 9 of the ProductsLiabilityRestatement incorporates the doctrine of § 402B
of the SecondRestatement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 9 cmt.
b (1998).
467. See, e.g., Bank of Montreal v. Signet Bank, 193 F.3d 818 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying
Virginia law); Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 698 N.Y.S.2d 615, 621 (Ct. App. 1999) ("To
make out a prima facie case of fraud, the complaint must contain allegations of a representation
of material fact, falsity, scienter, reliance and injury."); Sturgeon v. Retherford Publications,
Inc., 987 P.2d 1218, 1228 (Okla. Ct. App. 1999). See also 1 Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I.
FRIEDMAN, PRODuCTsLIABILITY § 2.05 [2], at 2-55 (Cary Sklaren rev. ed. 1999) (characterizing
element merely as "reliance upon the truth of the representation").
468. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 (1965).
469. Justifiable reliance is not a required element of certain statutory claims for deceptive
business practices and consumer fraud. See Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 691 A.2d 350,
364-65 (N.J. 1997); Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 679 N.Y.S.2d 593,599 (App. Div. 1998),
aff'd, 698 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1999).
470. See Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. Winkler, 640 P.2d 216, 223 (Colo. 1982); Boyd v.
A. 0. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 776 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) ("An essential
element of both fraud and negligent misrepresentation is justifiable reliance."); Gawloski v.
Miller Brewing Co., 644 N.E.2d 731,734 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). ButseePhinney v. Perlmutter,
564 N.W.2d 532, 546-48 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (narrowly reasoned and not a products liability
case), rejected by Novak v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 599 N.W.2d 546, 554 (Mich. 1999)
("[A] person who unreasonablyrelies on false statements should not be entitled to damages for
misrepresentation .... .").
471. See, e.g., Am. Safety Equip. Corp., 640 P.2d at 223 (holding by implication that
justifiable reliance cannot be characterized as an affirmative defense); cf. Kruse v. Bank of Am.,
248 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that fraud pleading insufficient without allegations
ofjustifiable reliance). See generally37 AM. JUR. 2D FRAUD & DECEIT § 435 (1968) (disclosing
plaintiff generally has the duty to plead a right to rely).
472. See, e.g., Baker v. Danek Medical, 35 F. Supp. 2d 875, 878 (N.D. Fla. 1998)
(finding negligence and strict liability for misrepresentation); Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp., 674
F. Supp. 1149, 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (dismissing claims against tobacco companies for fraud,
negligence, and strict liability for misrepresentation on ground that advertisements at issue "are
not the kind of representations upon which reasonable people would rely"); Am. Safety Equip.
Corp., 640 P.2d at 223 (4-3 decision) (strict liability); Gawloski, 644 N.E.2d at 736 (fraudulent
misrepresentation: no justifiable reliance as a matter of law).

2000]

USER MISCONDUCT DEFENSES

the justifiability of a plaintiff's reliance is normally a question of fact for the

jury to resolve.473

B. Justifiabilityof Reliance
Whether a plaintiff's reliance is justifiable depends upon the nature of the
representation and all of the circumstances of the particular transaction. These
include the materiality of the representation;47 the extent to which it was
precise and factual, on the one hand, or vague and subjectively a matter of

opinion, on the other;4'5 its form and the context in which it was made, as in

television advertising, face-to-face negotiations, or in the owner's manual;476
its apparent plausibility, or its suspiciousness suggesting that the plaintiff
should "smell a rat"; ' the availability of other sources of information
revealing the falsity of the representation;" 7 and any other matter bearing on

473. See Rowan County Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 407 S.E.2d 860, 863 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1991).
474. Section 538 of the Restatement (Second)of Torts provides that "[rieliance upon a
fraudulent misrepresentation is not justifiable unless the matter misrepresented is material," and
it defines a matter as "material" if:
(a) a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or
nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in
question; or
(b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that
its recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in
determining his choice of action, although a reasonable man would not so
regard it.
RESTATSMFNT (SECOND) OF ToRTs, § 538 (1977).
475. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 50, § 109, at 755.
476. C. RESTATEMENT (SE OND) OFTORTS, § 538A, cmt. c (1977).
477. AMPAT/Midwest, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works Inc., 896 F.2d 1035, 1041 (7th Cir.
1990) (Ill. law). Thanks to Judge Posner for this colorful phrase.
478. See Gawloski v. Miller Brewing Co., 644 N.E.2d 731 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (finding
that even if Miller beer commercials had represented that prolonged and excessive beer drinking
was safe, no justifiable reliance as a matter of law because of common awareness for centuries
of risks of alcoholism from prolonged and excessive consumption of alcohol). The court in
Gawloski remarked:
Our nation continues to inform its citizens of those dangers, supporting the
community's common knowledge with well-documented and highly
publicized scientific and statistical information that repeatedly warns ofthe
detrimental physical, psychological, and emotional effects caused by
prolonged and excessive alcohol use. Even though we acknowledge that
beer advertising is pervasive in our society, we hold that, as a matter of
law, a beer manufacturer's commercial images, although enticing, are not
enough to neutralize or nullify the immense body of knowledge a
reasonable consumer possesses about the dangers of alcohol. Therefore, a
reasonable consumer could not, as a matter of law, ignore basic common
knowledge about the dangers of alcohol and justifiably rely upon beer
advertisements and their idyllic images to conclude that the prolonged and
excessive use of alcohol is safe and acceptable.
Id. at 736. C. Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 679 N.Y.S.2d 593, 600 (App. Div. 1998), aff'd,
698 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1999). In Small the court decertified a class action against the tobacco
industry for fraudulently concealing the addictive nature of cigarette smoking, questioning the
plausibility of plaintiff's claim of reliance because of the hundreds of articles published in New
York newspapers during the 1980s and 1990s about nicotine addiction.
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whether in the circumstances the plaintiff, or a reasonable person, 479 could
properly believe and base a decision upon the representation. 8 0 So, a court
or jury may conclude that a person can reasonably believe explicit assurances
that a golfing practice device is "completely safe" and that the "ball will not
hit player," 8 or that a mace weapon sold for self defense "disables as
effectively as a gun" and will "subdue" an attacker "instantly," 41 whereas a
person, ignoring widespread publicity about the evils of drinking and
smoking, may not justifiably base personal beer or cigarette consumption
decisions upon commercials that glorify drinking or smoking and that
somehow convey the idea that the prolonged and excessive consumption of
such products is not harmful or addictive. 3
Reliance itself, apart from its justifiability, involves the entirely factual
subjective question of whether the representee personally believed the
representation and took action, at least in part, upon it. In contrast, the
justifiability of that reliance requires an evaluation of the basis for reliance to
determine if it was sound or had at least some sensible explanation. Because
it gauges the wisdom of a plaintiff's decision to rely upon a particular
representation, the justifiability of reliance is often said to be based upon an

479. The standard for establishing justifiability of reliance for fraud is tailored to the
knowledge and characteristics of the specific plaintiff, in contrast to the objective reasonable
person standard for negligent and innocent misrepresentation. See infra text accompanying notes
482-87.
480. Representative factors to be considered in evaluating the justifiability of a plaintiff's
reliance upon a defendant's fraudulent representations are set forth in Sippy v. Cristich, 609 P.2d
204 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980), an action brought by home purchasers alleging the seller's
concealment of a defective roof:
Many factors must be considered in determining whether a statement
is a matter of fact or matter of opinion and whether or not plaintiff has a
right to rely on the statement. Among the facts the court will take into
consideration are the intelligence, education, business experience and
relative situation of the parties; the general information and experience of
the persons involved as to the nature and use of the property; the habits and
methods of those in the industry or profession involved; the opportunity for
both parties to make an independent investigation as well as the nature,
extent, and result of any investigation so made; and any contract the parties
knowingly and understandingly entered into. . . . "A recipient of a
fraudulent misrepresentation is justified in relying upon its truth without
investigation, unless he knows or has reason to know of facts which make
his reliance unreasonable" . . . IThe test is whether the recipient has
"information which would serve as a danger signal and a red light to any
normal person of his intelligence and experience."
Id. at 208 (quoting from, inter alia,Restatement (Second) of Torts § 540 and comments thereto).
481. Hauter v. Zogarts, 534 P.2d 377, 379 (Cal. 1975).
482. Klages v. General Ordnance Equip. Corp., 367 A.2d 304, 306 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976).
483. See Small, 679 N.Y.S.2d at 600; Gawloski, 644 N.E.2d at 736; Smith v. AnheuserBusch, Inc., 599 A.2d 320 (R.I. 1991). Cf. Hill v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 44 F. Supp. 2d
837, 845-46 (W.D. Ky. 1999). In Hill the defendant moved to dismiss the fraud claim on
grounds that the dangers of smoking were common knowledge. The court denied the motion.
Common knowledge is no defense to fraud, and it applies thereto, "if at all, by undermining
proof of justified reliance upon misinformation" which the fact-finder should compare to the
"convincingness" of the misrepresentation. While common knowledge does not "automatically
negate thejustifiability of reliance," it "introduces a powerful argument against reasonableness"
which is more appropriately considered on a motion for summary judgment than on a motion
to dismiss. Id. at 846.
484. See 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILrTY, supra note 8, § 3:2, at 89.
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"objective" determination. 4 In cases involving the intentional tort of fraud,
however, the standard differs from the normal objective standard of a
reasonable prudent person, since the gullibility or other fault of a person in
believing such a misrepresentation cannot in fairness bar a claim against an
intentional deceiver who deliberately and shamelessly exploits a person's
trust. 4 In such cases "[j]ustification is a matter of the qualities and
characteristics of the particular plaintiff, and the circumstances of the
particular case, rather than of the application of a community standard of
conduct to all cases." 48' Normally, a person may justifiably rely upon a
fraudulent misstatement unless the falsity of the representation is so clear,
based on the known or obvious facts, as to place in doubt the person's own
truthfulness, or possibly even sanity, in claiming to have relied upon it. 488 In
reality, tailoring the justifiability criteria to the plaintiff's specific
characteristics makes the standard look suspiciously subjective, 4 9 such that
it might be best if the courts in fraud cases would abandon pounding and
twisting the justifiability standard into an "objective" hole in which it does
not fit.

485. See, e.g., Gawloski, 644 N.E.2d at 736. See generally PROSSER & KEETON ON
TORTS, supra note 50, § 108, at 750 (arguing that purpose of justifiable reliance requirement is
for "providing some objective corroborations to plaintiff's claim that he did rely").
486. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 545A (1972) ("One who justifiably relies
upon a fraudulent misrepresentation is not barred from recovery by his contributory negligence
in doing so."). "Although the plaintiff's reliance on the misrepresentation must be
justifiable . . . this does not mean that his conduct must conform to the standard of the
reasonable man." Id. cmt. b. This is the prevailing rule, but there is authority to the contrary.
See generally 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud& Deceit § 249 (1968).
487. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 545A cmt. b. Not unlike the child standard of
care in the law of negligence, the standard of justifiability for fraud is often said to conform to
the particular attributes of the plaintiff, including his or her age, intelligence, experience, and
mental and physical condition. See Cheney Bros. v. Batesville Casket Co., 47 F.3d 111, 115
(4th Cir. 1995) (applying South Carolina law).
488. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 50, § 108:
Rather than contributory negligence, the matter seems to turn upon
an individual standard of the plaintiff's own capacity and the knowledge
which he has, or which may fairly be charged against him from the facts
within his observation in the light of his individual case, and so comes
closer to the rules which are associated with assumption of risk. "More
succinctly stated, the rule is that one cannot be heard to say he relied upon
a statement so patently ridiculous as to be unbelievable on its face, unless
he happens to be that special object of the affections of a court of Equity,
an idiot."
Id. at 751 (quoting Obiter Dicta, 25 FORD. L. REv. 395, 397 (1956)). Cf. AMPAT/Midwest,
Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works Inc., 896 F.2d 1035, 1041-42 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying Illinois law)
(Posner, J.), overruledon other grounds by Roboserve, Inc. v. Kato Kaga Ku Co., 78 F.3d 266
(1 th Cir. 1996). Judge Posner stated:
We think it comes down to this: while the victim of an ordinary accident
is required to use the ordinary care of an average person [to avoid being
contributorily negligent] ... the victim ofa deliberate fraud is barred only
if he has notice of the fraud, and so he need only avoid deliberate or
reckless risk-taking.
Id. at 1041. Thus, a fraud victim "cannot close his eyes to a known risk," for that would be to
"ignore a manifest danger," which would be reckless. Id. at 1042.
489. So, justifiability might be said to lie closer to assumption of risk than it does to
contributory negligence. See AMPAT/Midwest, Inc., 896 F.2d at 1042 ("It differs by only a
shade, if that, from... assumption of risk that defeats liability under the first aspect of the duty
of reasonable reliance as we conceive it."); PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 50,
§ 108.
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The justifiability requirement is not designed to provide a shield behind
which wicked fraudfeasors may hide in order to exploit the gullibility of
trusting victims, for the law seeks the opposite result.4 Instead, justifiability
overlaps and serves as a useful check on other components of a fraud claim:
whether the representation was factual, or merely opinion; whether it was
material, or actually quite trivial; whether the plaintiff was ignorant of the
falsity of the representation, or truly knew (or at least suspected) that it might
be false; and, ultimately, whether the plaintiff in fact relied upon the
representation in making a decision to buy or use the product. 91 Even in
fraud cases, therefore, the justifiability requirement serves this important
validation function of helping weed out claims where the plaintiff unfairly
seeks to hold the defendant liable for harm caused principally by the
plaintiff's bad judgement rather than any false statement the defendant may
have made. 4' 9
In claims for merely negligent misrepresentation, the standard of conduct
for the plaintiff reverts to the normal objective standard of reasonable
behavior for a person exercising due regard for his or her own welfare. 4" As
for strict liability claims for misrepresentation, the case law is very sparse,
but most courts would probably agree that the justifiability of a plaintiff's
reliance upon a manufacturer's innocent misrepresentation "involves an
objective standard" based upon whether a "reasonable consumer" could rely
on the particular representations in dispute."

§ 108, at 751 (citations omitted):
The design of the law is to protect the weak and credulous from the wiles
and stratagems of the artful and cunning, as well as those whose vigilance
and security enable them to protect themselves, [and] no rogue should
enjoy his ill-gotten plunder for the simple reason that his victim is by
chance a fool.

490. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supranote 50,

Id.
491. See, e.g., AMPAT/Midwest, Inc., 896 F.2d at 1042 ("The requirement ofjustifiable
reliance backstops the jury's determination of actual reliance."). Justifiable reliance is
conventionally used as an umbrella concept that includes the elements of materiality and fact.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 cmt. b; PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note
50, §§ 108, 109. See generally DOBBS, supra note 314, § 474, at 1360-61.
492. See 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LlABILrrY, supra note 8, § 3:2, at 90.
493. See, e.g., Mainline Tractor& Equip. Co. v. Nutrite Corp., 937 F. Supp. 1095, 1105
(D. Vt. 1996) (applying Vermont law and holding justifiability of reliance based on objective
standard); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552A cmt. b (stating that "[t]he recipient of a
negligent misrepresentation is barred from recovery for pecuniary loss suffered in reliance upon
it if he is negligent in so relying," but noting that comparative fault may be applicable to claims
involving physical harm).
494. Gawloski v. Miller Brewing Co., 644 N.E.2d 731, 736 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that any reliance on commercials not justifiable as a matter of law when prison inmates
sued Miller for causing their alcoholism that led to lives of crime, on ground that commercials
misrepresented Miller beer as "an enhancer of the quality of life"); see also Am. Safety Equip.
Corp. v. Winkler, 640 P.2d 216, 223 (Colo. 1982) (4-3 decision) ("Justifiable reliance
contemplates the reasonable exercise of knowledge and intelligence in assessing the represented
facts. Unsupportable subjective reliance is inadequate.").
Commentj to Restatement (Second) ofTorts § 402B (on justifiable reliance) provides scant
assistance in discerning the standard for assessing justifiability in the strict liability context.
However, comment g suggests an objective standard: "mhe fact misrepresented must be a
material one, of importance to the normal purchaser, by which the ultimate buyer may justifiably
be expected to be influenced in buying the chattel."
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C. Contributoryand ComparativeNegligence, Assumption ofRisk, and
Misuse
If a plaintiff is justified in relying upon a tortious misrepresentation, there
may well be no room for the conventional misconduct defenses to operate.
To put the matter another way, the defenses of contributory negligence,
assumption of risk, and misuse all logically appear to be absorbed into the
requirement that a plaintiff establish the justifiability of his or her reliance
upon the defendant's representation.
An example may help to illustrate this point. Assume that a plaintiff
purchases a "Golfing Gizmo," a golfers' training device consisting of two
metal pegs, two cords_(one cotton and one elastic), and a golf ball attached
to the cotton cord. 4' The purpose of the device, described by the
manufacturer as "completely safe-ball will not hit player," is to return the
ball to the golfer, via the elastic cord, after it is hit. If the player sets up the
Gizmo device ten feet in front of a brick wall and squarely hits the ball
against the wall, the ball might well bounce back and hit the golfer in the
head. Using the Gizmo in such an obviously dangerous manner is clearly
unreasonable, hence contributorily negligent, and the golfer would appear
quite plainly to have assumed the risk. Similarly, if the golfer were to strike
the ball with a sledge hammer rather than a golf club, shattering the ball
which injured his eye, or if the golfer were injured in a fall when the cord
broke as he used it to climb a tree, such unforeseeable misuse should bar
recovery. But in each of these situations, the golfer's injuries could not
conceivably be said to result from a justifiable reliance on the manufacturer's
safety representation." In short, the justifiable reliance element of tortious
misrepresentation claims appears to embrace and so supplant the traditional
forms of user misconduct defense.
Over centuries of fraud cases, the courts developed a substantial body of
doctrine concerning the misconduct of the representee, largely in cases
involving pecuniary loss and mostly involving the effect of a plaintiff's
contributory negligence. Although many decisions have required plaintiffs
engaged in business transactions to maintain a reasonable4 vigilance for their
widely
own protection, even from fraudulent misrepresentation, the cases
hold that "contributory negligence" as such is no defense to fraud.498 The rule

495. This was the product in fact involved inHauterv.Zogarts, 534 P.2d 377 (Cal. 1975),
an early, prominent case decided under § 402B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
496. See Sales, supranote 461, at 271. It would also appear to fail on falsity, in that a fair
interpretation of the safety representation includes an implicit limitation that the Gizmos be used
in a manner that is not patently dangerous.
497. See, e.g., Cheney Bros. v. Batesville Casket Co., 47 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 1995)
(applying South Carolina law and noting the established "'duty on the part of the representee to
use some measure of protection and precaution to safeguard his interest'" (quoting Thomas v.
Am. Workmen, 197 S.C. 178, 182, 14 S.E.2d 886, 887-88 (S.C. 1941))).
498. "That a more cautious buyer might not have relied, might have smelled a rat, does
not defeat liability. There is no defense of contributory negligence to an intentional tort,
including fraud." AMPAT/Midwest, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works Inc., 896 F.2d 1035, 1041 (7th
Cir. 1990) (applying Illinois law) (Posner, J.). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFToRTS
§ 545A. Although § 545A by its terms applies to recovery for pecuniary loss, it is incorporated
by reference into the Restatement's fraud section governing liability for physical harm. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 557A cmt. a; 37 AM JUR 2D Fraud& Deceit § 247, at 329
(1968) (noting the conflicting policies of suppressing fraud, on the one hand, while not
encouraging the neglect of one's own interests, on the other, and observing that the law has
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is said to be different for claims of negligent misrepresentation, where
contributory negligence is conventionally said to bar the claim. 4 Yet, here
as well, these cases have mostly involved business transactions involving
pecuniary loss, 5" and there is little case law on whether the contributory
negligence defense is applicable to products liability misrepresentation cases
involving physical harm.
For claims of strict products liability for misrepresentation, as set forth
in Section 402B of the Second Restatement and Section 9 of the Third
Restatement, the effect of a plaintiff's contributory negligence is unclear.
Commentj to Section 402B, which explicitly addresses justifiable reliance,
provides scant assistance in discerning the meaning of justifiability in the
strict liability context; it merely mentions that justifiability is a requirement
and references the Second Restatement sections on justifiable reliance for
fraud, "so far as they are pertinent," including the provision that contributory
negligence does not bar liability."' There is little value in such dated, offhand
treatment of important doctrine, and the ThirdRestatementaddresses the issue
even less."tr While some isolated case law involving strict liability claims
suggests that contributory negligence should not serve as a defense, the
authority is old and not entirely on point. 3 Thus, whether a plaintiff's
contributory negligence should play some role in strict products liability
claims for tortious misrepresentation, or whether contributory negligence is
exclusively absorbed into the issue of the justifiability of the plaintiff's
reliance, remains a problem to be solved. Surely the most appropriate
resolution of this issue, as discussed above, is to view contributory
negligence, in all forms of tortious misrepresentation cases, as merged
entirely into the justifiability of reliance.
But contributory negligence has been resurrected in recent years in the
guise of comparative fault, and so some courts may feel obligated to consider
whether and, if so, how the comparative fault doctrine may affect claims for
tortious misrepresentation. This issue has received little consideration from
either courts or commentators."
In cases involving intentional
misrepresentation, the comparative fault doctrine is widely viewed to be

opted to protect not only the vigilant but also the gullible "against the machinations of the
designedly wicked").
499. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552A (1977).
500. See id. The principal Restatement section on negligent misrepresentation involving
risk of physical harm, § 311, addresses the plaintiff misconduct issue only in terms of the
reasonableness of the plaintiff's reliance. See id. § 311 cmt. c.
501. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 545A (1977).
502. In short, because of the brevity of explicit discussion ofjustifiability in either Section
402B of the Second Restatement or Section 9 of the Third Restatement, neither Restatement
provides a basis for determining whether, in addition to the justifiable reliance element, the
doctrine of strict products liability in tort for misrepresentation may be barred, or damages
reduced, on the ground of a plaintiff's contributory negligence.
503. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 50, § 108, at 750 n.10.
504. The commentary includes a couple of suggestions that comparative fault principles
might be applied to negligent misrepresentation claims. See DOBBS, supra note 314, at 1359-60;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 552A cmt. b (1977). Contra Massey, supra note 461, at
190. But such observations probably spring from a desire to reduce the harshness of contributory
negligence serving as a total bar, rather than to provide misrepresenters a second bite at the
misconduct apple.
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inapplicable' for the same reasons of fairness and policy that properly
preclude the use of contributory negligence as a bar to fraud recovery
discussed above. In negligent misrepresentation cases involving pecuniary
loss outside the realm of products liability, the few cases are split, but the
better view appears to be that comparative fault should not apply here
either.6 No case has been found applying comparative fault to cases
involving strict products liability for misrepresentation under Section 402B
of the Second Restatement or its Third Restatement counterpart. Surely
comparative fault is inappropriate for strict liability claims where the very
idea of a buyer's negligence in relying justifiably upon a manufacturer's
product safety representations is a concept that is difficult to grasp.
Because a plaintiff must prove the justifiability of his or her reliance for
any tortious misrepresentation claim, the traditional products liability
misconduct defenses are simply out of place. Of the few decisions that have
addressed this issue, the better reasoned ones have exhibited little tolerance
for attempts by defense lawyers to get two bites at the misconduct apple by
arguing, first, that the plaintiff's reliance upon the representation was
unjustified, and, second, that, even if the reliance in fact was justified, the
plaintiff was negligent, assumed the risk, or misused the product.' r These
decisions persuasively conclude that the justifiability (or reasonableness) of
a plaintiff's reliance encompasses all forms of plaintiff misconduct addressed
by the traditional misconduct defenses. 508 If a statute does not compel a
contrary result,' little would be lost except confusion if the courts would
clearly hold that none of the traditional misconduct defenses apply to common
law tortious misrepresentation claims in products liability litigation.

505. Woors & DE

RE,

supra note 5, § 14:51, at 396 ("It is probably safe to say that

comparative negligence will not apply in deceit cases except in the 'comparative fault'
jurisdictions of Arkansas, Maine, and New York."). See generally Allan L. Schwartz,

Annotation, Applicabilityof ComparativeNegligencePrinciplesTo IntentionalTorts, 18 A.L.R.

5th 525 (1994) (discussing applicability of comparative negligence to intentional tort actions).
506. See, e.g., Estate of Braswell v. People's Credit Union, 602 A.2d 510, 515 (R.I.
1992); Greyeas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1566 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying Illinois law);
Condor Enter., Inc. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 856 P.2d 713, 716 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). See

generally Sonja Larsen, Annotation, Applicability of Comparative Negligence Doctrine to

Actions Based on Negligent Misrepresentation, 22 A.L.R. 5th 464 (1994) (discussing
applicability of comparative negligence to negligent misrepresentation actions).
507. See, e.g., Klages v. General Ordnance Equip. Corp., 367 A.2d 304, 313 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1976) ("[The lower court fully charged the jury regarding justifiable reliance, and that
instruction encompassed appellant's claim of assumption of the risk.. . . "); Schwabe v. Porter,
92-1250-FT, 1993 WL 48173, *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1993) (holding that a plaintiff's
recovery cannot be reduced according to plaintiff's comparative fault).
508. Not all courts or commentators entirely agree. See Nugent v. Utica Cutlery Co., 636
S.W.2d 805, 809-10 (Tex. App. 1982) (allowing misuse defense in defense of § 402B claim);
Daye v. General Motors Corp., 720 So. 2d 654, 660 (La. 1998) (holding that sole cause of
accident was driver's negligent driving, not defendant's advertising). See generally Sales, supra
note 461, at 269-77 (acknowledging that the justifiability of reliance requirement fully embraces
the assumption of risk defense, but arguing that misuse and comparative fault should be allowed
as independent defenses); Massey, supra note 461, at 190 (arguing that assumption of risk and
contributory and comparative negligence should not be defenses, but misuse should).
509. At least one state, Connecticut, has a products liability statute (1) providing that
misrepresentation is a products liability claim, and (2) specifying misconduct defenses that apply
generally to such claims. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-5721, m(b), & o (West 1991 & Supp. 2000).
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CONCLUSION

In using products, consumers must exercise a variety of choices and
physical skills. The human brain is quite imperfect, and consumers frequently
are distracted, uninformed, clumsy, hasty, or adventurous when putting their
products to use. If a consumer's choices or skills in using a product are faulty
in some respect, a product accident may result.
Product accidents normally do not give rise to products liability claims
because most such accidents result solely from the consumer's faulty
judgment or behavior.5 0 But accidents sometimes are caused at least in part
because a product is defective or because a consumer relies upon a supplier's
false assertion about a product's safety or performance. When product
accidents do result from some combination of product defect (or false
assertion) and a consumer's faulty conduct, one or more user misconduct
defenses normally serve to bar recovery or reduce the user's damages. As
examined throughout this Article, the products liability law on user
misconduct defenses is extensive and in some respects complex. Because
consumer misbehavior in some form often figures prominently in products
liability litigation, a thorough understanding of the user misconduct defenses
is essential to lawyers handling such cases.

510. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

